Another new ACW blog, launched this month:
http://civilwargazette.wordpress.com/
11/10/2006
Immediate advance or more preparation?
One Michael Patrick Leahy has launched a new blog about getting a Civil War novel published. He put his synopsis online and it starts,
Fort Desperate follows the lives of three men and their wives from 1846 to 1863. The men are central players in the Civil War campaign to control New Orleans and the Mississippi River Valley.
That opening is dead. It does not pique the least interest and Leahy should not expect to hear from the lit agents to whom he sent this. Suggestion:
Fort Desperate is an historical novel which will appeal to two major markets at once: Romance novel readers and the Civil War fiction buyers. It combines the plotting and character elements that have won so much success for Carmen Smith's Woman in a Ripped Bodice series while stoking Civil War readers' love of gore, derring-do, and over-the-top melodrama.
Oh no, you say. This is a synopsis not a cover letter, you say.
My friends, cover letters get misplaced and as the estimables in a Mamet play have been made to say, "Always be selling." Our author blogs tellingly :
Did I send it off to Ms. Vater before it was ready ?
Yes.
So why did I do that ? Why didn't I spend a day making the synopsis so good it would make Ms. Vater cry for Felicie and Andre ?
Because I wanted forward movement.
Michael Patrick Leahy has McDowelled himself!
Catching up to Jeff Davis
John Robb's Global Guerillas blog presents the next wave of Boydian analysis at a level that does great credit to the foundations Col. John Boyd laid.
A new post, Global Guerillas in the UK, ties a couple of Robb's advanced "fifth generation of warfare" themes, open source warfare and networked guerillas, to news from Britain.
For the advanced Civil War reader these concepts might evoke Jefferson Davis's May of 1865 plans for continuing the war.
When Britain's chief of MI5 says, "my officers and the police are working to contend with some 200 groupings or [guerilla] networks," and characterizes them as "resilient networks," we are immediately reminded of Winik's argument that Davis envisioned networks sustaining a small Continentals-style CSA field army that would travel the South striking at fixed Union positions, property, and collaborators until Northern will collapsed.
The "open source" part of Rebel warfare of late 1865, then, might take the form of bands of men capable of organizing new, temporary militia units ("flash mobs"?) based on opportunity and local conditions in parallel with the sustained effort of Davis's small band of "Continentals."
The war ended under the only terms it could: the physical apprehension of Jeff Davis. Even that was not final because members of his government (Kirby Smith among them) were determined to continue the fight. Happenstance precluded Davis's "fourth generation" warfare experiment.
As I have said many times in this space, the Army we have today is "second generation" - a Civil War institution overwhelmingly concerned with synchronization, alignment, hierarchy, direction, control. Actually, I said it better in an earlier post: it is a system committed to "alignment, synchronicity, spatial management, and the micromanagement of undertrained subordinates," and all new technology is put at the service of these values. In that same post we saw John J. Pershing proposing a third generation alternative: "Open warfare had irregular formations, comparatively little regulation of space and time, and the greatest possible use of the infantry's own firepower to enable it to "get forward ... [with] brief orders" and "the greatest possible use of individual initiative."
Despite Davis and later Pershing, we see yet another Armistice Day with the same ancient "second generation" values holding sway in our armed forces.
A new post, Global Guerillas in the UK, ties a couple of Robb's advanced "fifth generation of warfare" themes, open source warfare and networked guerillas, to news from Britain.
For the advanced Civil War reader these concepts might evoke Jefferson Davis's May of 1865 plans for continuing the war.
When Britain's chief of MI5 says, "my officers and the police are working to contend with some 200 groupings or [guerilla] networks," and characterizes them as "resilient networks," we are immediately reminded of Winik's argument that Davis envisioned networks sustaining a small Continentals-style CSA field army that would travel the South striking at fixed Union positions, property, and collaborators until Northern will collapsed.
The "open source" part of Rebel warfare of late 1865, then, might take the form of bands of men capable of organizing new, temporary militia units ("flash mobs"?) based on opportunity and local conditions in parallel with the sustained effort of Davis's small band of "Continentals."
The war ended under the only terms it could: the physical apprehension of Jeff Davis. Even that was not final because members of his government (Kirby Smith among them) were determined to continue the fight. Happenstance precluded Davis's "fourth generation" warfare experiment.
As I have said many times in this space, the Army we have today is "second generation" - a Civil War institution overwhelmingly concerned with synchronization, alignment, hierarchy, direction, control. Actually, I said it better in an earlier post: it is a system committed to "alignment, synchronicity, spatial management, and the micromanagement of undertrained subordinates," and all new technology is put at the service of these values. In that same post we saw John J. Pershing proposing a third generation alternative: "Open warfare had irregular formations, comparatively little regulation of space and time, and the greatest possible use of the infantry's own firepower to enable it to "get forward ... [with] brief orders" and "the greatest possible use of individual initiative."
Despite Davis and later Pershing, we see yet another Armistice Day with the same ancient "second generation" values holding sway in our armed forces.
Armistice day tomorrow
Even when it's over, it's not over.
Pershing (b. 1860) later told Congress that he could not know what the Armistice foretold, whether it would stick. He also said it was bogus.
(See Wasted Lives on Armistice Day.)On November 11, 1918, Armistice Day, the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) on the Western Front in France suffered more than thirty-five hundred casualties, although it had been known unofficially for two days that the fighting would end that day and known with absolute certainty as of 5 o'clock that morning that it would end at 11 a.m.
Pershing (b. 1860) later told Congress that he could not know what the Armistice foretold, whether it would stick. He also said it was bogus.
To Pershing the very idea of an armistice was repugnant. "Their request is an acknowledgment of weakness and clearly means that the Allies are winning the war," he maintained. "Germany's desire is only to regain time to restore order among her forces, but she must be given no opportunity to recuperate and we must strike harder than ever." As for terms, Pershing had one response: "There can be no conclusion to this war until Germany is brought to her knees."
11/09/2006
Kearny and life
It has often struck me that the one thing we carry away from infantry service, whether officer or enlisted, regular or reservist, is the continuous, absolute judgement of the character of colleagues: "Do I want to be in a foxhole with this person?"It subsides over the decades but it never goes away. It's contrary to Christian teaching but it never goes away. It can work against one's own best interests but it never goes away.
I was therefore delighted to find this Phil Kearny quote in Beatie's Volume III of the Army of the Potomac, an instruction to his leaders:
Estimate the laggard, brand the coward, and direct the brave.Indeed.
Highlights from the Gettysburg Address (aftermath)
I should be glad, if I could flatter myself that I came as near the central idea of the occasion in two hours, as you [Lincoln] did in two minutes. - Edward Everett
11/08/2006
Highlights from the Gettysburg Address
As my eye ranges over the fields whose sods were so lately moistened by the blood of gallant and loyal men, I feel, as never before, how truly it was said of old that it is sweet and becoming to die for one's country...
And now, friends, fellow-citizens, as we stand among these honored graves, the momentous question presents itself, Which of the two parties to the war is responsible for all this suffering, for this dreadful sacrifice of life, — the lawful and constituted government of the United States, or the ambitious men who have rebelled against it?
... can it need a serious argument to prove that there can be no State right to enter into a new confederation reserved under a Constitution which expressly prohibits a State to "enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation," or any "agreement or compact with another State or a foreign power"?
The people of loyal America will never ask you, sir, to take to your confidence or admit again to a share in the government the hard-hearted men whose cruel lust of power has brought this desolating war upon the land, but there is no personal bitterness felt even against them. They may live, if they can bear to live after wantonly causing the death of so many thousands of their fellow-men; they may live in safe obscurity beneath the shelter of the government they have sought to overthrow, or they may fly to the protection of the governments of Europe...
But the hour is coming and now is, when the power of the leaders of the Rebellion to delude and inflame must cease. There is no bitterness on the part of the masses. The people of the South are not going to wage an eternal war for the wretched pretexts by which this rebellion is sought to be justified.
... these bonds of union are of perennial force and energy, while the causes of alienation are imaginary, factitious, and transient. The heart of the People, North and South, is for the Union.
You now feel it a new bond of union, that they shall lie side by side, till a clarion, louder than that which marshalled them to the combat, shall awake their slumbers. God bless the Union; — it is dearer to us for the blood of brave men which has been shed in its defence.
... wheresoever throughout the civilized world the accounts of this great warfare are read, and down to the latest period of recorded time, in the glorious annals of our common country there will be no brighter page than that which relates THE BATTLES OF GETTYSBURG.
From Edward Everett, "Gettysburg Oration," 19 November 1863
And now, friends, fellow-citizens, as we stand among these honored graves, the momentous question presents itself, Which of the two parties to the war is responsible for all this suffering, for this dreadful sacrifice of life, — the lawful and constituted government of the United States, or the ambitious men who have rebelled against it?
... can it need a serious argument to prove that there can be no State right to enter into a new confederation reserved under a Constitution which expressly prohibits a State to "enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation," or any "agreement or compact with another State or a foreign power"?
The people of loyal America will never ask you, sir, to take to your confidence or admit again to a share in the government the hard-hearted men whose cruel lust of power has brought this desolating war upon the land, but there is no personal bitterness felt even against them. They may live, if they can bear to live after wantonly causing the death of so many thousands of their fellow-men; they may live in safe obscurity beneath the shelter of the government they have sought to overthrow, or they may fly to the protection of the governments of Europe...
But the hour is coming and now is, when the power of the leaders of the Rebellion to delude and inflame must cease. There is no bitterness on the part of the masses. The people of the South are not going to wage an eternal war for the wretched pretexts by which this rebellion is sought to be justified.
... these bonds of union are of perennial force and energy, while the causes of alienation are imaginary, factitious, and transient. The heart of the People, North and South, is for the Union.
You now feel it a new bond of union, that they shall lie side by side, till a clarion, louder than that which marshalled them to the combat, shall awake their slumbers. God bless the Union; — it is dearer to us for the blood of brave men which has been shed in its defence.
... wheresoever throughout the civilized world the accounts of this great warfare are read, and down to the latest period of recorded time, in the glorious annals of our common country there will be no brighter page than that which relates THE BATTLES OF GETTYSBURG.
From Edward Everett, "Gettysburg Oration," 19 November 1863
11/07/2006
Civil War Book News is relocating
I am a little distracted with the folderol of moving Civil War Bookshelf to a new website (not yet active) called civilwarbookshelf.com ... and so posting here has been light.
Good-bye and good riddance to to cw-book-news, a terrible URL concocted in 1997 as the concluding element on a string that ran www.hopewellagency.com/cw-book-news. Some years later I moved it to cw-book-news.com, thinking that was a better URL.
Here's the joke. Dead websites with a lot of inbound links make money for businesses that reregister them with no content but lots of ads. The Tucows empire snapped up my Hopewell Agency URL and has been making money from it ever since. It will be interesting to see who grabs cw-book-news.com.
The Web is a strange place.
Good-bye and good riddance to to cw-book-news, a terrible URL concocted in 1997 as the concluding element on a string that ran www.hopewellagency.com/cw-book-news. Some years later I moved it to cw-book-news.com, thinking that was a better URL.
Here's the joke. Dead websites with a lot of inbound links make money for businesses that reregister them with no content but lots of ads. The Tucows empire snapped up my Hopewell Agency URL and has been making money from it ever since. It will be interesting to see who grabs cw-book-news.com.
The Web is a strange place.
McPherson's editor has died
James McPherson's editor at Oxford University Press died last month. The Daily Princetonian had a better obit than the wires but the New York Sun had the best coverage of all.
One hopes he had nothing to do with that preposterous picture book issued in 2003.
(Note: this post was put up earlier in the day but Blogger did not publish it. If it shows twice later, I'll delete this repost.)
One hopes he had nothing to do with that preposterous picture book issued in 2003.
(Note: this post was put up earlier in the day but Blogger did not publish it. If it shows twice later, I'll delete this repost.)
Where Blamey is due
Down Under, one member of parliament can accuse another of being a "McClellan" - and listeners there know (or think they know) what that means . Amazing.
Why not honor accuracy and locality by labeling someone a Blamey or a Rowell instead?
Why not honor accuracy and locality by labeling someone a Blamey or a Rowell instead?
11/06/2006
That Civil War reality show...
It's no joke. Winner collects $1 million in gold.
Competitions for the Sabers and Roses contestants will be based on tasks relevant to the Civil War era. Challenges for the men include loading and firing a musket three times in one minute, firing a cannon towards a target, riding a horse into battle, marching long distances barefoot and sabotaging an enemy camp.
Harry's new blog
Harry Smeltzer has started a blog about the first Bull Run.
He's not messing around with Blogger, either, having gone to the more sophisticated publishing WordPress system. Two things we can expect, I think, once he gets a grip on the technology: lots of ACW content (an intense ACW focus) and lots of sharing from his voluminous research.
Congratulations, Harry!
He's not messing around with Blogger, either, having gone to the more sophisticated publishing WordPress system. Two things we can expect, I think, once he gets a grip on the technology: lots of ACW content (an intense ACW focus) and lots of sharing from his voluminous research.
Congratulations, Harry!
11/03/2006
These professionals are starting to get good
Donald B. Connelly is shaping up - with Ethan Rafuse - to be the most impressive military professional* active in Civil War history.
I have mentioned previously that Connelly, in this new book about John Schofield, ruptured the divide between political and military history in Civil War literature and established a new paradigm for this branch of nonfiction. A couple of more good deeds are worth mentioning.
Connelly is not only aware of Archer Jones' conclusion that you cannot destroy a Civil War army, he raises the issue repeatedly in dealing with the aftermath of Thomas vs. Hood at Nashville.
For the majority of readers locked into the concept of battles of annihilation, for those of the "lost opportunities" school of blame and anger, debunking annihilation hurts. It strikes at the very root of reading enjoyment.
I would occasionally, in days past, present the Jones view to a Civil War forum where the objection would be raised, "But what about Hood at Nashville." Connelly uses Hood at Nashville as that very example that tests and proves Jones' idea.
Are we through with this idea yet? Not as long as there are talespinners getting book contracts, but thanks to Connelly for bringing this essential point to a larger audience.
Connely is also on the job in identifying the source of the annihilation error. It is a Napoleonic idea, then current among newspapermen, Jomini readers, and politicians. It was a case of fighting the last war or even the one before that. He commends those generals, like Halleck, who (based on experience) abandoned it early on. He seems to regret that Schofield is not one of these.
Kin to the annihilation error is the less extravagant "decisive battle" doctrine. Connelly tags this as out-of-date as well and unusable in the Civil War context. Bravo. He deserves praise for gently chiding those generals who, in pursuit of the phantasmic "decisive battle" make the enemy army their object, an unlikely objective in 1861-1865 and a mark of professional innocence and inexperience.
Schofield was down on McClellan for what he perceived to be McClellan's Richmond fixation. In fact, McClellan was selecting sore bunions - like Richmond - to step on such that the foe had to stand and fight offensively against a superior Union defense ... quite the radical modification of Schofield's (and Lincoln's) quaint Bonapartism.
This last (Mac) point was beyond the scope of Connelly's analysis but is worth mentioning.
Even two years ago I despaired of Civil War authors assimilating Jones' analysis. Times are changing so fast.
*I mean by "military professional" an historian who teaches history to the military, not necessarily one wearing the uniform.
Donald B. Connelly is associate professor of joint and multinational operations at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. A retired U.S. Army military intelligence officer, he has also served as historian at U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.The general run of people writing history for military instruction is awful, recapping insights swiped from the worst kind of pop history. It was a disgusting brew of sentiment and instinct served to me way back when and it is still laughable now. (See here.)
I have mentioned previously that Connelly, in this new book about John Schofield, ruptured the divide between political and military history in Civil War literature and established a new paradigm for this branch of nonfiction. A couple of more good deeds are worth mentioning.
Connelly is not only aware of Archer Jones' conclusion that you cannot destroy a Civil War army, he raises the issue repeatedly in dealing with the aftermath of Thomas vs. Hood at Nashville.
For the majority of readers locked into the concept of battles of annihilation, for those of the "lost opportunities" school of blame and anger, debunking annihilation hurts. It strikes at the very root of reading enjoyment.
I would occasionally, in days past, present the Jones view to a Civil War forum where the objection would be raised, "But what about Hood at Nashville." Connelly uses Hood at Nashville as that very example that tests and proves Jones' idea.
Are we through with this idea yet? Not as long as there are talespinners getting book contracts, but thanks to Connelly for bringing this essential point to a larger audience.
Connely is also on the job in identifying the source of the annihilation error. It is a Napoleonic idea, then current among newspapermen, Jomini readers, and politicians. It was a case of fighting the last war or even the one before that. He commends those generals, like Halleck, who (based on experience) abandoned it early on. He seems to regret that Schofield is not one of these.
Kin to the annihilation error is the less extravagant "decisive battle" doctrine. Connelly tags this as out-of-date as well and unusable in the Civil War context. Bravo. He deserves praise for gently chiding those generals who, in pursuit of the phantasmic "decisive battle" make the enemy army their object, an unlikely objective in 1861-1865 and a mark of professional innocence and inexperience.
Schofield was down on McClellan for what he perceived to be McClellan's Richmond fixation. In fact, McClellan was selecting sore bunions - like Richmond - to step on such that the foe had to stand and fight offensively against a superior Union defense ... quite the radical modification of Schofield's (and Lincoln's) quaint Bonapartism.
This last (Mac) point was beyond the scope of Connelly's analysis but is worth mentioning.
Even two years ago I despaired of Civil War authors assimilating Jones' analysis. Times are changing so fast.
*I mean by "military professional" an historian who teaches history to the military, not necessarily one wearing the uniform.
Army of the Potomac: McClellan's First Campaign
Thanks to Savas Beatie, I have a reading copy of this Volume 3 of the Army of the Potomac series. Weighing in at a healthy 708 pages (pre-index), it looks like a great read. I note a publication date of February now ... looks like a delay from December, which is what the online booksellers were listing.
Nice blurb from Ethan Rafuse. Seems to come from a review of Vol 2: "Like the first volume in this series, this study is distinguished by a research effort in primary sources that is impressive beyond words..." I think that sums it up in a nutshell. There is a "wow" factor on nearly every page of every volume if you are a deep reader and have gone through the underlying sources yourself. There are times when I will simply sit and read the bibliography and sources information for an hour or so.
Rafuse continues, "What seems beyond debate is that by the time Beatie is done with the landmark multi-volume study, he will not only have provided Civil Warriors with an incredible mass of information, but with plenty of food for thought - and fuel for debate - as well."
I'll probably start posting on this volume with the topic that ends it - the Battle of Williamsburg. That may be my contribution to debate since I have never seen the battle analyzed to my liking (on the micro or macro level) in any account of the ACW; it will be fun to see how Beatie manages a matter that has stumped generations of ACW writers.
Nice blurb from Ethan Rafuse. Seems to come from a review of Vol 2: "Like the first volume in this series, this study is distinguished by a research effort in primary sources that is impressive beyond words..." I think that sums it up in a nutshell. There is a "wow" factor on nearly every page of every volume if you are a deep reader and have gone through the underlying sources yourself. There are times when I will simply sit and read the bibliography and sources information for an hour or so.
Rafuse continues, "What seems beyond debate is that by the time Beatie is done with the landmark multi-volume study, he will not only have provided Civil Warriors with an incredible mass of information, but with plenty of food for thought - and fuel for debate - as well."
I'll probably start posting on this volume with the topic that ends it - the Battle of Williamsburg. That may be my contribution to debate since I have never seen the battle analyzed to my liking (on the micro or macro level) in any account of the ACW; it will be fun to see how Beatie manages a matter that has stumped generations of ACW writers.
Shades of 1864!
The possibilities of soldiers voting - and tipping elections toward Republicans - is still controversial.
11/01/2006
The Republican National Committee in 1864
Thanks to the Wall Street Journal for informing me that New York Times' publisher Henry Raymond led the Republican National Committee in 1864 . I had previously said it was Edwin Morgan, ex-governor of New York (the third member of a power troika including Seward and Weed).
Most of what passes for Civil War history today simply repeats story lines developed in the Times 1861-1865.
So Morgan gave up his party chairmanship in 1864 and picked it up again in 1872. That could have been due to the weakening of the Weed machine :
("Union" here refers to a Republican front organization, a fusion party designed to split Democratic voters.)
Will report back on this Raymond-for-Morgan business.
Most of what passes for Civil War history today simply repeats story lines developed in the Times 1861-1865.
So Morgan gave up his party chairmanship in 1864 and picked it up again in 1872. That could have been due to the weakening of the Weed machine :
In 1862, Thurlow Weed tried to secure the New York State [party] gubernatorial nomination for [General John] Dix. He [Dix] lost the Union nomination to General James Wadsworth, whose views on slavery and the war were more radical.
("Union" here refers to a Republican front organization, a fusion party designed to split Democratic voters.)
Will report back on this Raymond-for-Morgan business.
Pale Fire indeed
I think it was in Nabokov's novel Pale Fire that the author joked about a novel that would tell the story of a family from the perspective of a tree growing in the backyard. The snatches of life that a tree might "hear" or "observe" would comprise the narrative thread.
It was a good spoof of naturalism in literature and it is one that Civil War author Tom Wheeler needs to read. He's written a history of the Union war effort from the perspective of a telegraph line. The joke's now on him.
It was a good spoof of naturalism in literature and it is one that Civil War author Tom Wheeler needs to read. He's written a history of the Union war effort from the perspective of a telegraph line. The joke's now on him.
10/31/2006
Sesquicentennial mysteries
Kevin Levin has started "Blogging the Sesquicentennial". It contains a grand total of one post mentioning the cypher at the head of this activity.
To repeat: the Sesquicentennial is an activity run by Rick Beard. In a blog covering the Sesquicentennial, he garners a one-time mention.
Kevin looks at a panel called "Planning for the Civil War Sesquicentennial" and tries to figure out if the panel members are "all involved in the project in some capacity." Another puzzle. He adds "There is no website for the project. My guess is that this session will begin the discussion of how to go about organizing events and other related projects."
Baffling.
And when you go to the website for Beard's day job, you see no mention of him in the last 27 days. No vision statement, no meet and greet, no nothing.
How ghostly. Booo!
Historians as numerologists: what Mac saw
I think most readers familiar with Fox and Livermore also know that by their careful tallies, McClellan fought every battle on the Peninsula outnumbered. This in itself should be interesting to readers of the “opportunities squandered” school of numerology, but it is only a fragment of a much worse picture for the Union.
It was McClellan’s assessment that the Rebels would mount a supreme effort to defend Richmond, which meant – as a minimum – the assignment of all available regional forces to his front. He could not conceive of the CSA doing otherwise and it is an anomaly of history that the concentration envisioned by McClellan and demanded by Johnston would be denied by Davis until Lee replaced Johnston at the very gates of the city.
Johnston himself calculated Lee’s strength in the Seven Days at 126,000 (Harsh so notes in Confederate Tide Rising). This obviously does not include the three militia regiments at Williamsburg we have previously mentioned, nor any emergency men, nor Richmond city militia, nor Carson's Division of Virginia Militia, nor any military formations outside the CSA “federal” field army structure – just Lee’s forces. We don’t know how many of those were effectives, but we know how many present for duty McClellan himself had based on the morning reports collected by the field surgeons and published in the Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion. He peaked in June with just over 78,000. From this number would be deducted the detachments, sick, skulkers, etc.
Johnston was good enough to break the Rebel figure down: 15,000 men from NC; 22,000 from SC and GA, 16,000 from the Valley (Jackson) totaling 53,000 reinforcements added to the 73,000 men Johnston said he had on 5/31/62. (Harsh says that later in life, Johnston changed his figuring. Wonder why.)
It is interesting to compare Johnston’s estimate with what Livermore counted in April 1862. Johnston’s Army of the Potomac = 110,000 excluding troops in the Acquia district. Ewell (apart) = 8,500. Valley District forces (Jackson) = 8,397. Huger in Norfolk = 15,143. The Department of North Carolina = 26,433. SC and GA = 40,000.
We have not counted Magruder behind his Warwick Line and yet we have reached 208,000 men in the field armies available to defend Richmond. We have not counted the state militias, reserves, home guards, etc. and we are over 208,000.
This is what McClellan saw while at the head of his 74,000 in May and his 78,000 in June.
Edwin C. Fishel, who died a bitter critic of both McClellan and Pinkerton, gives Pinkerton at least one compliment - one that is key to the entire business. He said that Pinkerton was extremely accurate in counting and identifying units in theatre: that the failure (in his opinion) came in assigning fill rates that were too high to those formations.
We have not gained in Rebel head counting much since Livermore but we have clarified the presence of Rebel units in theater and on the battlefield (which positions us to pass judgements on Pinkerton). It is time now for those Civil War historians who would let go of numerology to actually count those units as Pinkerton did and then consider their own reasonable fill rate. It will ruin their storylines but they would see Union commanders in an entirely new light.
Deal with unit counts and fill rates, with the Surgeons' history, with Fox and Livermore, and we are on our way out of the morass of made-up numbers that advance a literary purpose.
More in this in considering the Maryland Campaign.
It was McClellan’s assessment that the Rebels would mount a supreme effort to defend Richmond, which meant – as a minimum – the assignment of all available regional forces to his front. He could not conceive of the CSA doing otherwise and it is an anomaly of history that the concentration envisioned by McClellan and demanded by Johnston would be denied by Davis until Lee replaced Johnston at the very gates of the city.
Johnston himself calculated Lee’s strength in the Seven Days at 126,000 (Harsh so notes in Confederate Tide Rising). This obviously does not include the three militia regiments at Williamsburg we have previously mentioned, nor any emergency men, nor Richmond city militia, nor Carson's Division of Virginia Militia, nor any military formations outside the CSA “federal” field army structure – just Lee’s forces. We don’t know how many of those were effectives, but we know how many present for duty McClellan himself had based on the morning reports collected by the field surgeons and published in the Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion. He peaked in June with just over 78,000. From this number would be deducted the detachments, sick, skulkers, etc.
Johnston was good enough to break the Rebel figure down: 15,000 men from NC; 22,000 from SC and GA, 16,000 from the Valley (Jackson) totaling 53,000 reinforcements added to the 73,000 men Johnston said he had on 5/31/62. (Harsh says that later in life, Johnston changed his figuring. Wonder why.)
It is interesting to compare Johnston’s estimate with what Livermore counted in April 1862. Johnston’s Army of the Potomac = 110,000 excluding troops in the Acquia district. Ewell (apart) = 8,500. Valley District forces (Jackson) = 8,397. Huger in Norfolk = 15,143. The Department of North Carolina = 26,433. SC and GA = 40,000.
We have not counted Magruder behind his Warwick Line and yet we have reached 208,000 men in the field armies available to defend Richmond. We have not counted the state militias, reserves, home guards, etc. and we are over 208,000.
This is what McClellan saw while at the head of his 74,000 in May and his 78,000 in June.
Edwin C. Fishel, who died a bitter critic of both McClellan and Pinkerton, gives Pinkerton at least one compliment - one that is key to the entire business. He said that Pinkerton was extremely accurate in counting and identifying units in theatre: that the failure (in his opinion) came in assigning fill rates that were too high to those formations.
We have not gained in Rebel head counting much since Livermore but we have clarified the presence of Rebel units in theater and on the battlefield (which positions us to pass judgements on Pinkerton). It is time now for those Civil War historians who would let go of numerology to actually count those units as Pinkerton did and then consider their own reasonable fill rate. It will ruin their storylines but they would see Union commanders in an entirely new light.
Deal with unit counts and fill rates, with the Surgeons' history, with Fox and Livermore, and we are on our way out of the morass of made-up numbers that advance a literary purpose.
More in this in considering the Maryland Campaign.
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