Confusion about strategy

When President Obama recently said "We don’t have a strategy yet," political reporters became obligated to define "strategy," which (predictably) they refused to do (in any story I've seen).

Leaving "strategy" to the imagination of the political class, it could mean "objectives," "tactics," "general intentions," political or military posture, or "frame of reference."

To the military history reader, strategy refers to an outcome based on overall goals, with intermediate objectives, timetables, possibly means, and pre-selected milestone events (as needed). Such a reader might imagine WWII in the west: North Africa landings, Sicily, Italy, France; likewise the island hopping in the Pacific culminating in a home islands invasion.

We cannot, however, reasonably expect any politician anywhere to ever adopt anything like what we would call strategy. This makes the idea that Obama was "speaking our language" absurd. Whatever the "gaffe" was in making his statement, we can assume it was not military or strategic because politicians do no strategy, politicians do contingency.

I have said it before:

- Any strategy is death to political control of the military. It puts the politician at the mercy of events, ends and means having been decided and posted to the court of public opinion.

- There is a long list of inhibitors that guarantee strategy cannot be formulated or adopted.

- "He means to win the war by strategy" - biggest laugh line of the Civil War.

What about Roosevelt's war strategy, unfolding as it did? North Africa, specifically Operation Torch, was the military's desperate, improvised reaction to Roosevelt's non-negotiable demand that the European Axis must be engaged by American troops in 1942. It was pick a front and go. After Torch, Sicily was clearly opportunistic and with the fall of Sicily, the second opportunity of Italy promised a political effect against Mussolini: this was low hanging fruit. The decision to invade of France was a political football that remained in play into early 1944. After accepting the conditional surrender of Vichy in Africa and Badoglio in Italy, unconditional surrender suddenly became unconditional - a policy that would govern strategy or the absence of strategy to war's end. Note to political pundits: policy is not strategy.

In the Pacific, the same pattern emerges. The Navy's war was haphazard and self-directed. The Army's war, under MacArthur, followed the general's strategy for returning to the Philippines (one new book showing how MacArthur obtained incremental buy-in from Roosevelt in the absence of a presidential strategy).

And of Korea, Vietnam, the post war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the less said the better.

Since WWII, the political control of the military has so deeply affected the military's culture, our generals and admirals are at a complete loss as to what strategy is. They cannot seem to transcend the political bubble. Here are the comments of the current chairman of the Joint Chiefs on "strategy" (emphasis added):

Yeah, I will say up front that normally we talk about ends, ways and means mostly during the budget season, when the means become the prominent feature in strategic discussions.

The other way we talk about strategy throughout the year is choices and consequences. You know, we are blessed as a nation to have, you know – we have multiple options in how to deal with issues, in ways that some other countries – most other countries around the world have far, far fewer options.

[...]

And then the other interesting thing about strategy, to me, is whether it’s best to define an end state and then deliberately plot a series of actions to achieve that end state. That’s the traditional thinking, by the way. You identify the end state and then you back plan from that and you chart a course with milestones to decide whether you’ve got it right or not; or whether the world in which we live today actually is one where, kind of like the Heisenberg principle in physics, where you should touch it and see what happens.

To understand how confused the general can be about strategy, consider these pop culture assertions:

- Strategy is operational excellence
- Strategy is is perspective, position, plan, and pattern
- "Strategy is that which top management does that is of great importance to the organization"

And yet, Google's top-of-search gives all the presidents, policymen, and policy executors what they need: strategy is "a plan of action or policy designed to achieve a major or overall aim." This definition is surprisingly close to what military readers think of as strategy, not that we should raise our hopes that others will agree with us. Because strategy is clear and actionable and measurable and it succeeds or fails, this must be poison to politicians. President Obama will adopt no strategy. Neither did Lincoln or Davis.

Our Civil War military in Iraq

When we think of the deficits in Abraham Lincoln's strategic thinking we often fail to consider, as I have mentioned before, that strategy is death to political control of the military. This creates friction and disapppointment when such as McClellan or Grant have to deal with civilian contingency-lovers and their endless ad hockery.

I sometimes mention the insight by Civil War historians Jones and/or Hattaway, that the ideal Civil War "strategy," from the point of view of Northern politicians, would have been to have a series of incremental victories of increasing magnitude with these wins tallying up to a final triumph by draining off the enemy's political support and will. Thus, under this fuzzy logic, victories could be anywhere and lead to nothing, strategically. They would still have delivered steadily increasing public support for the war while decreasing enemy support; they would generate political capital through favorable headlines one battle at a time while draining the enemy administration of its goodwill; and they would demonstrate superior war management skills by the civil leadership. Matters of policy and spoils-of-victory could also be better managed on an extended timeline.

Today's de-professionalized officer corps has internalized the anti-strategic confusion of its civilian masters. Thus, recently, Colonel John Boyd's student William Lind observed while attending some Iraq war talks that "the assumption behind almost all the [military] briefings was that if we can only accumulate enough tactical victories, we are certain to win strategically as well." [Emphasis added.]

If Lind was dismayed then, he seems to be embracing incrementalism now.

In a new column, while talking to some Marine officers, he tells them:

There are two basic ways to design a strategy. The first is to set a single strategic objective which, if you attain it, is decisive. However, if you fail to attain it, you lose.

You are "McClellanized," to use Grant's term. But Lind is mixing up meanings. An objective is not a strategy.

Lind continues,

An alternative type of strategy is one where you have a series of objectives, one maximalist, but others that yield partial successes or at least avoid outright defeat. [...] My recommendation to the Marines was that they attempt to devise a strategy of this second type for the U.S. in Iraq. ... [T]he current all-or-nothing strategy, where the only acceptable outcome is a "democratic" Iraq that is an American ally, is likely to leave us with nothing.

But the Union had an all-or-nothing strategy, to force the surrender of every rebellious state. The preferred means of its politicians were victories incrementing over time. The ambitious aim can co-exist with anti-strategic means.

Politicians, however, set that kind of aim, not generals. And the cost of this sort of war is higher, of course, much higher.

Meanwhile, our Iraqi enemies strive, like Jeff Davis, not to win with a string of successes but to deliver one or two morale-shattering blows that will force a peace on their terms.

Because we think Lincoln was always right about everything and because it all worked out just fine, don't you know, we are fighting in Iraq with a Civil War officer corps that has no Civil War memory of the effects of an absence of strategy.

*** *** *** *** *** ***

P.S. They seem to be casting about for advice in the oddest quarters: James McPherson was recently booked to give senior soldiers advice. He compared Iraq with Dixie [my emphasis added]:

But the [Southern white] insurgency was potent and took more than 1,000 lives. Along with the Ku Klux Klan, there were underground groups such as "The White Brotherhood" and "The Knights of the White Camellia," determined to preserve the old regime’s power. White insurgents staged bloody riots in Memphis and New Orleans in 1866. The rebels also drew support from the remnants of irregular Confederate units such as Quantrill’s Raiders, which spawned the outlaws Frank and Jesse James. [...] By 1877, says McPherson, the North essentially gave up.

*** *** *** *** *** ***

P.P.S. I just noticed that Chris Cross already addressed this McPherson talk. I think McPherson's insights come across as happy hour talk at the officers' club. (Do they still have officers' clubs?) The take-away seems to be "Persist!" - as ignorant as the Radicals' "Attack!."

Meanwhile, Jay Winik is making a bundle of money month after month selling a book that reverses McPherson's conclusions: April 1865 - The Month That Saved America. Its point is that the losers laid aside their guerilla options and nothing like "white insurgency" followed the breakup of Davis's government.

Given the military's appetite for history, and given that Winik has been outselling McPherson's Battle Cry for a long time now, a few people in this audience must have been suffering "cognitive dissonance" during this talk.

(Which reminds me to do a post about the phenomenal sustained sales levels of Winik's book. As for the idea that we are served by a Civil War officer corps, that is explored here, here, and here.)

The Harrison's Bar Letter of Stanley McChrystal

This letter under the circumstances is one of the most extraordinary productions on record. When McClellan wrote it he was not General in Chief. His only functions were those of the commander of the Army of the Potomac... [H]e addressed a carefully prepared letter to the President, laying down a civil and military policy for the United States... Engaged in actual war, with the cause he was fighting for at stake upon the use of his sword, he proceeded to "save the country" with his pen." - MG James B. Fry, "McClellan and His Mission," Century Illustrated, Vol. 48, 1894

General Fry's view carries on in the Centennial doctrines of today which are still taught to all cadets and which I also imbibed through both military and civil sources in the heyday of the Centennial itself.

There is no doubt in my mind the Afghanistan commander learned Fry's lessons that (1) Below the top of the military hierarchy, political questions may not be raised (2) A field commander's job is to fight regardless of the political circustances his government has imposed on him. Reading a lot of ACW, one suspects nothing could be more heinous than for a field commander to address political questions germane to his success.

And yet, this is what McChrystal did in spades - with impunity - in his now famous Initial Assessment. The reader, searching for a military plan that justifies a troop increase, will not find it. I have worked at battalion, brigade, division and army headquarters and know what a military plan looks like. I also know what an assessment looks like: it tends to address predictable topics like state of supply, state of maintenance, force levels, absenteeism, the enemy situation, etc., and none of that is here in conventional reporting shape.

Instead, what we have is about sixty pages explaining what must change politically in order for the field force to be able to win. Read it yourself. McClellan covered he same ground in two pages, but then he was a genius.

Some of this reads like Stanton's house metaphysician, MG E. A. Hitchcock, wrote it: "The key to changing perceptions lies in changing the underlying truths" and "the system must be understood holistically."

The reader cannot be expected to share my shock at McChrystal's assessment unless he has served in the old Army himself; however, the reading of garden variety Civil War history offers some preparation. What was McChrystal thinking? "We must assist at improving governance at all levels," "the objective is the will of the people," "we require more civilian and military resources," "economic opportunity, especially job creation, is a critical part of reinegrating the foot-solier into normal life."

He was taught of the great wickedness of McClellan at Harrison's Bar and yet here he is Harrison Barring it to the nth power.

Part of the answer, I see, lies in the new strategic thinking being taught in the advanced service schools. This too was drilled into McChrystal, albeit more recently.

Let us skim the texts of the prolific strategy author Colin S. Gray (right), who is published by the Army War College and its Air Force counterpart. I'm not being arch when I warn that the following material is going to upset a great many Civil War readers.

From The Airpower Advantage in Future Warfare:

Since war is always about politics, the political context must always be the source for all future warfare of every character.

From Schools for Strategy:

... strategists should not shrink from their professional duty to study the politically purposeful use of force.

...the awesome challenges of the strategist's role in the no man's land where politics/policy and military power meet ...

... the strategist has to attempt to orchestrate military and other behavior for desired political consequences.

From Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy:

While all warfare is political, irregular warfare is the most political of all...

I cannot state often enough or clearly enough that victory or defeat in irregular warfare is all about the beliefs, attitudes, and consequent behavior of the public.

The traditional separation of the political and the conduct of war is a lethal weakness...

The United States often has difficulty with strategy because, unsurprisingly, the "normal" theory of American civil-military relations does its best to close down the strategy bridge that should unite politicians and soldiers in an unequal but never-ending dialog over means and ends.

When Americans wage war as a largely autonomous activity ... the strategy bridge has broken down ...

You might reread McChrystal's Assessment in light of Colin Gray's writings (which are also accessible free in PDF). There is quite a correlation at work.

If there is enough of this taught at the colonel and general level, Centennialism may lose its grip on cadets ... at which point, at the academies at least, Harrison's Bar will take on a new look indeed.

General-in-chief?

The president has found his "war czar" and all sorts of interesting ACW associations are emerging. From the linked story, this is clearly a Halleck-like position: bureaucratic and devoted to on-demand political servicing. The associated punditry parodies itself:

While creating a manager for the war could be a good idea, the choice of Lute reinforces the notion that the problems in Iraq and Afghanistan need military solutions, says Kathleen Hicks, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "It's exactly the wrong message," she says.

Over at Opposed Systems Design, the question arises, "Tsar? How about a grand strategy?" They offer this quote from the WSJ:

“The war efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq are adrift in the absence of a properly developed grand strategy to integrate military and nonmilitary elements of national power,” said Stephen Biddle, a Council on Foreign Relations scholar who just returned from a monthlong tour advising Gen. David Petraeus...

As I often say here, a grand strategy imposes immense political risks and costs on the political decisionmaker. Lincoln would have none of it - neither would Jeff Davis. It takes a politician with immense levels of self-confidence and public support, an FDR comes to mind, to commit to grand strategy and even then there tends to be pay-as-you go mini-strategy, with elements of a grand design approved in phases.

The thing that interests me in this appointment is that this man Lute, like Petraeus, was appointed to a four-star position with three-star rank, bypassing the four-star talent pool. Recall that Pershing was promoted from captain to brigadier general over the heads of (IIRC) 835 senior officers. Likewise, WWWII was fought, MacArthur excepted, by Pershing's young WWI staffers rather than by senior incumbents like Hugh Drum and suchlike.

One of interesting things about Rumsfeld was that he took over the promotion of generals above the rank of major general where previously the generals' club had selected its own. Here, we have two Rumsfeld-selected three-stars receiving appointment - from politicians - to war-fighting positions ... a major throwback to the ACW.

We all hope the results will justify this historic return to the historic.

Towards a new Civil War history (cont.)

To continue this list but with a list of underdeveloped ideas of my own leavened with attributions where needed:

(51) Abraham Lincoln adapted the Mexican War playbook of James Polk:

(51a) Create a USV force structure at the service of party-building and patronage

(51b) Appoint a general-in-chief to direct field forces, one answerable to the president (neutralize seniority)

(51c) Insert own party generals under other party's generals

(51d) Communicate with own party generals under other party's generals

(51e) Adjust strategy, operations, and tempo to serve political agenda

(51f) Appoint the head of the most powerful political machine in the country to be Secretary of State

(52) Lincoln never adopted a strategy to win the war.

(53) Strategy is anathema to politicians.

(54) The fortunes of any general correlate to his standing with a patron, the relative standing of the patron, and events on the field, never simply to events on the field.

(55) A few generals had military patrons only; these were as weak as generals who fell from their patron's favor.

(56) The effects of any victory can be undone by spin.

(57) Battles, as understood by politicians, could win the war: a series of victories forming a pattern strong enough to collapse the political support of the enemy.

(58) Battles, as understood by McClellan, could win the war: a series of victories leading to occupation and control of key points making government of the South geographically impossible.

(59) Battles, as understood by Lincoln, could win the war: as a series of losses, mutually inflicted, to exhaust the reserves of the frailer party ("terrible arithmetic").

(60) Lincoln did not understand until 1864 that the Union was the frailer party.

(61) The war was not won simply by capturing Richmond, Davis, Lee's army, or Johnson's Army; the rump Rebel government had to quit as well. (Winik)

(62) Davis's rump government succumbed to (57).

(63) The surrender of armies could not prevent new armies from being raised or improvised.

(64) Much current analysis is a rehashing of partisan editorials 1861-1864.

(65) Literate ACW people operated deep inside of theatrical and literary conventions; they recast events of their lives in theatrical or novelistic terms.

(66) Modern historians adopt those antiquated theatrical and literary forms for color and interest, polluting their own narratives and history in general.

(67) What we know is shaped by what the publisher can sell.

(68) The publisher can sell what we think we know and what we suspect we want to know.

I'll add links to posts on these themes when I can take more time.

A cry for "political officers"

This essay in the Armed Forces Journal calls for Congressional intervention in the selection and promotion of general officers. (Under Clinton and previously, the generals selected each other; under this president the secretary of defense has selected all new three- and four-star generals).

The author, a lieutenant colonel, is calling for intellect and achievment to be recognized. The problem in my view is that regardless of the quality of the general officer, he would be hamstrung by that Civil War ethos that dominates all thinking in the services today (linearity, synchronization, occupation of space, firepower, hierarchy); he would be hampered by a diffusion of authority across hundreds of generals and commands; he would be bound to consult dozens of civilian masters, including under-secretaries of this and that; he would be trapped in a web of "Jointness" (real word) requiring enormous investment in cross-service communications and consensus building; he would be micromanaged by anyone able claiming a stake in his success; and he would never, ever be allowed to pursue strategy because strategy is the death of political ad hockery. Strategy sets goals, timetables, means, and ends under which politicians careers could be crushed.

Furthermore to say, as this author does, that we are at Valmy on the road to Jena, makes the classic error of confusing any commanding general in any situation with the commander-in-chief as head of state (Frederick, Napoleon).

I do want political generals, however, and I do heartily agree that:

If America desires creative intelligence and moral courage in its general officer corps, it must create a system that rewards these qualities. Congress can create such incentives by exercising its proper oversight function in three areas. First, Congress must change the system for selecting general officers. Second, oversight committees must apply increased scrutiny over generating the necessary means and pursuing appropriate ways for applying America's military power. Third, the Senate must hold accountable through its confirmation powers those officers who fail to achieve the aims of policy at an acceptable cost in blood and treasure.

The Civil War was led almost entirely by political generals, chief among them Scott (Seward's creature), McClellan (Chase's creation), Grant (Washburne's project), etc. These were civilians who had left the service and returned to it at an exalted rank; and there were also civilians who donned the stars with no experience, as in WWII. The exceptions are few: Meigs, FJ Porter, Franklin, Tim Sherman all had unbroken service up until Sumter but even these were promoted far beyond their experience as a result of political decisions based on political patronage.

The post-ACW professionalism wrought by Grant and Sherman had to be radically modified for the Spanish-American war, two world wars, and Korea. Its implementation by MacNamara under Kennedy and Johnson, leavened with his management philosophies, might reasonably be declared a failure at this time.

Frederick the Great admonished, "You officers amuse yourselves with God knows what buffooneries and never dream in the least of serious service..." We can say nowadays that ours amuse themselves with the accoutrements of professionalism: procurement, seminars, reports, management training, social experiments, programs, policy development, and briefings, briefings, briefings.

There was a famous quote: "I'd rather entrust the government of the United States to the first 400 people listed in the Boston telephone directory than to the faculty of Harvard University." It has some applicability to this case of extreme professionalism, the number of Army generals on duty being set at 302.

(More of the same subject here.)

Jomini's objectives

Speaking of Jomini, here is a passage from the US 1862 edition of his Art of War. I cite this in the hope we can be rid of the procrustean nostrum Make the enemy your objective:

There are two classes of objective points,—objective points of maneuver, and geographical objective points. A geographical objective point may be an important fortress, the line of a river, a front of operations which affords good lines of defense or good points of support for ulterior enterprises. Objective points of maneuver, in contradistinction to geographical objectives, derive their importance from, and their positions depend upon, the situation of the hostile masses.

In strategy, the object of the campaign determines the objective point. If this aim be offensive, the point will be the possession of the hostile capital, or that of a province whose loss would compel the enemy to make peace. In a war of invasion the capital is, ordinarily, the objective point.

More, with reference to risk:

As to the choice of objective points, every thing will generally depend upon the aim of the war and the character which political or other circumstances may give it, and, finally, upon the military facilities of the two parties.

In cases where there are powerful reasons for avoiding all risk, it may be prudent to aim only at the acquisition of partial advantages,—such as the capture of a few towns or the possession of adjacent territory. In other cases, where a party has the means of achieving a great success by incurring great dangers, he may attempt the destruction of the hostile army, as did Napoleon.

Did the Union ever have the political capacity to incur "great dangers"? Demanding great results without incurring great danger is exactly what we would expect of politicians.

There is another class of decisive points to be mentioned, which are determined more from political than from strategic considerations: they play a great part in most coalitions, and influence the operations and plans of cabinets. They may be called political objective points. [...] This subject is so extensive and so complicated that it would be absurd to attempt to reduce it to a few rules. The only one which can be given has just been alluded to, and is, that either the political objective points should be selected according to the principles of strategy, or their consideration should be postponed till after the decisive events of the campaign.

Emphasis added. Have a look.

Ending the war in 1862

A friend recently said to me, "I don't think the war could have ended in 1862." He said that shyly, expecting harrumphs but he was preaching to the choir. As Jay Winik has pointed out, its ending as early as 1865 was quite the fluke - one to be grateful for.

Tim Reese was good enough to pass on this paper to me today by MG JBA Bailey: “Over By Christmas”: Campaigning, Delusions and Force Requirements.

... over the past hundred years military establishments, encouraged and directed by their political masters, have persistently underestimated the length and costs of their campaigns and have frequently had little idea of the actual nature of their undertakings.

It's a sucker's game: the civilians ask for a military estimate and get one. They then enter into war - Politik conducted by other means - making a hash of the military estimate.

Politically-tainted overoptimism has often led to fundamental misappreciation of the nature of a military undertaking. This deficit in imagination and understanding is then, with some resentment, often blamed on “mission creep,” or explained away with clichés masquerading as alibis, asserting that plans “never survive the first contact” or that readily predictable consequences could not have been known in advance.

Politicians hate plans and hate strategy. They are creatures of contingency.

... the serial misbehaviour of which defense establishments and their political masters have been guilty is so apparently irrational and foolish that it may in some way be endemic to the civil-military condition, and not amenable to correction by better training, education or more assiduous staff work.”

McClellan's friend von Moltke the elder (above, right) noted: “when millions of men array themselves opposite each other, and engage in a desperate struggle for their national existence, it is difficult to assume that the question will be settled by a few victories.”

Unless you are a Civil War author.

There is a lot of George McClellan in old von Moltke, including the not entirely fair teaching offered the Prussian General Staff during his tenure that Grant's 1864 plans were simply a revival of McClellan's 1862 strategy.

I should note, by the way, that the business about no plan surviving contact with the enemy is pure von Moltke.

Meanwhile, Bailey has moments of optimism that surprise one:

The criteria for success in this complex battlespace must be headed by an awareness of the strategic environment, an understanding of the desired endstate and its clear articulation.

Good luck with that, my friend. Desired endstates and clear articulation are not exactly stock in trade of the political class. I like it better when you say,

We are after all but actors in a long-running “human comedy.”

A very dark comedy, if you are a soldier, sailor, airman, or marine.

Enjoy this essay by a British major general and understand - I am speaking as a former general staff officer myself - that no American soldier since McClellan would have dared write this piece.

No strategies please, we're politicians

The irritation of this political blogger reminds me of my reaction to Lincoln in the Civil War:

I continue to find myself frustrated by lack of understanding of the reach of the War on Terror. I have yet to hear any offical explain the stragety of the war, and unfortunately the Administration has been reluctant to lay it out as they are afraid of being labeled "War Mongers".

He runs off the rails with "War Mongers," but this pretty well captures how I felt first reading through the cycle "General X submits plan" + "Lincoln fails to comment on plan." I'm not talking about battle plans or campaign plans, I'm talking war-winning strategy.

However, it's not entirely a Lincoln thing. Any administration has ample disincentive to "lay it out." Aside from "security" matters, we can count the inhibitors by analyzing the Civil War experience:

* You don't want the public measuring and judging your progress.

* You don't want commit in advance to a multi-election-cycle plan.

* You don't want to relinquish the freedom to make a large number of ad hoc decisions.

* You don't want people analyzing inevitable political tampering with what they perceive as a purely military plan.

* You don't want your political opponents proposing a concrete and better overall plan.

* You don't want your generals managing you by holding results hostage to men, supplies, etc.

* You don't want anything that smacks of timetable - not in any form, direct or implied, ever.

Those are seven unlucky breaks for national strategists.

Lincoln's aversion to strategy was a function of his political sense.

Shades of Stanton

The biggest laugh you could raise among Civil War politicians of a certain stripe was to say of a general, "He means to win the war by strategy!" Secretary of War Stanton was especially free with this kind of ridicule, denigrating his own commanders in front of reporters, congressmen, and others outside the Administration.

Lincoln himself showed more than a strain of this thinking, opting at one point to employ "the terrible arithmetic" of attrition against the Rebellion. (It was a short-lived decision - in his memoirs, Grant says Lincon asked him to suspend offensive operations after casualties became a political liability.) Lincoln was also party to the sophistry that the Union commander must make the enemy army his objective; in fact you see this error endorsed by pop historians who have not considered that armies need food, water, ammunition, animals, recruits, pay, and camps or bases; and they need open communications with their government, paymasters, and families.

I thought we had come far enough in our understanding of war that the laugh was now on Stanton and friends. Apparently not.

Here is an anti-reform author arguing for attrition warfare. Explicitly. In Praise of Attrition.

Having just won a conventional war against Iraq without an attrition model, this author argues for one, and the argument is as emotional and incoherent as the Civil War critics who despised maneuver and "strategy."

Moral: these people will always be with us.

Storytelling machines

A new Civil War game has been released in time for the holidays: among its other features, in Forge of Freedom, "each state has its own Governor and they will make demands on you and shift their attitudes according to events."

Good - we're starting to integrate the political into a Civil War narrative. I say "narrative" because games are storytelling machines that entertain the player as they unfold their plotlines.

In the age of CGA and EGA graphics, Encyclopedia Brittanica put out a very interesting Civil War game which IIRC was called "No Greater Glory." There was no way the Civil War buff was going to buy or promote the game - it was entirely about Lincoln-level (or Davis-level) war management. It was anti-tactical, the battlefield being a place far beyond the player's direct control.

First, you filled a limited number of cabinet and ambassadorial positions; when done, your appointments had to represent regional and political balances, or there would be lower recruitment and tax revenues from any slighted region and/or loss of political support from slighted Radicals or Conservatives.

Similarly, you made military appointments based on region and seniority. Appointments were made before the campaign phase began. Troops were raised and distributed each season and new troops would depress the efficiency of an older force. There was never enough transport to get men where they were needed. The result was a collection of forces (armies), sometimes far from the front, all awaiting the season's reshuffling of the high command.

With lost battles, generals would lose seniority; you might want a Butler at the bottom of the list anyway. With won battles, they would advance and the player often found himself - due to unforeseen victories - with a Banks, Butler, and McDowell (or a Polk, Pillow, and Bragg) demanding appointment to the three largest armies.

The truly inspired piece of design here was that it took momentum for the Union to win and the player had to work the angles hard to get any sort of momentum going - that means multiple victories on multiple fronts in a single campaign season. The player had minimal control over the fight, as mentioned earlier. He could deliver men and materiel to a force, appoint its commander based on seniority (or take serious political heat), issue orders, then wait. The computer resolved the campaign, informing the player of outcomes.

One charming feature of the game was commanders ignoring orders. The player, then, had the wonderfully queasy feeling of pushing things in a certain direction and hoping for the best.

With momentum, money flowed and recruitments got ever larger; units became seasoned; it became possible to raise black regiments, to emancipate the slaves; etc. Without momentum, the game stalled out in Union failure as support (enlistees, taxes) steadily dropped.

This seemed to be a game based on the Hattaway-Jones premise that Lincoln (and the politicians) perceived the best outcome of the war to be a long series of victories that translated into newspaper headlines, no matter where, no matter when, no matter connected to what war aim or strategy. This series of victories would produce enormous political bounties useful in warmaking and party building.

And so, we see a new Civil War gaming blog written by Brett Schulte's friend Doug Jackson. Perhaps Doug, new to the Civil War, will keep us up to date about new game releases, as Brett has been doing. As a new ACW reader, I expect he'll be more interested in the gaming experience itself - which is a literary experience - than in the accuracy of historical content.

Certainly, it is hard to visit his site and not see the story that games tell.

Spotsylvania County is now a battlefield

The Washington Post has published an article - too frivolous for my taste - on the radical strategy of declaring an entire Virginia county to be one endangered battlefield. The authors of this error, Civil War Preservation Trust, are fairly honest about their motives:

"When we ask for money, they are more likely to give for places like Spotsylvania than for relatively unknown sites in the country. There is a financial incentive on our part to be more involved in Spotsylvania County."

Observe closely. The reporter asked about declaring an entire county to be an endagered battlefield and the CWPT had no answer ready - except its own self-interest.

CWPT is lucky to have a sympathetic government in Spotsylvania at the moment. They are going to need that support, now that they have declared war on every developer, large and small, in that county, through this foolhardy action. They say they are raising a warchest for Spotsylvania interventions.

I'm reminded of Lincoln's rhetorical question to McClellan after he requested permission to fire his corps commanders. To paraphrase: Do you really feel strong enough to put your boot on the throat of Spotsylvania commerce and construction and keep it there?

* You have shown an utter inability to define danger or prioritize conservation.

* You have forfeited any claim to the interpretation of historical significance.

* You appear planless except in raising money.

* You have given no comprehensible reason for declaring an entire county to be one endangered battlefield.

* You have dragged your cause into the gutter of local politics and staked your victory on friendly politicians staying in power and supporting you indefinitely.

Meanwhile, CWPT's link to its own report remains broken.

No strategies please, we're politicians (cont.)

I don't recall if it was ACW historian Herman Hattaway or his colleague Archer Jones (or the two in tandem) who explained the politically optimum course of the war for Lincoln and the Republican Party would have been to fight and win an incremental series of battles leading to the demise of the Rebellion.

This was given in the general context of why Lincoln and/or Congress were so strategy-challenged and why their thinking seemed so odd from a military science viewpoint.

In Civil War texts, the people we style "military professionals" are pictured in opposition to this simplistic thinking; the civilian generals, attuned to the political, embrace it.

With the extensive politicization of the U.S. military during Vietnam and since, with the officer class now giving the political thinking of their civilian masters pride of place in warfighting, the situation is altogether different. I sometimes think of this in reading current news through the lens of Boydian military analysis.

Col. John Boyd's friend William Lind was recently at an Armor Shool conference whence he summarized the higher-level Army mentality, post-Iraq using the Hattaway/Archer insight:

... the assumption behind almost all the briefings was that if we can only accumulate enough tactical victories, we are certain to win strategically as well.

Good heavens, is it 1861? It is something worse if senior soldiers believe this.

Index, 2003-2006 (version 1.0)

Index to series appears at the bottom of the post.

AHA (see also Hoffer)
10/3/2003, 11/19/04, 1/7/05, 1/18/05, 2/8/05, 3/10/05, 3/11/05, 4/29/05

ALPLM
9/19/03, 6/24/04, 7/8/04, 7/16/04, 7/26/04, 10/27/04, 12/1/04, 12/27/04, 1/4/05, 1/20/05, 3/28/05, 4/11/05, 4/12/05, 4/18/05, 4/19/05, 4/26/05, 4/28/05, 5/19/05, 6/24/05, 7/7/05, 7/14/05, 8/15/05, 10/11/05, 12/11/06

ALPLM and Richard Norton Smith
9/30/06, 10/6/03, 10/9/03, 10/10/03, 11/26/03, 12/18/03, 2/4/04, 2/6/04, 2/10/04, 2/12/04, 3/1/04, 3/17/04, 3/18/04, 3/22/04, 4/14/04, 6/4/04, 6/15/04, 8/24/04, 10/6/04, 12/1/04, 2/14/05, 2/18/05, 12/6/05, 2/16/06, 2/17/06

ALPLM and Rick Beard
10/30/06, 10/31/06, 11/25/06, 12/18/06

APSA
12/16/05

Absenteeism (Rebel)
12/26/03, 6/29/06, 7/3/06

Absenteeism (Union, see also “Numbers and Losses”)
11/17/03, 6/2/04

Albert (chess master)
10/26/04

Alito (jurist)
1/12/06

American Heritage (magazine)
9/20/05, 6/23/06, 7/4/06

Aubrecht (blogger)
2/3/06, 2/14/06,

Ayers (author)
8/19/05, 9/16/05, 10/5/05, 10/17/05, 11/2/05, 1/20/06, 2/3/06, 4/3/06

Ball’s Bluff (battle)
1/20/06

Banks (general)
5/31/06

Baseball - ACW
3/31/05, 4/4/05, 5/17/05

Battlefield guides
9/1/03

Baudrillard (philosopher)
10/14/04, 10/15/04, 10/18/04, 2/11/05, 9/8/05

Bearss (author)
8/17/05

Beatie (author)
10/8/03, 11/10/04, 11/11/04, 1/4/05, 1/5/05, 3/22/05, 3/30/05, 3/31/05, 4/6/05, 4/28/05, 5/9/05, 9/12/05, 10/18/05, 4/14/06, 5/17/06, 6/28/06, 8/12/06, 8/18/06, 9/17/06, 10/12/06, 11/03/06, 11/19/06, 12/19/06

Benko (chess master)
11/18/05, 11/21/05

Bierce (author)
6/9/04, 1/10/05, 5/16/05

Bloch
11/11/03

Blogs of the ACW
5/21/04, 12/6/04, 2/1/05, 2/24/05, 3/11/05, 3/17/05, 6/27/05, 9/6/05, 10/7/05, 11/30/05, 1/16/06, 3/13/06, 3/21/06, 5/19/06, 7/17/06, 9/21/06, 9/25/06, 10/12/06, 11/10/06, 11/14/06, 11/17/06, 12/20/06

Blunt (general)
12/11/05, 12/12/05

Bonekemper (author)
5/12/04, 8/22/05, 4/18/06

Boritt (author)
2/16/04, 10/30/06, 12/5/06

Boyd (military theorist)
6/28/04, 10/1/04, 5/6/05, 6/6/05, 7/8/05

Brady (photographer)
1/23/06, 10/18/06

Brautigan (author)
1/20/06,

Brooks (author)
4/18/06, 4/20/06

Brooksher (author)
5/9/06, 5/22/06

Brown (author)
7/11/05

Brown (revolutionary)
11/25/03, 8/18/04

Buchanan (president)
5/5/05, 7/26/05

Buchanan’s “Public Man”
7/26/05

Buell (author)
9/21/05

Buford N (general)
10/13/05, 10/14/05

Bundy (author)
2/27/06

Bunting (author)
11/24/04, 8/22/05, 4/18/06

Burns (TV producer)
9/16/05, 10/5/05, 10/27/06

Burnside (general, see also “Sprague”)
11/5/03, 1/29/04, 2/4/04, 12/6/04, 2/1/05, 8/2/05

Burton (author)
7/4/06

Butler (general, see also Robertson)
11/10/04, 8/4/05, 1/4/06, 10/18/06

Butterfield (philosopher)
9/26/05, 9/27/05

Butternut & Blue (publisher)
10/7/03

CSA (movie)
12/3/03, 3/2/05, 9/16/05, 10/10/05, 8/2/06, 10/1/06

C-SPAN
8/16/04

CVBT
12/22/05,

CWPT
3/2/04, 3/3/04, 3/4/04, 3/5/04, 3/6/04, 3/7/04, 3/10/04, 3/16/04, 4/6/04, 4/7/04, 4/8/04, 6/4/04, 8/13/04, 9/22/04, 9/24/04, 1/11/05, 1/12/05, 2/22/05, 2/24/05, 2/25/05, 3/17/05, 4/1/05, 4/27/05, 4/29/05, 5/5/05, 11/15/05, 12/12/05, 12/30/05, 1/31/06, 2/15/06, 2/21/06, 3/1/06, 3/8/06, 6/21/06, 9/29/06

Carhart (author)
4/28/05, 11/22/52

Catton (author)
9/22/04, 11/11/04, 12/13/04, 12/14/04, 4/29/05, 5/5/05, 3/16/06, 5/31/06

Causes of the ACW
12/9/03

Cavalry doctrine (see also series)
1/17/05, 1/4/06, 8/28/06

Centennialism (also Nevins, Catton, Williams, McPherson, et al)
9/10/03, 9/12/03, 4/12/05, 1/20/06, 6/20/06, 7/4/06

Chamberlain (general)
2/4/04, 6/3/06

Cheney (veep)
1/26/04, 5/13/04

Citations, electronic media
4/7/06, 9/7/06

Clark (politician) as McClellan
10/1/03, 10/2/03, 10/28/03, 3/30/04, 11/2/04, 8/24/05

Clay (Whig)
6/11/04

Clemens (author)
4/22/04, 5/11/05

Cline (blogger)
9/3/03, 9/4/03, 9/22/04, 5/25/05

Clinton (author)
11/22/05

Cold Mountain (movie)
10/30/03, 12/11/03, 12/16/03, 12/17/03, 12/18/03, 12/21/03, 12/24/03, 12/25/03, 12/29/03, 2/6/04, 2/10/04

Collier (author)
7/6/04

Comments, blog
4/28/06

Comte de Paris, diary
9/8/06

Confederate flags
10/14/03, 11/25/03, 12/4/03, 2/24/04, 8/26/04, 9/3/04, 9/7/04

Conflicts of interest (authors)
2/25/04, 2/26/04, 2/27/04

Connelly (author)
5/18/06, 6/27/06, 6/28/06, 11/3/06

Constitution (“pact with hell”)
9/29/05

Contingency, historical
4/14/05, 4/16/05, 1/23/06, 1/24/06, 2/9/06

Cormack (blogger)
5/24/05, 7/8/05, 9/19/05

Cotton trading (illegal, see also Sprague, Chase, McDowell)
5/19/04, 6/22/04, 7/21/05, 9/12/06

Cramer (blogger)
10/5/05

Crampton’s Gap (see also Reese)
10/6/03, 1/14/04, 3/30/04, 4/30/04, 8/25/05, 12/8/04, 1/6/05, 1/20/05, 2/14/05, 2/15/05, 2/16/05, 6/13/05, 12/15/05, 1/6/09, 1/13/06, 1/18/06

Crane (author)
2/18/04

Cricket (American game)
8/23/05

Crimean War (see also Moten and “Cavalry Doctrine” series)
4/21/04

Cross (bolgger)
9/30/05

Cult of celebrity
10/23/03

Custer (general)
4/11/05

Dail (blogger)
3/27/06, 9/21/06

Darien (GA)
5/29/06, 5/30/06

Davis (author)
12/21/04, 5/25/05, 3/1/06, 8/7/06

Davis (secwar, see also series on “Cavalry Doctrine”)
1/17/05, 1/19/05, 8/28/06, 8/30/06

Davis (rebel)
9/7/05, 9/8/05

Decoration Day
5/31/04, 5/30/05

Denikin (general)
10/4/05

Dennison (governor)
11/24/03,

Desjardin (author)
12/8/03, 9/19/05, 10/24/05, 11/29/05

Detzer (author)
11/11/04, 8/7/06, 10/8/06

Dirck (blogger)
2/13/06

Doctorow (author)
8/17/05, 9/21/05, 4/17/06

Donald (author)
12/16/03, 3/26/04, 5/3/04, 9/12/05, 9/16/05, 5/5/06

Donizetti (composer, see also “Music”)
11/16/04

Doubleday (general)
8/24/06

Downey (blogger)
4/1/06, 8/30/06, 9/8/06, 9/22/06, 10/30/06

Economics and business of ACW
12/7/04, 7/13/05, 7/24/06, 7/31/06

Eicher (author)
8/11/05, 4/24/06

Eicher and Eicher (authors)
12/12/05, 2/7/06,

Emerson and Sumner
1/3/06

Ericsson (naval architect)
9/26/05

Fishel (author)
10/31/06

Fischer (author)
12/16/03, 9/15/04, 9/16/04, 9/17/04, 9/20/04, 9/21/04, 12/20/04, 8/25/05

Fitness
9/20/05, 9/30/05

Fleming (author)
6/28/04, 7/13/04

Foote (author)
11/25/03, 11/11/04, 12/9/04, 5/17/05, 6/29/05, 6/30/05, 7/13/05, 7/18/05, 7/21/05, 7/25/05, 8/5/05, 8/16/05, 9/29/05, 4/4/06

Ford’s Theatre
6/25/04

Franco-Prussian War
2/4/04

Franklin (general – see also Snell)
6/30/06

Fulgham (author)
10/12/05

Gallagher (author)
11/20/03, 2/9/04, 3/12/04, 7/23/04, 12/21/04, 3/28/05, 4/11/05, 4/27/05, 8/5/05, 9/12/05, 6/11/06, 7/26/06

Garfield (president)
1/21/05, 8/12/05

Gettysburg (address)
11/8/06, 11/9/06

Gettysburg (casino)
5/2/05, 5/16/05, 5/31/05, 10/5/05, 11/8/05, 4/6/06, 12/21/06

Gettysburg (movie)
7/30/04, 6/10/05

Ghosts
10/31/03

Gingrich and Forstchen (authors)
6/23/04, 7/5/04, 8/10/05, 4/20/06

Glasgow (author)
12/1/03

Glory (movie)
7/30/04

Gods and Generals (movie)
7/30/04

Goodwin (author)
9/20/04, 1/24/05, 7/12/05, 8/03/05, 8/19/05, 9/12/05, 9/30/05, 10/20/05, 10/25/05, 11/1/05, 11/16/05, 11/18/05, 11/28/05, 2/13/06

Goodwin (movie)
6/23/05, 7/12/05

Goss (author)
8/28/03, 9/21/03, 5/7/04, 12/17/04

Grant (general)
5/13/04, 9/20/04, 9/29/04, 11/24/04, 11/29/04, 2/3/05, 4/27/05, 5/2/05, 5/3/05, 5/5/05, 8/19/05, 9/14/05, 9/30/05, 1/2/06, 5/31/06, 12/19/06

Graves (author)
9/21/04, 9/22/04

Griffith (author)
2/9/06

Grimsley (author)
4/8/04, 8/11/04, 2/2/05, 2/3/05, 2/23/05, 2/24/05, 3/11/05, 3/17/05, 5/3/05, 5/20/05, 7/14/05, 8/4/05, 8/16/05, 8/18/05, 8/25/05, 9/9/05, 9/15/05, 11/6/05, 3/21/06, 5/31/06, 9/8/06, 10/12/06, 10/22/06, 11/14/06, 11/17/06

Grombowicz (author)
2/10/05, 2/11/05

Guelzo (author)
5/20/04, 6/3/04, 12/9/04, 4/22/05

Hackworth (military analyst)
5/23/05

Hagerman (author)
11/7/05

Hagmaier (blogger)
5/24/05, 5/27/05, 6/1/05, 6/9/05, 7/20/05, 2/9/06, 2/10/06,

Halleck (general: see also “Marszalek”)
11/30/04, 6/1/05, 6/2/05, 6/3/05, 6/6/05, 6/16/05

Handlin (historian)
1/23/06

Hanson (author)
4/28/04

Hardeee (general)
8/30/06

Harsh (author)
4/15/05, 5/2/05, 6/28/06, 10/31/06

Hartwig (historian)
8/26/04

Hats (military)
12/11/05, 12/14/05

Hattaway (author)
3/15/04, 4/22/04, 2/22/05, 8/9/06, 12/4/06

Heintzelman (general)
8/12/06, 9/15/06

Helmets (McClellan)
3/9/05

Helmets (McDowell, see also helmet series)
9/11/06

Hennessy (historian)
6/30/04, 3/28/05, 7/8/05, 9/13/06

Heritage tourism
10/24/03, 10/29/03, 10/30/03, 11/05, 11/19/03, 12/12/03, 1/28/04, 1/30/04, 2/3/04, 3/16/04, 3/19/04, 3/21/04, 3/30/04, 4/9/04, 4/29/04, 7/1/04, 8/20/04, 10/18/04, 2/25/05, 3/8/05, 3/10/05, 4/20/05, 5/16/05, 5/18/05, 9/22/05, 12/1/05, 6/21/06, 7/16/06, 7/18/06, 8/4/06, 8/8/06, 8/16/06, 10/4/06, 12/6/06, 12/11/06, 12/22/06

Hicks (author)
8/29/05, 8/30/05

Hindemith (composer)
4/29/04

Historical markers
9/11/03

Historical time
2/19/04, 10/11/06

History (curriculum)
12/9/03, 1/26/04, 3/26/04, 4/14/04, 5/14/04, 10/15/04, 3/15/05, 5/18/05, 6/8/05, 5/16/06, 12/1/06

History (ethics)
10/3/2003, 3/10/05, 3/11/05, 3/17/05

History and evidence
10/21/03, 6/14/04, 6/15/04, 1/27/05

History via punditry
9/8/2003, 8/18/05, 8/23/05, 8/24/05, 7/17/06, 12/27/06

Hobsbawm (author)
6/5/06, 6/6/06

Hoffer (author)
9/20/04, 10/25/04, 11/15/04, 11/19/04, 12/30/04, 2/1/05, 5/3/05

Hood (general)
11/17/04, 5/31/06, 10/17/06

Howard (general)
5/26/06, 5/27/06

Hyperreality
See Baudrillard

Ingram (wholesaler)
12/10/04, 8/18/05,

“Iron Brigade”
1/22/04

Ironclads
11/4/03, 3/22/05, 3/24/05, 5/3/05, 6/8/05

Jack (ACW ripper)
7/26/04

Jaffa (author)
2/16/04, 5/20/05

James (thief)
9/13/04

Johnson (president)
12/28/04

Johnston J (general, see also “Cavalry Doctrine”)
8/28/06, 8/30/06, 10/8/06, 10/31/06

Jomini vs. Clausewitz
3/29/04, 12/2/05, 12/6/05

Jones (author)
11/5/04, 2/22/05, 4/15/05, 8/9/06, 11/03/06

Juneteenth
1/2/04, 6/22/04

Kearny (general, see also Styple)
10/17/06, 11/9/06

Keegan (author)
11/28/03

Kelly (sculptor)
See Styple

Keyes (general)
8/18/06

Keyes (politician)
8/23/04

Koepke (blogger)
9/9/05

Korda (author)
11/24/04, 7/15/05, 8/22/05, 4/18/06

Lander (general)
1/5/05

Larabee (author)
8/18/05, 9/22/05, 1/5/06

Lasker (chess master)
5/18/06

Last Full Measure (movie)
7/30/04, 10/6/04, 7/24/06

Last Samurai (movie)
11/10/03, 12/5/03

Law and Supreme Court
10/27/03, 11/3/03, 2/17/04

Le Carre (author)
12/21/05

Lee (general)
5/12/04, 8/2/04, 9/22/04, 11/9/04, 10/14/05, 1/20/06, 10/31/06

Leech (author)
2/4/05, 3/14/05

Lehrman (philanthropist)
8/24/04

Levin (blogger)
11/30/05, 1/16/06, 2/8/06, 4/3/06, 4/4/06, 10/31/06

Limbaugh (radio host – see also “Clark”)
8/24/05

Lincoln (advertising)
1/28/04, 2/22/05, 9/12/06, 9/15/06

Lincoln (assassination)
8/24/04, 12/9/04, 4/5/05, 9/21/05, 1/3/05

Lincoln (corpse)
11/6/03

Lincoln and Declaration (see also “Keyes, politician” and “Constitution”)
8/23/04, 8/24/04

Lincoln (gay)
9/18/03, 12/23/04, 1/18/05, 2/16/05

Lincoln impersonators
1/28/04, 3/23/04

Lincoln Institute
8/24/04

Lincoln (legends)
5/3/05, 10/22/06

Lincoln as Maguffin
1/31/05, 2/7/05, 3/3/05

“Lincoln/McClellan Syndrome”
6/17/05

Lincoln (opponents)
10/13/04, 3/2/05

Lincoln (property, see also series “Social Identity”)
2/14/05

Lincoln (psychology)
9/22/05, 3/27/06, 5/5/06

Lincoln Prize (see also “Borrit”)
2/13/04, 2/13/06, 2/27/06

Lincoln voice recordings/speeches
7/12/04, 7/21/08, 1/12/05

Lincoln (war powers)
7/23/06

Lind (military analyst)
10/1/04, 5/6/05, 7/8/05

Livermore (historian)
See “Numbers and Losses”

Local historians
11/13/03, 11/27/03, 3/31/04, 8/2/06

Longstreet (general)
8/7/06

Loring (general)
9/20/05

Lost Order
7/23/04, 9/22/04, 9/25/04

Lost Cause (see also “Lost Cause” series)
6/5/06, 6/6/06, 6/11/06

Lowry (author)
10/27/03, 2/17/04, 1/25/06

Lukacs (author)
4/16/04

Luker (historian)
8/4/05, 10/5/05

Mandelbrot (mathematician)
3/23/05, 4/15/05

Marquand (author)
8/1/06

Marvel (author)
4/28/04, 9/4/06, 11/14/06, 11/17/06

Marszalek (author)
11/30/04, 6/1/05, 6/2/05, 6/16/05

Marx and Engels (revolutionaries)
10/28/03, 6/3/04

Maxwell (filmmaker)
6/9/04, 7/30/04, 10/6/04, 1/20/06, 2/8/06, 3/22/06, 7/24/06, 8/22/06

McClellan, Dr. G
1/2/06

McClellan (lost telegram date)
2/26/04

McClellan and Jackson
5/5/04, 5/10/04

McClellan, Max
1/2/06

McClellan poetry
3/13/04, 3/20/04, 3/27/04, 4/3/04, 4/4/04, 4/10/04, 4/17/04, 4/24/04, 5/1/04, 5/8/04, 5/15/04, 5/22/04, 5/29/04, 6/5/04, 6/12/04, 6/17/04, 6/20/04, 6/26/04, 7/3/04, 7/10/04, 7/17/04, 7/24/04, 7/31/04, 8/8/04, 8/15/04, 8/21/04, 8/28/04, 9/4/04, 9/11/04, 9/18/04, 10/2/04, 10/16/04

“McClellan Rangers”
8/3/05, 8/4/05, 8/8/05

McClellan replacements (notional)
10/13/05, 10/31/05,

McLuhan (media analyst)
1/17/06, 4/4/06

McCullough (author)
9/12/05

McDonald (author)
12/6/04

McDowell (general, see also “Helmets” series)
12/12/05, 12/15/05, 8/9/06, 9/11/06, 9/12/06, 9/13/06, 9/17/06

McDowell (colonel)
9/12/06, 9/13/06

McDowell (paymaster)
See “Cotton Trading”

McFeely (author)
2/23/04, 2/24/04, 8/22/05, 9/12/05

McMurry (author)
5/24/04

McPherson (author)
12/13/04, 12/15/04, 2/23/05, 3/28/05, 5/3/05, 8/29/05, 9/16/05, 10/24/05, 11/2/05, 4/27/06, 6/23/06, 7/4/06, 11/7/06, 12/22/06

McPherson (illustrated Battle Cry)
9/11/03, 11/14/03

McPherson (celebrity)
1/12/2004, 2/9/04, 2/11/04, 2/12/04, 3/15/04, 4/8/04, 4/28/04, 5/21/04, 9/20/04, 10/5/04, 11/11/04, 12/2/04, 12/3/04, 2/15/05, 5/6/05, 6/14/05, 8/1/05, 8/3/05, 8/5/05, 8/8/05, 8/19/05, 8/25/05, 9/15/05, 9/22/05, 10/5/05, 11/22/05, 12/2/05, 12/7/05

Meade (general)
5/31/06

Meigs (general)
6/30/06, 9/13/06

Medicine (ACW)
8/12/05, 11/28/05, 4/24/06

Mexican War vets
2/19/04

Military history
8/11/04, 1/13/05, 9/20/06, 10/12/06, 10/22/06

Military reform (see also Boyd, also series)
6/28/04, 5/6/05, 7/8/05, 9/14/05, 11/28/05, 2/9/06, 6/23/06

Military science
11/3/03, 1/20/04, 7/2/04, 10/1/04, 10/26/04, 11/5/04

Miller R (author)
8/24/04, 8/26/05, 10/20/05, 10/25/05, 12/10/05, 2/24/06, 4/4/06

Von Moeltke (general)
4/26/06

Montgomery (author)
1/3/06

Morningside books
9/17/03, 1/15/06

Morphy (chess master, see also “Scott”)
7/2/4, 9/16/04

Morton (governor)
11/24/03

Mosier (author)
12/13/04, 1/26/05

Moten (author – see “Cavalry Doctrine” series)
9/7/06

Mozart
9/3/04

Mummers
1/2/04, 1/1/05

Music of the ACW
2/20/04, 4/13/04, 4/14/04, 4/18/04, 4/26/04, 5/24/04, 5/25/04, 7/23/04, 9/3/04, 11/16/04, 3/7/05, 3/8/05, 11/1/05, 7/16/06

Muslims and the ACW
9/8/04, 9/14/04

NPS
8/29/03, 9/9/03, 9/19/03, 9/29/03, 10/7/03, 10/22/03, 12/4/03, 1/21/04, 3/10/04, 6/29/04, 2/4/05, 5/26/05, 7/1/05, 7/20/05, 9/7/05

Naglee (general)
10/22/04

Navies of the ACW
10/20/03, 11/4/03, 12/2/03, 3/8/04, 3/29/04, 3/22/05, 3/24/05, 5/3/05, 6/8/05, 8/5/05, 5/12/06, 7/30/06

Neely (author)
11/29/05, 1/25/06, 5/18/06, 6/20/06, 6/26/06, 6/28/06

Nevins (plagiarism)
12/23/03

Nevins (author, see also “Centennialism” and “American Heritage”)
1/16/04, 11/11/04, 11/24/04, 12/13/04, 1/23/06, 6/23/06, 7/4/06

New paradigms
10/15/03, 3/28/05, 4/7/05

Newton (author)
3/28/05

Nolan (author)
1/22/04, 6/11/06

Nosworthy (author)
3/4/05, 3/23/05, 3/24/05, 3/28/05, 4/7/05, 4/15/05, 2/9/06,

Nous
4/25/06

Numbers and losses (see also series “Numerolgy”)
11/17/03, 9/7/04, 10/27/04, 10/29/04, 11/3/04, 1/3/05, 6/7/05, 6/28/05, 6/26/06, 10/1/06, 10/3/06, 10/5/06, 10/8/06, 10/9/06, 10/23/06, 10/25/06, 10/26/06, 10/30/06, 10/31/06

OAH
8/4/05

Olcott (ACW Buddhist)
8/2/05

Olmsted (landscaper)
9/13/05

POW
6/10/04

Painting the ACW
10/13/03, 10/24/03, 7/1/04, 8/16/04, 10/19/04, 11/9/04, 6/2/05, 6/17/05, 4/17/06

“Parasocial relationships”
7/29/05,

Patterson (general)
10/29/04, 11/12/04, 9/7/05

Perrett (author)
3/22/05, 4/26/05

Perry (author)
8/22/05

Pershing (general)
6/28/04, 11/10/06

Phillips (author)
6/24/05, 7/25/05

Pinkerton (detective; see also “Numerology” series)
10/16/03, 8/23/06

Plagiarism
9/14/04, 9/27/04, 9/28/04, 10/1/04, 10/4/04, 10/8/04, 1/6/05, 2/8/05, 3/10/05, 4/27/05, 4/29/05, 5/2/05, 5/3/05, 5/5/05, 5/9/05, 5/13/05, 7/21/05, 8/4/05, 10/5/05, 11/18/05, 9/15/06, 9/22/06, 11/14/06, 11/15/06, 12/7/06, 12/8/06

Pleasanton (general)
11/21/06, 11/22/06

Pohanka (author)
10/30/03, 6/20/05, 8/4/05, 9/30/05, 3/14/06,

Polk (president)
9/15/04, 1/3/06

Political generals (see also “Goss”)
5/11/04, 5/13/04

Pop history
11/23/04, 5/10/05, 5/19/05, 5/20/05, 5/31/05, 6/21/05, 8/1/05, 9/15/05, 11/7/05, 12/21/05, 1/3/06, 6/23/06, 12/28/06

Pop history (master narrative)
8/27/03, 9/3/03, 9/4/03, 4/29/04, 8/4/04, 9/22/04, 5/11/05, 6/25/05, 7/7/05, 9/27/06, 12/27/06

Popper (philosopher)
1/12/06, 6/5/06, 6/6/06

Porter (general)
11/21/06

Poulter (editor)
5/13/05, 10/3/05

Preservation
3/24/04, 3/25/04, 4/2/04, 4/5/04, 4/12/04, 4/22/04, 5/6/04, 7/9/04, 7/15/04, 8/3/04, 8/12/04, 8/25/05, 8/30/04, 8/31/04, 9/1/04, 9/2/04, 9/3/04, 9/7/04, 9/9/04, 9/10/04, 9/13/04, 9/15/04, 9/16/04, 9/17/04, 9/20/04, 10/4/04, 10/8/04, 10/20/04, 10/21/04, 10/22/04, 10/24/04, 10/25/04, 11/01/04, 11/02/04, 11/3/04, 11/10/04, 11/22/04, 12/2/04, 12/20/04, 1/5/05, 1/21/05, 1/27/05, 1/28/05, 2/9/05, 2/16/05, 2/18/05, 2/23/05, 2/28/05, 4/1/05, 4/25/05, 5/17/05, 6/27/05, 7/6/05, 7/25/05, 7/27/05, 8/2/05, 8/3/06, 9/7/05, 9/8/05, 11/29/05, 12/1/05, 3/1/06, 3/7/06, 3/8/06, 5/23/06, 5/24/06, 6/22/06, 12/26/06

Priest (author)
3/28/05

Prokopowicz (radio host)
5/13/05, 6/22/05, 7/14/05, 10/3/05, 10/17/05, 10/21/05, 1/25/06, 7/4/06

“Public history”
12/5/03, 12/19/03, 6/30/04, 7/9/04, 8/16/04, 11/18/04, 12/8/04, 12/10/04, 12/23/04, 1/13/05, 2/1/05, 2/7/05, 2/9/05, 3/2/05, 3/14/05, 3/18/05, 3/21/05, 4/6/05, 5/11/05, 5/13/05, 5/25/05, 6/8/05, 6/13/05, 6/21/05, 11/29/05, 7/30/06

Publishing (foibles)
2/2/04, 8/16/04, 9/8/04, 11/16/04, 1/25/05, 5/19/05, 5/23/05, 5/31/05, 10/12/05, 11/6/05, 1/12/06, 1/13/06, 9/3/06

Publishing (tech)
6/25/04, 1/25/05, 3/22/05, 5/4/05, 3/15/06, 4/4/06, 4/5/06, 6/1/06, 6/5/06, 6/18/06, 7/17/06, 9/11/06, 9/22/06

Publishing (trends, see also series on sales figures)
11/26/04, 12/7/04, 12/8/04, 12/9/04, 12/10/04, 12/13/04, 12/21/04, 12/23/04, 12/24/04, 12/28/04, 12/29/04, 12/30/04, 12/31/04, 5/4/05, 5/9/05, 5/17/05, 9/6/06, 11/13/06

Rafuse (author, see also “Command Crisis” series)
5/11/05, 5/12/05, 5/27/05, 6/9/05, 6/13/05, 7/11/05, 7/20/05, 10/18/05, 1/30/06, 5/31/06, 8/24/06, 9/19/06, 11/03/06

Railroads
4/14/05, 5/4/05

Randall (author)
9/16/05, 12/7/05, 4/3/06

Ransom (alternative history)
8/16/05, 8/18/05

Rawley (author)
12/7/05

Ray (author)
1/23/06

Reagan (president)
6/7/04, 6/11/04,

Reality TV, ACW
1/1/04, 11/6/06

Reconstruction
8/26/05

Reed (author)
1/14/05

Reenacting
5/4/04, 6/18/04, 8/17/04, 9/28/04, 5/10/05, 10/3/05, 7/19/06, 8/22/06

Reenacting (opposition to)
11/20/03, 4/21/04, 1/19/05

Reenactors, drunken
10/3/06, 11/24/03, 5/19/04

Reese (author; see also High-Water Mark series)
9/1/03, 10/6/03, 1/14/04, 1/22/04, 2/26/04, 3/31/04, 4/22/04, 4/30/04, 5/21/04, 6/16/04, 6/22/04, 7/8/04, 7/30/04, 8/25/05, 1/11/05 , 1/20/05, 2/16/05, 3/8/05, 5/13/05, 5/24/05, 5/27/05, 6/13/05, 9/22/05, 12/15/05, 12/16/05, 1/9/06, 1/13/06, 1/18/06, 3/1/06, 4/4/06, 6/5/06, 6/18/06, 9/11/06, 9/12/06, 9/13/06,

Republicans
10/24/03, 11/24/03, 3/24/04, 4/27/04, 1/24/06, 3/13/06, 11/1/06

Research failures
10/8/03, 10/17/03, 11/28/03, 12/19/03, 12/30/03, 12/31/03, 1/5/04, 1/9/04, 1/14/04, 2/26/04, 5/25/04, 11/17/04

Research (failures, McPherson)
11/28/03

Research (failures, Sears)
1/5/03, 1/6/04, 1/7/04, 1/8/04, 1/11/04

Ride with the Devil (movie)
7/30/04

Ridgway (author)
8/24/05

Robb (military analyst)
6/6/05, 7/22/05, 11/10/06

Robertson (author)
1/4/06

Ropes (author)
6/30/04

Roundtables
10/7/04

Rowland (author)
4/7/05, 4/12/05, 4/13/05, 4/15/05, 5/27/05, 7/5/05, 9/11/06

Ruhlman (author)
9/4/06, 11/14/06, 11/15/06, 11/17/06

Rumsfeld (secdef)
5/13/04

Savas (publisher, incl. Savas Beatie)
9/22/04, 1/28/05, 4/6/05, 8/4/05, 3/1/06, 4/14/06, 4/17/06, 5/17/06, 6/7/06, 11/3/06, 11/19/06

Schofield (see also “Connelly”)
10/17/06, 11/03/06

Schulte (blogger)
9/6/05, 9/9/05, 9/19/05, 9/28/05, 10/18/05, 1/6/05, 4/18/06

Schwartz (historian)
5/13/05, 11/25/06

Sci-fi ACW
11/23/05

Scott (general)
4/23/04, 9/16/04, 1/19/05

Sears (author)
7/23/04, 9/22/04, 9/25/04, 12/20/04, 3/4/05, 3/28/05, 8/9/05, 8/19/05, 8/29/05, 9/12/05, 3/16/06

Sears (Gettysburg)
12/10/03, 2/11/04

Sears (Civil War Papers of GBM)
1/7/04, 1/8/04, 1/9/04, 1/11/04, 4/4/06,

Shaara, J (author)
2/9/04, 4/29/04, 12/22/04, 8/10/05, 9/12/05, 9/25/06

Shackel (author)
11/21/03, 11/25/03, 11/27/03

Shepherdstown (battle)
7/27/05, 7/29/05, 9/9/05, 1/20/06, 3/14/06

Sheridan (general, see also “Little Phil” series)
2/4/04, 5/24/04, 5/25/04, 6/6/05, 9/26/05

Sherlock (author)
9/22/04, 3/16/06

Sherman T (general)
8/02/04

Sherman W (brother of senator)
3/14/05, 3/17/05, 1/2/06, 10/17/06

Silman (chess master)
7/2/04, 5/18/06

Simon (author)
2/16/04, 2/20/04, 2/23/04, 4/14/04, 6/15/04, 12/1/04, 3/28/05, 6/23/05, 7/14/05, 9/15/05,

Simpson (author)
2/23/04, 11/22/04, 11/29/04, 3/22/05, 3/28/05, 5/12/05, 9/16/05, 3/21/06, 10/22/06, 12/19/06

Slavery
2/5/04, 7/26/04, 10/08/04, 3/2/05, 6/9/06, 7/20/06

Slavery (reparations)
12/9/03, 12/23/03, 4/20/04, 8/23/04, 10/04/05

Smeltzer (blogger, about)
11/17/05, 5/16/06, 5/24/06, 6/2/06, 9/13/06, 11/6/06, 11/13/06, 12/8/06

Smeltzer (blogged by)
5/25/06, 5/26/06, 5/27/06, 5/29/06, 5/30/06, 5/31/06, 6/1/06

Smith W (general)
11/8/04, 11/10/04

Smith, J (author)
2/23/04, 4/27/05, 4/29/05, 5/2/05, 5/3/05, 5/5/05, 8/22/05

Smith T (author)
6/28/05

Smithsonian
4/21/06

Snell (author)
1/5/04, 1/6/04, 4/15/04, 4/22/04, 8/30/04, 5/11/05, 6/22/05, 6/30/06

Sprague (governor, see also “Cotton Trading,” and “Burnside”)
9/12/06

Springfield (IL)
8/6/04, 10/11/04, 2/7/05, 1/16/06

Stanton (secwar)
6/2/04, 6/8/04, 2/4/05

“Stevens Floating Battery”
3/4/05, 12/7/06

Stotelmyer (lecturer)
8/25/04, 8/26/04, 1/6/05, 2/14/05, 2/15/05, 2/16/05

Strain (painter)
8/16/04, 4/19/05

Strategy (see also military reform)
5/6/05, 6/24/05, 4/26/06

Striner (author)
11/29/06

Styple (author)
2/3/06, 4/13/06, 10/17/06, 11/21/06, 11/22/06, 12/5/06

Sumner (general)
8/24/06, 8/28/06, 8/30/06

Sumner (senator)
1/3/06

Sumner and Sumner
1/4/06, 8/28/06

Sun Tzu (theoretician)
10/1/04

Surgeons’ headcounts (see also series “Numerology” and “Numbers and Losses”)
6/7/05

Sweeny (general)
7/21/04

Symonds (author)
7/30/06

Taaffe (author – see also series on Corps Commanders)
5/18/06, 8/9/06, 8/10/06, 8/12/06, 8/18/06, 8/24/06, 9/17/06, 10/12/06

Taleb (contingency theorist)
4/14/05, 4/15/05, 1/23/06,

Taney (chief justice)
12/31/03

Tidball (general)
9/13/06

Timrod (poet)
7/19/05

Todman (blogger)
8/23/05

Trading cards, ACW
7/12/04

Trefousse (author)
11/28/05, 11/29/05, 12/7/05, 11/29/06

Tsouras (editor)
5/24/04, 5/25/04, 5/26/04, 5/27/04, 5/28/04, 6/1/04, 6/2/04, 6/3/04, 6/4/04, 6/6/05, 6/8/04

Tubman biographies
1/27/04

Turchin (general)
4/11/05, 9/7/06

USV (institution)
9/23/05

Updike (author)
5/5/05

Upton (general)
7/14/05

Valee (ufologist)
6/11/06

Vandalism
11/7/03, 11/24/03, 12/2/03, 1/21/04, 10/12/04, 11/15/04, 2/17/05, 5/27/05, 6/20/05, 7/5/05, 8/25/05, 10/10/05, 1/9/06, 5/1/06

Vandergriff (military analyst)
5/23/05

Veterans (fake)
11/18/03, 4/28/04

Vidal (author)
12/21/04, 3/3/05, 9/12/05

Voegelin (philosopher)
4/14/04, 12/16/05, 4/25/06, 6/11/06

WWI
11/11/03, 11/11/04, 12/22/04, 2/4/05, 2/8/05, 11/11/05, 6/29/06, 11/10/06

Wade (senator)
11/22/06, 11/27/06

Wagenhoffer (game designer)
6/3/05, 6/7/05, 9/6/05, 9/7/05, 9/9/05, 9/19/05, 11/7/05, 5/22/06, 8/7/06

Waud (illustrator)
11/19/06

Waugh (author)
4/14/04

Washburn(e)s (any, all)
3/1/05

Weigley (author)
3/15/04, 4/1/04

Western theatre
6/15/06, 6/19/06, 7/12/06, 11/30/06

Whigs
3/25/05, 5/12/05

Whig theory of history
9/26/05

Willards (hotel)
7/28/04, 8/18/04, 12/15/04, 10/20/05, 10/21/05,

Williams F (author)
5/13/05

Williams K (author)
12/13/04

Williams T (author)
12/10/04, 11/29/05, 3/16/06

Williamsburg (battle)
8/3/04, 1/21/05, 11/3/06, 12/19/06

Wilson (author)
7/19/05, 7/24/06, 7/31/06

Winik (author)
2/22/05, 4/6/05, 5/6/05, 8/8/05, 8/18/05, 4/26/06, 7/6/06, 11/10/06

Wirz (commandant)
9/4/06

Wittenberg (author – see also Little Phil series)
6/6/05, 6/22/05, 9/6/05, 9/26/05, 10/3/05, 10/14/05, 11/6/05, 11/18/05, 11/29/05, 1/4/06, 1/15/06, 3/1/06, 3/14/06, 4/5/06, 4/14/06, 6/7/06, 8/10/06, 10/17/06

“Who are you?”
3/26/04

Woodbury (blogger)
12/10/05, 1/20/06, 2/8/06, 4/14/06, 5/22/06

Woodward (author)
9/16/05, 11/2/05

Woodworth (author)
5/4/4, 3/21/06, 5/31/06

Wrangel (general)
10/04/05

Yates
11/24/03


SERIES LISTING
(Chronological order)

The State of Civil War History
9/22/03, 9/23/03, 9/24/03, 9/25/03, 9/26/03

Military Reform Now and Then
5/13/04, 5/14/04, 5/16/04, 5/17/04, 5/18/04, 5/19/04, 5/20/04, 5/21/04, 5/28/04

High-Water Mark
7/14/04, 7/16/04, 7/20/04, 7/22/04, 7/27/04, 7/29/04, 8/3/04, 8/5/04, 8/10/04, 8/12/04, 8/19/04, 8/20/04

Fallacies of Abundance
9/23/04, 9/25/04

No Strategies Please, We’re Politicians
9/30/04, 10/1/04,

ACW Hyperreality
10/14/04, 10/15/04, 10/18/04, 10/19/04

Book Sales and New Thinking
12/08/04, 12/09/04, 12/10/04, 12/13/04, 12/14/04, 12/15/04, 12/20/04, 12/21/04, 12/24/04

The Quality of Historical Speculation
4/14/05, 4/15/05

Jean Smith and Grant
4/27/05, 4/29/05, 5/2/05, 5/3/05, 5/5/05

Our Civil War Army in Iraq (theme, not series)
5/6/05, 5/23/05 (Hackworth), 6/6/05, 7/8/05, 8/25/05, 9/14/05

McClellan at Gettysburg
5/24/05, 5/25/05, 5/26/05, 5/27/05, 6/1/05

Marszalek and Halleck
6/1/05, 6/2/05, 6/16/05; 6/3/05 and 6/6/05 Halleck sans Marszalek

McClellan’s War by Rafuse
6/9/05, 6/13/05, 7/20/05

Appreciating Foote (theme, not series)
6/29/05, 6/30/05, 7/5/05, 8/16/05

ACW sea novels (theme, not series)
7/6/05, 7/28/05, 8/12/05, 9/13/05

Book sales 2005
8/4/05, 8/5/05, 8/8/05, 8/9/05, 8/10/05, 8/22/05

Whig Theory of ACW History
9/26/05, 9/27/05

Wittenberg’s Little Phil
10/17/05, 10/18/05, 10/19/05

Lost Continents of Understanding
10/24/05 (to be cont.)

“Dialogs”
McLuhan, 1/17/06; Baudrillard, 1/18/06; Ortega, 1/24/06; Zizek, 2/9/06; McLaren, 3/30/06

The Command Crisis of 9/62
1/30/06, 2/1/06, 2/3/06, 2/4/06,

Book Sales in 2005
4/11/06, 4/18/06, 4/27/06,

Twenty Questions for CWPT
3/20/06, 3/21/06, 3/22/06, 3/23/06

Failing Better
4/4/06, 4/5/06

Howard’s Torpedo (by Harry Smeltzer)
5/26/06, 5/27/06

Burning of Darien (by Harry Smeltzer)
5/29/06, 5/30/06

Lost Cause Historiography
6/5/06, 6/6/06, 6/11/06

How to become a Corps Commander
8/10/06, 8/12/06, 8/18/06, 8/23/06, 8/24/06, 9/11/06, 9/17/06

McClellan/Johnston Cavalry Doctrines
8/28/06, 8/30/06, 9/7/06,

McDowell’s “Obnoxious” Hat
9/12/06, 9/13/06

Historians as Numerolgists
10/2/06, 10/3/06, 10/5/06, 10/8/06, 10/9/06, 10/23/06, 10/26/06, 10/31/06

Conditions for Commanding the AOP
11/19/06, 11/21/06, 11/22/06, 11/27/06

Lincoln’s Social Identity
12/12/06, 12/16/06, 12/18/06