No strategies please, we're politicians (cont.)

I don't recall if it was ACW historian Herman Hattaway or his colleague Archer Jones (or the two in tandem) who explained the politically optimum course of the war for Lincoln and the Republican Party would have been to fight and win an incremental series of battles leading to the demise of the Rebellion.

This was given in the general context of why Lincoln and/or Congress were so strategy-challenged and why their thinking seemed so odd from a military science viewpoint.

In Civil War texts, the people we style "military professionals" are pictured in opposition to this simplistic thinking; the civilian generals, attuned to the political, embrace it.

With the extensive politicization of the U.S. military during Vietnam and since, with the officer class now giving the political thinking of their civilian masters pride of place in warfighting, the situation is altogether different. I sometimes think of this in reading current news through the lens of Boydian military analysis.

Col. John Boyd's friend William Lind was recently at an Armor Shool conference whence he summarized the higher-level Army mentality, post-Iraq using the Hattaway/Archer insight:
... the assumption behind almost all the briefings was that if we can only accumulate enough tactical victories, we are certain to win strategically as well.

Good heavens, is it 1861? It is something worse if senior soldiers believe this.