Maurice D’Aoust submitted the
following in response to Stephen Sears's March 30th post. "Once again, for ease of reference I have addressed each of Mr. Sears’s points individually."
SEARS:
To argue that
McClellan’s Sept. 13 telegram to Lincoln, announcing the finding of the Lost Order,
was sent at midnight rather than noon, Mr. D’Aoust offers two supposed proofs
demonstrating that the Lost Order did not reach McClellan in time for him to
telegraph Lincoln at noon. A third supposed proof, by Gene Thorp and laid out
in an appendix to the post, attempts to show how a telegram sent at midnight
was erroneously labeled noon in the records, and what lesson is to be drawn
from that.
D'AOUST: How
can Mr. Sears possibly refer to two primary source accounts confirming the 27th
Indiana's 12 noon arrival as "supposed" proof? The first of these proofs is from a Battles
and Leaders article, (vol. 2, p. 603) in which Silas Colgrove writes "The
Twelfth Army Corps arrived at Frederick, Maryland, about noon on the 13th of September,
1862. The 27th Indiana Volunteers, of which I was colonel at that date,
belonged to the Third Brigade, First Division, of that corps." The second primary source is from Antietam
chronicler Ezra A. Carman when he writes, "Williams Corps arrived near
Frederick and halted about noon, very early noon, and this agrees with the
recollections and papers of this author."
See Thomas G. Clemens, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. 1:
South Mountain, p. 280 in this regard. Then there is the evidence contained within the message itself
surrounding the taking of Catoctin.
I'll reserve my comments regarding Mr. Thorp's evidence until later in
this response.
SEARS:
The heart of
the matter is this: Just because no sending copy of the Sept. 13 telegram in
McClellan’s handwriting has been found—and I have looked long and hard, far and
wide—Messrs. D’Aoust and Thorp and their advocates say the dispatch was
tampered with or messed with in the telegraphic process. I say the telegraphic
process worked just fine (except for unavoidable delay) and exactly as it was
supposed to.
D'AOUST: Absolutely
no one suggested Lincoln's copy was "tampered with" or "messed
with." These are entirely Mr.
Sears's words. As I've already stated,
the time stamp was amended by someone in order to correct the
telegrapher's "12M" error. The
evidence confirms that whoever amended the document was absolutely correct in
doing so.
SEARS:
To begin with,
I find no factual, confirmable evidence disproving the telegram was sent at
noon, so, obviously, the Lost Order reached McClellan before noon. But Mr.
D’Aoust persists, and his evidence deserves a hearing. He claims the 27th
Indiana did not get to where the Order was found in time for Corp. Mitchell to
do the finding before noon. But Charles B. Dew, writing in the Journal of
Southern History, used the Samuel Pittman papers to show that Silas Colgrove,
the 27th’s colonel, carried the Lost Order to Twelfth Corps headquarters, last
stop before it went to McClellan, before noon. Pittman was General Alpheus
Williams’s aide, identified the Order’s handwriting as authentic, and is a
sound witness. Ezra Carman heard from the courier (urged by Pittman to ride
fast) who delivered the Order, saying he left for army headquarters about 9:30
a.m. (No reliance can be placed on Jones’s regimental history of the 27th
Indiana. It is riddled with errors, such as the canard that Mitchell was
illiterate.)
D'AOUST: The
"confirmable evidence" that disproves the telegram was sent at noon
has been there all along for Mr. Sears
to find. He has simply chosen to ignore
it. The evidence confirming the 27
Indiana did not reach Frederick until noon is comprised of two primary source
accounts from two participants who were there when these events took
place. As for Charles B. Dew's article,
I assume Mr. Sears is referring to Dew's "How Samuel Pittman validated
Lee's 'Lost Order' Prior to Antietam: A Historical Note" in which, as one
reviewer puts it, "Dew uses Stephen
Sears and James B. McPherson's books to synthesize a description of the
event." Is this the article Mr.
Sears is referring to? Ezra Carman,
considered to be the foremost expert on the Battle of Antietam and who was also
present when these events took place, had this to say about Pittman's account: "[i]n this he was evidently mistaken, accounts generally agree that Williams
Corps arrived near Frederick and halted about noon, very early noon, and this
agrees with the recollections and papers of this author." Have either Messrs. Sears or Dew bothered to
investigate Carman's conclusion on this matter or have they simply chosen to
deem Carman a liar? For that matter, why
do they also completely discount Colgrove's Battles and Leaders 12 noon
account? Finally, should two sources
(Carman's and Colgrove's) not trump one (Pittman's)? Tom Clemens, editor of a three volume work on
Caman's papers, has confirmed to me that Carman received no such correspondence
from anyone purporting to be the courier.
In fact, it does not appear anyone truly knows who the courier was, there
being several theories. I must now make
a point of obtaining a copy of Jones's "error riddled" book and wish
to thank Mr. Sears for that heads up.
SEARS:
Next, Mr.
D’Aoust claims that McClellan’s telegram, saying the Catoctin range was in
Union hands, could not have been sent at noon since that feat was not
accomplished until 2 p.m. There is, however, cavalryman Pleasonton’s 11 a.m.
dispatch to McClellan (McClellan Papers) saying he is “4 miles west of
Frederick” at the Catoctins. That was good enough for McClellan to add that
extra bit of good news to his noon telegram to Lincoln.
D'AOUST: Fact: Catoctin pass was not taken until 2 p.m.
Fact: In his 12 Midnight
telegram, McClellan correctly informs the President that he has possession of
the Catoctin pass being that, by then, he truly was in possession of it. Not so at noon. Mr. Sears suggestion that Pleasonton's 11
a.m. dispatch was "good enough for McClellan to add that extra bit of good
news" to a supposed 12 noon telegram to Lincoln is an entirely
unsubstantiated, if not preposterous, fabrication on his part and is
undeserving of even the slightest consideration.
SEARS:
To repeat, if
there is demonstrable proof—as I contend there is—that the telegram was sent at
noon, all arguments that the Lost Order could not have gotten there “in time”
are nulled.
D'AOUST: And
what demonstrable proof does Mr. Sears offer? 1. An Official Records stamp on
the 12M War Department copy. The same stamp as is found on the clearly erroneous
September 11th telegram to Halleck. 2. A
preposterous and entirely unsubstantiated fabrication with which to counter the
Catoctin reference. 3. One account (Pittman's) with which to contradict two
others (Colgrove and Carman) regarding the time of the 27th Indiana's
arrival. Mr. Sears must know that
postulation and fabrication do not cut it as far as "demonstrable
proof" is concerned. Hard, primary
source evidence is what is required and this I have provided as support for the
12 Midnight telegram.
SEARS:
Finally,
Messrs. D’Aoust and Thorp appear willing to rest their case on . . . well,
quicksand. That is, McClellan’s Lincoln telegram was sent at midnight; that the
belief it was sent at noon is due entirely to a
Washington War Dept. telegraph operator who was a dolt, who made
repeated blunders that have muddied the historical waters ever since. I, on the
other hand, find the man entirely capable. He did his job exactly as he was
supposed to do and expected to do.
Mr. Thorp
displays a McClellan-Halleck telegram sent Sept. 11—two days before the Lost
Order telegram—that he claims is time-marked by McClellan 12 midnight. But that
dolt of a War Dept. operator marked it 12 M instead of 12 Midnight as he was
supposed to do and required to do. Now, that’s not just one major mistake,
that’s two major mistakes, perhaps three: 1) Not writing down the time-mark as
sent; 2) writing 12 M, the flat-out wrong abbreviation for midnight; or 3)
somehow misreading midnight as meridian or as noon and therefore rendering it
12 M, telegraphese for noon. The Official Records compilers saw 12 M and for
emphasis rendered it 12 noon in OR 19.2:252.
D'AOUST: Apparently,
Mr. Sears has had a change of heart since writing those last words and I am
referring to his "A Mystery Solved" postscript in which he now
suggests that the telegram to Halleck was, in fact, time marked "12
Midnight" (something Mr. Sears previously
argued McClellan would never
ever do.) He is also suggesting that the telegraph operator did transcribe it
as "Midnight" but that the "idnight" portion was covered up
by a "stamp wielder" resulting
in the OR compilers misrepresenting the time mark as "12M" in the OR. Mr. Sears claims that the "idnight"
is clearly visible in the National Archives microfilm and that it is even
visible in Mr. Thorp's copy. I would
respectfully suggest that Mr. Sears is seeing things and say this for several
reasons. Firstly, I've looked at Thorp's
"illustration" and see absolutely nothing after the M (see the
attached blow-up of that section of the telegram.) What I do see is the
down-stroke of the letter "g" from the word Middleburg above. That down-stroke extends down into the area of the stamp and
is clearly visible. Why can I see this
under the stamp and yet I can see no other writing? Why is that?
Because there is nothing else there. Secondly, Mr. Thorp has confirmed to me that
he personally viewed the same microfilm as Mr. Sears did in the National
Archives reading room and that he made a digital copy from that very same microfilm. Suffice it to say that Mr. Thorp looked the
image over very carefully and never saw any "idnight." But wait, there is more. Based on that phantom "idnight"
under the stamp, Mr. Sears now claims the telegrapher "faithfully copied
the sender’s time-mark 12 Midnight" and that "the War Dept. operator
was entirely competent on Sept. 11."
Let' now watch Mr. Sears's case sink and ultimately disappear beneath
the quicksand.
While at the
National Archives Mr. Thorp, was, under the watchful eye of two National
Archives staff members, given the opportunity to view and actually hold
Halleck's received copy of the September 11th telegram and there is even a
picture of him holding the document for all to see. And what time-stamp did the
"competent" telegrapher specify on Halleck's copy? . . . "12M"!
So much for Mr. Sears's "A
Mystery Solved" theory. So where
does that leave us? With a
"sent" copy clearly marked 12 Midnight and a received copy
clearly marked 12M. Conclusion, the
telegrapher failed to faithfully copy the sender's time-mark and did so again
two days later.
SEARS:
To stay with
the Sept. 11 telegram, it’s in a dispatch book in the McClellan Papers. (The
McClellan-Lincoln telegram, not an official message, is not recorded in a
dispatch book.) This telegram is not in
McClellan’s handwriting; he did not break telegraphic protocol by writing 12
Midnight on it. It was dictated (it’s a routine message), and McClellan cannot
have read it or he would have seen it corrected from 12 Midnight to standard 12
or 12 p.m. on the copy. (It’s in the proper chronological order in the dispatch
book.) As noted in my earlier post, McClellan was careful about telegraphic
protocol.
D'AOUST: As
mentioned above, Mr. Sears in his "A Mystery Solved" postscript, has
now changed his mind regarding McClellan not breaking "telegraphic
protocol by writing 12 Midnight on it [the September 11th telegram to
Halleck.]"
SEARS:
Next, Mr.
Thorp would have us believe this same dolt of an operator two days later did exactly
the same stupid thing! That is, on Sept. 13 he deciphered a second 12 midnight
telegram from McClellan, made the same series of blunders for whatever reasons
of his own, and turned it into a 12 M telegram. Then “somebody” at the
telegraph office “corrected” the operator’s 12 M copy made for Mr. Lincoln by
adding “idnight” . . . but for whatever reasons of his own did not similarly
correct the office file copy and carbon.
D'AOUST: Well,
yes, that is exactly what Mr. Thorp would have us believe and in this he is
absolutely correct. Halleck's received
copy proves conclusively that the telegrapher did precisely that on September
11th. As for the September 13th 12
Midnight telegram, the evidence is overwhelming in proving that the telegram
could not possibly have been written at 12M and therefore, that the telegrapher
did make "the same series of blunders" and turned that message into a
12 M telegram. Thankfully someone
caught the error in time and added the "idnight" on Lincoln's copy.
SEARS:
I cannot find
a single confirmable fact in this scenario. It’s pure speculation, and I have
to say, simply beyond bizarre.
D'AOUST: It
is a confirmable fact that the September 11th telegram was time-marked 12
Midnight as evidenced by the sent copy.
It is also a confimable fact that Halleck's copy has been erroneously
time-marked 12M and again I refer to the image of Thorp holding that very
document. That there is no writing
whatsoever behind the "copied" stamp on the erroneously deciphered
War Dept. copy of the September 11th message to Halleck which is also a confirmable
fact. Anyone who looks carefully will
see nothing after the "M." It
is also a confirmable fact that Lincoln's copy of the September 13 message is
time-marked 12 Midnight. The evidence
supporting the 12 Midnight time-mark are also confirmable facts. What am I
missing, I ask Mr. Sears?
SEARS:
What actually,
factually happened at noon at Frederick was this: McClellan was handed the Lost
Order, delivered by a courier from General Williams and Lieutenant Pittman at
Twelfth Corps headquarters, confirmed as authentic by Williams’s covering note.
It was a Eureka! moment for McClellan. The scales fell from his eyes. He
finally knew what to do. He had before him a telegram from the president, sent at
4:10 the previous afternoon (McClellan Papers), reading “How does it look now?”
He promptly replied, time-marking his telegram 12 M, for meridian or noon.
D'AOUST: Close
but no cigar. What actually, factually
happened shortly before 3 p.m., at Frederick was this: McClellan was
handed the Lost Order, delivered by a courier from General Williams and
Lieutenant Pittman at Twelfth Corps headquarters, confirmed as authentic by
Williams’s covering note. It was a Eureka! moment for McClellan. The scales fell
from his eyes. He finally knew what to do. He had before him a telegram from
the president, sent at 4:10 the previous afternoon (McClellan Papers), reading
“How does it look now?” McClellan being
too busy with critical military matters waited until late that night, at
Midnight, to be precise, before responding to Lincoln's inquiry. For all we know, the telegraph was still down
that afternoon and evening thus preventing McClellan from writing earlier. Then again, McClellan was in the habit of
writing such messages late in the night. In any event, he replied to Lincoln's message at Midnight, hence why the
message was time-marked 12 Midnight.
SEARS:
What actually,
factually happened in the early morning hours of Sept. 14 in the War Department
telegraph office was this: A perfectly
competent operator routinely took down McClellan’s Sept. 13 12 M telegram to Lincoln, labeled it received at
2:35 a.m. [14th], made one copy and carbon marked 12 M for the office, and one
marked 12 M for the president. When Lincoln was handed the telegram and saw the
2:35 a.m. received time, he figured two and a half hours about right for a
telegram to reach him (not knowing of the telegraphic delays), and altered 12 M
into 12 Midnight, no doubt for clarity in understanding events. It’s an
essentially simple story. It meets McClellan’s telegraphic protocol, meets the
professionalism of the War Dept. telegraph office. And most of all, it meets
the confirmable facts.
D'AOUST: What actually, factually happened in
the early morning hours of Sept. 14 in the War Department telegraph office was
this: A not so competent operator took
down McClellan’s Sept. 13 12 Midnight
telegram to Lincoln, labeled it received at 2:35 a.m. [14th] and
arranged to have it delivered to the President.
Someone, we will never know who, having realized that the time
designation was wrong, added the "idnight." As part of the clerical function, a War
Department copy and carbon copies were subsequently made, all erroneously
marked 12M. It’s an essentially simple
story. It meets all logic and most of all, it meets the confirmable facts (the
two accounts re the 27th Indiana's arrival time and the Catoctin aspect and
finally, Messrs. Thorp's and Clemens's discovery re the September 11th message
to Halleck.)
SEARS:
(And no, Mr.
D’Aoust, I did not “suppress,” as you accusingly put it, the Lincoln Copy when
I saw it some thirty years ago. I left it right where it is, in the Lincoln
Papers and microfilm, for all to see and ponder.)
D'AOUST: One
definition of the word suppress includes " To keep from being revealed,
published, or circulated." I'd say
that pretty well fits the circumstances.
That is not to suggest that Mr. Sears is in any way guilty of any
malicious act but having said that, he, at the very least, owed it to his
readers and to history to immediately reveal the existence of the Lincoln
copy. It was simply too controversial of
an issue for it to have been left "right
where it is." I know this, most who
read this exchange will know it, and even Mr. Sears must know it.
SEARS:
Here is a
transcription of the McClellan-Lincoln Sept. 13 telegram. It needs to be
considered in this context. On Sept. 12 McClellan writes his wife he can’t
figure out where the enemy is or what he is doing. Then just before noon on the
13th (after a warm welcome by the ladies of Frederick), he is handed the Lost
Order. Immediately, in obvious excitement, he telegraphs the president. For
George McClellan, this is positively giddy. Then compare this with McClellan’s
11 p.m. telegram to Halleck, (OR 19.2:281-82, too long to transcribe here). It
is a very sober document. He is facing 120,000 Rebels led by Lee in person,
aiming for Pennsylvania. He expects a “severe general engagement tomorrow. . .
. I have the mass of their troops to contend with & they outnumber me when
united.”
D'AOUST: The
McClellan-Lincoln Sept. 13 telegram needs to be considered in this context. On
Sept. 12 McClellan writes his wife he can’t figure out where the enemy is or
what he is doing. Then just before 3 p.m. on the 13th he is handed the
Lost Order. Almost immediately, he sends a copy to Pleasonton with instructions
to confirm its contents. Pleasonton
returns one and a half to three hours later with a quasi confirmation. By 6:20 McClellan has formulated his plan and
issued his orders to Franklin. I've
already commented on how Mr. Sears is reading too much into the variances
between McClellan's messages to Halleck and Lincoln that night.
I submit that
it is beyond imagining that McClellan could have sent the September 13, 1862
telegram to Abraham Lincoln at 12M and that it is time to permanently dispel
that myth.
To the
President Hd Qrs Frederick
Sept 13th 12 Midnight
I have the whole Rebel force in
front of me but am confident and no time shall be lost. I have a difficult task
to perform but with Gods blessing will accomplish it. I think Lee has made a
gross mistake and that he will be severely punished for it. The Army is in
motion as rapidly as possible. I hope for a great success if the plans of the
Rebels remain unchanged. We have possession of Cotocktane. I have all the plans
of the Rebels and will catch them in their own trap if my men are equal to the
emergency. I now feel I can count on them as of old. All forces of Pennsylvania
should be placed to cooperate at Chambersburg. My respects to Mrs. Lincoln.
Received most enthusiastically by
the ladies. Will send you trophies. All well and with Gods blessing will
accomplish it.
Geo B. McClellan