Southern strategy in a nutshell

Atlantic blogger:

I don't want to overstate this, but I suspect going into the war, no small part of Southern secessionist ideology was built on the ability to kick ass, and that ability being decisive.

Civil War Navy Sesquicentennial

It's a new blog.

In pursuit of the MoH

How to have your ancestor awarded a Medal of Honor. (It helps to have Kent Masterson Brown write his bio.)

Juneteenth, 2010

Rather slim pickings, I think.

Carman reviews are coming

Sorry for the delays.

CSA vs USA intelligence: a problem shunned (2/4)

We have been considering the intelligence and counterintelligence disparity between North and South in the early to mid-war. It is a given, and every reader knows this, that McClellan felt deeply that his side was compromised by an effective Confederate espionage system. His counterintelligence methodology - to withhold information –is well known among ACW readers.

The historian deals with this by folding McClellan's beliefs and actions into a narrative of undue or inappropriate suspicion, and in extreme cases, paranoia. Some historians subject their readers to the shock treatment of showing McClellan withholding info from none other than Lincoln (gasp) - even though today such withholding from the president is routine and expected (it's called "need to know"). The deep reader may even remember Lincoln's pledge that he would not inquire into Grant's plans late in the war.

As I said earlier, however, Rebel foreknowledge of McClellan's plans (pre-Maryland) is validated in many Confederate letters and memoirs contemporary with those plans. In a new book, The Bravest of the Brave, the Rebel company-grade officer (and eventual general-to-be) Stephen Dodson Ramseur(right), has just passed into regimental command when he discusses McClellan's plans at a level of detail well worth comment.

Ramseur, having penned these insights into McClellan's grand strokes, makes me wonder, given the standard of Rebel intel, and given the dissemination of this information all the way down to Ramseur's level, whether the quoted text presents McClellan's plan in its fullest, most accurate form. In other words, has a Rebel given us the fuller story of GBM's first Richmond campaign?

Why ask?

Beatie says – it is worth considering this – that McClellan was truthful but that he took the truth only as far as it needed to go (after which your inferences could take over). I think I have that right.

A more neutral way to put this is that in his surviving post-war writings and comments, McClellan's representation of his own plans is stunted and usually (IMHO) to his own disadvantage.

Tim Reese spent a brilliant couple books on this, analyzing the commander's intent at South Mountain and Crampton's Gap. When you understand what McClellan was attempting in the battle of the gaps, Tim said, your jaw hits the floor. (Mine did.)

Likewise, Joseph Harsh's Maryland campaign books again show McClellan in a light where intentions, analysis and execution far exceed what GBM was interested in claiming for himself afterward. There are more examples of this but in our celebrity-starved culture, we wonder who would sell himself short and why?

I myself have tried to shed light on McClellan's second Richmond campaign in this blog, which I believe is at the root of Lee's and Mosby's identical postwar evaluations that McClellan "by all odds" (their words) was the best Union general.

Anyone reading GBM's papers is struck by the fact that after the war, he gave up the historiographical battle. After the fire destroyed his "secret history," he hung up his spurs. "Own Story" is not ultimately an exercise in self-advocacy although it is rich in criticism of political figures. GBM lost interest in the war and was never interested in defending himself other than in presenting what documentary evidence already pointed toward his intentions and actions.

I think McClellan felt it unseemly to go beyond the record to make claims about ultimate plans or schemes.

McClellan's postwar reticence looks extreme until compared to Lee's. I would not stoop to call Grant's or Sherman's memoirs "rationales " but they are babbling brooks compared to the still waters GBM left behind. McClellan did not elaborate much on his plans post-war.

There is a wonderful letter to the editor of a Philadelphia newspaper in the McClellan Papers. The writer, "Baldy" Smith was responding to a McClellan obituary. At this point in his life, Gen. Smith, portrayed by historians as a GBM critic, had come full circle and was again a GBM admirer. What he told the paper's readers was about GBM's attitude.

Smith and McClellan were riding a trail on the Peninsula. The landings were underway, the battles yet to come. Smith confronted McClellan on his situation: he had been demoted, humiliated, was being abused by politicians and cabinet; where is the response? McClellan answered that victories delivered from this point on would be the most powerful response he could deliver and that he would gain the victories.

His post war emphasis – aggravating as it may be for many – remained the same; and in lieu of explaining the plans that failed, McClellan explained the political decisions that failed the plans.

This is the root of his political commentary.

But let's get to what Ramseur says:

May 21st, 1862

My Dear Brother,

[Material removed. Predicts the destruction of Halleck's army near Corinth.]

In Virginia, I fear the prospect is not so bright. In fact, I verily believe that unless this Gen'l Johnston attacks McClellan in the next seven days, we will be forced to evacuate Virginia. And why? McClellan is now waiting only long enough to organize his grand attack on Richmond. Give him seven days and he will have McDowell to join him with 25,000 men. He (McClellan) will send 25,000 men to the south side of the James, there joined by 30,000 men from Wool (at Norfolk) and 15,000 from Burnside's army will form a column of 70,000. This column will then threaten our Right flank, cut off communication South, and operate in conjunction with McClellan's main army of 140,000 (at least) or 170,000 (at most). At the same time, we will be pressed by Fremont with 35,000 men & Banks with 40,000 men in N.W. Virginia. Suppose they unite to overwhelm Jackson with his 30,000, drive him back upon Richmond, or, which I believe is the plan, if they hold him in check until Richmond falls, what will become of him? Now I believe the only way to avert all these evils is for Johnston with his 80,000 to attack McClellan with his 150,000 & drive him back to Fort Monroe. This alone can save the evacuation of Virginia!

Obama's "corps commanders"

This week we see Admiral Farragut's successor, who has never yet found a problem with an easy solution, at last find something with a really quick and simple fix. Having knowledge of his president's preferences and having a calendar showing election day 2010, he is able to cut this ancient, awful Gordian knot in one stroke!

Not even his very own Joint Chiefs of Staff - made for consultation - were consulted, so quick and sure was his decision. There having been no "council of war," the Joint Chiefs were actually moved to write and sign a letter of complaint against their admiral and boss addressed to the political opposition! (McCain in the Senate)

This beats even the extraordinary affair of Lincoln's corps commanders.

Previously, I thought it astonishing that Lincoln would hang four Republican corps commanders around McClellan's neck, intimate to them his desires for an overland campaign, and then ask them to vote McClellan's watery Urbanna plan up or down in a council of war.

Here, the positions are inverted, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs rushing through "an easy answer" unplateable to "the corps commanders" who then appeal to the president's foes for relief.

So, indeed, the past isn't even past and it's getting wilder every day.

The Crater: its air is the thing

PBS revisits the ACW. I like the angle but trust the context will be mangled beyond belief.

Two approaches to heritage toursim

(1) Spend it and they will come: Manassas.

(2) Spend nothing, make them come: Horseheads.

Note: Horseheads are more intelligent than generally thought.

How to count your chickens in heritage tourism

Apologies to Mad magazine, but when they say

Civil War enthusiasts spent roughly $244 million in visiting Civil War battlefields across the country in 2007

What they really mean is

Civil War enthusiasts spent roughly $243.999 million and 99 cents visiting Gettysburg in 2007.

Focus

What are the chances that sixth grade moviemakers can create films "that will be used as learning tools for anyone who visits historic [ACW] sites"?

This project is a $400,000 extravaganza designed to amuse the teachers more than the students (note the quotes in the story - everyone talking about the excitement of the students, except the students).

The great thing about using sixth graders is that - historiographically - they don't talk back. Whatever you tell them happened, it happened.

The movies will be used at the battlefield [centers] and be streamed through other outlets.

It's a "science is settled" version of history and definitely a culmination of every evil trend since the Centennial.

Come here child. Take this camera and document the insights of a Pulitzer winner. That's a good little scholar.

Perhaps, through countless experiments like these, we may eventually come up with some Sesquicentennial offering the student of history might be interested in.

The explosive "cannonball"

Another potentially explosive "cannonball" - don't think we'll ever be rid of these stories.

McClellan's "typhoid fever"

This is more of a matter for Jim Schmidt's blog. nevertheless the news regarding Florida's dengue fever reminds me of my discomfort with the legend of McClellan's typhoid relapse in late '61.

I call it a legend because it is one of those endlessly repeated items that needs scrutiny. McClellan himself refers to the illness of December '61 as typhoid fever and as a relapse, which suggests he heard his own diagnosis from contemporary medicine. But contemporary medicine knew nothing of bacteria, which is how typhoid is transmitted.

Dengue is spread by mosquitos and the symptoms better match what we know about his "relapse." Dengue also reaches a dead end with the victim, unlike the "Typhoid Mary" effect which would fell some of the victim's cohort.

Let me suggest McClellan had dengue fever as we now define it. I cite recurrence; the nature of the symptoms; the duration of the December outbreak; the lack of contagion.

Here is a quick read on dengue fever and another on typhoid fever.

Farragut and his easy answers, updated

One-star Admiral David Farragut, USN: "Damn the torpedoes! Full speed ahead!" (1864, entering mined Mobile Bay under fire)

Four-star Admiral Mike Mullen, USN: "There’s no easy solution, and there will be no quick fix." (2008, on Afghanistan)

"If there was an easy answer, we would’ve picked it off the shelf." (2010, on Iran)

"... there are no easy answers there and it takes a considerable amount of study, participation and engagement to get your arms around what the challenges are." (2010, on Pakistan)

"... tough questions with no easy answers." (2009, on formulating national military strategy)

"Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Saturday that there are no easy answers." (2009, on rising military suicide rates)

McClellan visuals (cont.)

This is a photo I have not seen before used to illustrate a not very interesting website. The late Brian Pohanka shared with me his great collection of McClellan CDVs and this pose - almost a three quarter view - does not match anything therein. In its dimensions (unless it has been cropped) it is likely not a CDV at all.

I notice a moire pattern in the background that suggests the fine screen used in book publishing - or is this an illusion?

And the big, fat thumprint on his cheek - very distinctive.

Clues welcome - send them along.

CSA vs. USA intelligence - a problem shunned (1/4)

It is a staple of early war history that McClellan thought the Rebels knew his plans or could easily learn them if he shared too much.

This is generally presented as "McClellan thought" never as "McClellan knew." The most-prized historians offer it as yet another tile in their colorful mosaic of paranoid schizophrenia.

The publishing wave of Civil War letters and diaries that began in the 1990s validate McClellan. The oddity of prizewinners not understanding the impact of these letters and diaries upon their own doctrines is a deep subject covered here in postings past. Suffice it to say, the big men at the top are not reading contemporary stuff carefully enough, nor do they seem able to process what they are reading.

The overwhelming pattern in AoV early war memoirs and letters is an awareness of Union plans deep in Rebel ranks - down to company level in places. This is not consistent across all documents but it is persistent even if intermittent.

I read for this - used to actually log examples in a database that is no more. I invite you to do the same. What does the diarist or memoirist know? How does he know it?

The studies of Civil War intel I know of number only two, they are Union-centric, and they are feeble at best, to put it kindly. It may be a measure of Confederate excellence in this field that no studies have been written about their intelligence gathering (I set aside biographies of individual spies here).

It seems to me that historians generally fail to note that Southerners know Northern plans without Northerners knowing Southern plans. (Exception: McClellan's foreknowledge of Jackson's move from the Valley to turn his flank on the Peninsula; but this exception seems also unknown to historians.) Those who note the disparity don't care enough about it to investigate or filter their analysis accordingly.

A new biography of Stephen Dodson Ramseur, CSA, contains comments elaborating in detail on McClellan's Peninsula strategy made while Ramseur was a regimental grade officer. These will bear a closer look in later posts.

Your Antiques Roadshow moment has arrived

The oil painting described here is a color rendering of Alonzo Chappel's work (seen here). Looked familiar, eh? I had seen the engraving before.

Here's the neat part. Chappel ran something like Andy Warhol's art factory. His assistants created engravings from oil painting originals. They were all based on Long Island. This painting was found on Long Island.

Is this Chappel's original painting from which the engravings followed? It is not known to the web compilers of his art. It is a find but is it Chappel's work or a rendering of one of his engravings by a student or third party? Answer that question and your Antiques Roadshow moment has arrived.

Chappel did many nice pieces. This Scott graced an Eisenhower book cover. Gather clues by comparing and contrasting the level of technique in Scott's face and horse with GBM's face and horse.

And have yourself a nice Civil War browse.

Ezra Carman in spades

Tom Clemen's presentation of Ezra Carman's unpublished opus is nearly upon us and I want to take some space comparing it to Joseph Pierro's later this week.

McClellan visuals (cont.)

More McClellan visuals from recent research: this by the eminent and collected artist Robert Ball Hughes believed to have been done in 1862. The savagery of the attacks on GBM's reputation seem to have stimulated an outpouring of artistic expression.

This is "pyrography" and you can find another Hughes portrait burned into wood here (scroll down).

Idiosyncratic!

McClellan visuals

Hunting up the sources for the recent painting post has produced a bumper crop of imagery seeking exposure. This piece is irresistible: "George Brinton McClellan, c. 1862, Painted wood relief by Unidentified Artist; this wood carving was reputedly removed from the stern of a ship built in Thomaston, Maine." More to come.