These are the posts referring to Winfield Scott's operational art as demonstrated in his two coordinated offensives of 1861:
"Concentration in time" and the ACW (9/28/2010): How ACW writers and others misunderstand and misapply Clausewitz's concept; a suggestion that Scott be studied as a corrective.
"Concentration in time" and the ACW (9/29/2010): Shows that the mutated Clausewitzian construct "concentration in time" has been further bastardized by adding the Jominian idea of interior/exterior lines and proposes Scott's first coordinated offensive as a way to recast the analysis into something internally consistent and useful.
"Concentration in time" and the ACW (9/30/2010): A recap of Scott's first offensive with emphasis on how much better it was served by coordination than by simultaneity.
"Concentration in time" and the ACW (10/01/2010): Chronology (in context) of Scott's first coordinated offensive; demonstrates coordination as a superior principle to simultaneity.
Scott's operational art (10/05/2010) - Review of the complexity and dynamics at work in Scott's first coordinated offensive.
Scott's operational art (10/06/2010) - Describes the fruits of Scott's victorious first coordinated offensive in terms of benefits and how these influenced the second offensive.
Scott's operational art (10/08/2010) - Sketches stark differences between Scott's second coordinated offensive and his first.
Scott's operational art (10/21/2010) - Analyzes the fundamentally mistaken concepts Scott tried to implement in his second offensive and by which his subordinates were judged.
Scott's operational art (12/01/2010) - Reviews failures of Scott and Patterson in the Valley during Scott's second offensive with an emphasis on military management.
Scott's bad example to Lincoln - lists hypothetical lessons learned from Scott's 1861 campaigns that seem to inform Lincoln's subsequent military thinking and behavior.