Infantry doctrine

Have been immersed in infantry doctrine again for the first time in 40 years.

Civil War officers compensated for the lack of American doctrine by reading Jomini, McClellan's Delafield Report (Grant notably ordered it upon his colonelship), and Hardee's Tactics. This was not enough, for even where there are uniform, nationally approved and taught principles, consistency of views, aims, and results are difficult to obtain.

I was reminded of the fruit of American doctrinal poverty in the 1860s while reading about American infantry doctrines circa 1917. I think this little polemic about WWI era doctrine matches Civil War circumstances perfectly. It comes from a PhD dissertaion:

It produced infantry that attacked in linear formations of the decades gone by. It produced infantry that only knew how to attack straight ahead.It produced infantry unfamiliar with its normal supporting arms. It produced infantry willing to be killed in straight-ahead attacks because it knew no better.

This helps explain something to that tourist at Antietam who asked a tour guide (was it Mannie? I forget) "Were these people [the fallen] stupid or what?"

I can help here, because I myself was stupid and instinctively prefer stupidity in all things infantry.

In this recent reading, there was a shudder that went up my spine on recognizing my own training in the 1917 material. The gist of it is, at squad or platoon level, we were taught, doughboy style, ACW style, that job one was to achieve local fire superiority by bringing more rifles on line bearing down on the opposition faster than the enemy could bring his rifle fire down upon us. This was flavored in my day by including organic weaponry beyond just rifles, but it was the same principle. It was rooted in self-reliance, the weapons at hand, and any "easy access" auxiliary firepower that might be not too difficult to arrange; hence, the pervasiveness of this simplicity in the ACW, WWI, and Vietnam.

The imperative of (organic) firepower superiority is like a building block upon which other edifices can be built. It is linear. It is limited.

If the training and doctrine do not go far enough, then the basic doctrine of fire superiority is all that infantry is left with. They will be "stupid or what."

The human element, too is worth mentioning. I joined the Army to avoid the technical services (USAF, Navy). I joined the infantry to avoid the technical branches (artillery, armor, signal, etc.). My ideal was leg infantry and I was deeply annoyed at being assigned to a mechanized unit. Hated radios, codebooks, motor pools, etc. This is the human factor in infantry. We were, as a friend put it, "a proud but simple people."

Petain's immortal formulation, which Pershing so hated, is America's current Army infantry doctrine: Artillery conquers, infantry occupies. "Artillery" now refers to all centrally controlled and applied firepower. Fire superiority is a network-dependent orchestration of an insane number of external assets applied via GPS to positions satellite spotted, White House approved, and politically palatable.

I read about these kids calling in air strikes on snipers a block away and cannot relate. They call on surgically applied artillery: no part of my world. Drone aircraft: you're joking? "Force protection" - what the hell is that?

Mine was the stupid infantry, which helps me with my ACW reading. I feel an affinity.

Let's see, where were we

Ah, yes...

Amusing the children

Here's a stark sample of ACW event reporting we see all too often:

Civil War buffs receive treat at library

Local Civil War buffs are in for quite a treat next week. Cary author Martin Husk and historian Kent McCoury will both speak Wednesday...

The "adults" will amuse the "children." The children consider it a "treat" to be spoken to by authors and historians. (Never mind that they may be authors and historians.)

"Cute."

Do it for Purdy

Odd that we can save a battlefield but not a battleship. Or if you prefer, cruiser.

Where are all those optimistic, tourist-magnet heritage bonanza studies when you need them?

By Edward Colimore
Inquirer Staff Writer

The old warship has been part of Philadelphia's waterfront for 50 years and left lasting impressions on thousands of visitors who heard gripping stories of its role in the Spanish-American War.

Now the Olympia - the last surviving vessel from that 1898 conflict - could face an ignoble end as an artificial reef off Cape May if a new benefactor cannot be found.
The Independence Seaport Museum and the Navy have already checked with officials of New Jersey's Artificial Reef Program on the possibility of sinking the ship, once a source of national pride.

"Another option would be scrapping Olympia," said James McLane, interim president of the museum, which owns the ship and is adjacent to it at Penn's Landing. "But the Navy has told us that 'reefing' is better because it would allow divers to go down on it and would preserve Olympia."

The museum can no longer afford the ship's upkeep, McLane said. At least $20 million is needed to tow, restore, interpret, and endow the deteriorating vessel.
"We have a couple people we're talking to who might take the ship," McLane said, "but these things don't move with great speed."

The ship will be open until the end of September, then closed while its future is determined, McLane said.

"This may be the last summer for people to visit," he said. "They should come to see it while they can."

Another former Navy warship, the Arthur W. Radford, a 563-foot-long Spruance class destroyer, will be sunk by the fall to create a reef about 30 miles southeast of Cape May.

As for the Olympia, "we recognize the historic significance of the ship," said Larry Hajna, a spokesman for the state Department of Environmental Protection. "It's not our call. It was an inquiry. The DEP is not endorsing this."

Countless tons of vessels, military tanks, railroad cars, and other materials have been reefed since the state's Bureau of Marine Fisheries began the program in 1984. The purpose is to provide a habitat for marine life, fishing grounds, and points of interest for scuba divers.

Talk of making the Olympia part of New Jersey's reef network disappoints ship supporters such as Harry Burkhardt, a merchant marine captain and steam-engine expert who is a volunteer on the vessel.

Burkhardt is president of Friends of the Cruiser Olympia (www.fotco.org), which is trying to raise money for preservation of the ship. The group got its nonprofit status this month and has begun receiving pledges and interest from individuals and corporations, Burkhardt said.

"We want to take over its ownership and operation," he said. "We have a long list of ideas, but we have to save the ship to implement them."

Burkhardt, 53, of South Philadelphia, said he would turn the Olympia into a self-sustaining museum with a living-history crew and education programs for inner-city children.

"I think what's happening is a total disgrace," he said. "The Liberty Bell has a crack in it, but we don't melt it down. The Statue of Liberty turned green with corrosion, but we don't throw it away."

The Olympia "was a symbol of America's might and freedom," Burkhardt said. "Now she's a symbol of negligence."

Concerned about the condition of the Olympia, the Navy sent a letter to the museum last May asking about plans to dry-dock the vessel for the necessary maintenance.
On the water line, small portions of the Olympia's half-inch steel hull have corroded to an eighth of an inch and must be monitored continually. Water leaks through the deck into the interior, causing further rust.

"We have cared for Olympia lovingly," McLane said. "We have put $5.5 million into it and spend money on it every day."

The Olympia was authorized in 1888 and commissioned in 1895. The state-of-the-art vessel led five other U.S. warships into Manila Bay in the Philippines on May 1, 1898, and fired shots in a battle to wrest control of that country from the Spanish.

Navy Commodore George Dewey stood on the bridge of the ship and uttered the famous words: "You may fire when you are ready, Gridley."

Under Dewey's command, the U.S. fleet destroyed 10 Spanish cruisers and gunboats in hours without losing an American life.

The Olympia spent World War I in the Atlantic Ocean, and brought remains of the Unknown Soldier home from France in 1921.

It was docked at the Philadelphia Navy Yard from 1922 to 1959, and was on display at Pier 11 at the Benjamin Franklin Bridge through the 1960s until 1976, when it was moved to Penn's Landing. Today, the vessel is the world's oldest floating steel warship.

"The Navy has been in discussions with the museum to come up with a disposition plan if they can no longer operate it," said Patricia Dolan, a Navy spokeswoman. "Any plan for disposal of the vessel - scrapping or reefing - will have to be approved by the Navy."

The thought of scuttling the naval time capsule - filled with paintings, photos, and artifacts - has raised the ire of historians.

"It will be a national disgrace and major embarrassment for Philadelphia and Pennsylvania if Olympia is disposed of by scrapping or being sunk off the coast of New Jersey," said naval historian Lawrence Burr, who has produced documentaries and written four books, including U.S. Cruisers 1883-1904: The Birth of the Steel Navy.

"Neither the Spanish navy in 1898 nor the German navy in 1917-18 was able to sink Olympia," he said. "It will be ironic if the State of New Jersey is able to sink this unique historic warship that has been in the care of Philadelphia and Pennsylvania for over 50 years, and who have benefited from its role as a tourist attraction. . . .

"If sunk, she will only be seen by a small elite who are able to dive, with the risk that she will be plundered for souvenirs," he said.

Also expressing disappointment was the nonprofit Theodore Roosevelt Association in Oyster Bay, N.Y. Congress chartered the group in 1920 to perpetuate the legacy of Roosevelt, who was assistant secretary of the Navy before the Spanish-American War and ordered the Olympia furnished with extra coal so it could be sent to the Philippines. Roosevelt resigned from his office and served as a colonel in the Rough Riders during the invasion of Cuba.

The possible sinking of the Olympia "is an outrage," said Howard Ehrlich, executive director of the association. "You would think veterans groups would get together and lobby the Navy to save the ship."

Even sinking the 5,600-ton ship would be costly. Because of the ship's 211/2-foot draft, the basin where it is berthed would have to be dredged so the vessel could be moved to dry dock. There, it would be structurally reinforced so it could be safely towed down the Delaware River to the reef location.

"No decision has been made," McLane said. "This is not what we want to do. In these tough economic times, everybody is forced to make tough decisions."

Tough economic times - but the $20 million needed to rehab the Olympia is exactly the amount allocated in the new state budget for an Arlen Specter library and a John Murtha "Center for Public Policy." And check out this roster of multimillion dollar heritage and development projects. Tastycake factory - yeah, sure.

What we have here, son, is a failure of heritage tourism.

The Olympia was enough of an attraction to draw me in the past, first visit in '72 or '73. And I hadn't even known of Gilbert H. Purdy:

Seaman Gilbert H. Purdy was a fixture in the U. S. Navy. He served in the navy before the Civil War, left the service only to fight in the artillery at the Civil War battles of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. He rejoined the navy in time to be manning the guns of the KEARSARGE against the Confederate cruiser ALABAMA. He again left the service, only to return to serve aboard OLYMPIA at the Battle of Manila Bay.

Adm. George Dewey - was he on the Kearsarge with Purdy?

During the period 26 April 1861, until 30 August 1867, he [Dewey] had consecutive service on USS Mississippi, USS Brooklyn, USS Agawam, USS Colorado, USS Kearsarge, USS Canadiagua, and again USS Colorado. [...] Took prominent part in the operations of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, under Admiral Farragut. First Lieutenant of USS Mississippi in attacks on Forts Jackson and St. Philip, capture of New Orleans, and Battle of Port Hudson. Commended for gallantry, judgment and skill in action between Mississippi and enemy's forts at Port Hudson, and the rescue of the crew from the burning ship when set on fire by the enemy's shot. Participated in attacks on Fort Fisher, 24-25 December 1864 and 13-15 January 1865.

Dewey and Purdy make quite a pair. They were stellar Civil War veterans with remarkable records. If we're not going to do this for Dewey, can we do this for Purdy?

Or shall we celebrate the Sesquicentennial with a reef?

Painting top: Purdy, standing, talking to salts on the SS Mohican, 1888. Purdy here is 60 and it's 10 years to go before his (and Dewey's) battle at Manila Bay.

(Hat tip to honorable Mishiko San.)

Collecting images

If the Lincoln business is history, this makes no sense.

If the Lincoln business is a cult, this makes plenty of sense.

People interested in familial images have lost the thread. They are in reliquary territory.

Shown: reliquary of Charlemagne. He was historical and he was cultic.

They didn't have photographs back then but they did the best they could.

Rufus Barringer

General, brother-in-law to the famous (x2), Republican, ostracized Presbyterian: who remembers Gen. Barringer?

Heritage tourism for realtors

Mitch Hagmaier writes from Pennsylvania:

I had a guy try to sell me a house by claiming that the space under his detached garage might have been an Underground Railroad hidey-hole. I told him that somebody across town had already gotten ahead of him & put up a plaque on their alleged UR station-house. I didn't buy the house in the end, but it had more to do with the disastrous state of its foundation than the root cellar he was on about.

As every school child in America knows, slaves often stole the master's automobile and then hid under free state garages. A recent study shows master preferred Packards where slave ownership was 100 souls or fewer. On the really large plantations, master drove the Duesenberg.

p.s. I think the guy with the plaque risked scaring buyers with potential historical property restrictions.

It's official: he's a "rock star"

Aside from Larry Tagg, rock stars have little to do with history. The columnist may be doing Bearss a disservice here.

Stand by for bad history - or not

The McChrystal affair had me quaking in my ACW boots. Expected that hack newspaper writers would lie in wait behind every bush to whack me, an innocent newspaper reader, with their half-baked McClellan firing memes.

Surprisingly, the cop who kept order was none other than Goodwin, driving the NYT patrol car. She's not an honest cop, but her baton seems to have kept the riffraff in line.

AP juiced her stuff up:

Abraham Lincoln swallowed the preening and nasty behavior of the North’s top general, George McClellan, which historian Doris Kearns Goodwin pointed out included references to Lincoln as “the original gorilla.”

ABC chose a pensive, biblical image, the ghost writer for Stephanopolous blogging thus:

But my hunch is that Doris Kearns Goodwin has the most influential take of the day. She asks “what would Lincoln do?” The answer? Turn the other cheek to McChrystal’s “insolence” and focus on the task at hand: fighting this war.

The analogy at hand now becomes that of Truman/MacArthur, "the firing of McClellan" having been taken off the table by this "eminent historian."

Don't buy stock in the "trials of Lincoln" meme; you would never want to work for the man. This is, however a step up from the super-compressed GBM firing image most Americans seem to carry around with them.

A couple of words are also in order about the NYT piece. Forgive me, if you know this already:

(1) There were no "breaches of protocol." As Tom Rowland pointed out 15 years ago, the only evidence we have that Lincoln was once snubbed by a retiring McClellan is John Hay's word - nothing else.

(2) The term "original gorilla" was a Stanton catchphrase for Lincoln. It's use, if ever it was used by McClellan, would be an ironic allusion to Stanton's measure of the man. Trouble is, there is no evidence McClellan ever used the term publicly or in correspondence with his wife. It is scrawled in a notebook.

(3) All of Goodwin's "bad behavior" examples relate not to behavior but to sentiments discovered in a notebook. "McClellan's behavior" is a durable construct fabricated to serve wartime political purposes.

I don't think a prizewinning author could understand such distinctions but I hope the readers of this blog do.

Take a stand against co-mingling!

James McPherson makes the case against a Gettysburg-area casino using language from his early career as a race relations historian:

What we think of when we think of Gettysburg is that it is part of a great trauma in the United States that ought to be respected, not contaminated, by this kind of business ... Those people coming to the area to see the battlefield will be commingled with those engaged in the mindless jerking of handles of slot machines. It's bizarre and wrong.

Give Freud some credit, people.

Richard F. Miller

Was browsing at lunch in Borders and saw Harvard's Civil War had been released in paperback and was selling out at a Virginia store. Good for author Richard F. Miller!

Afternoon toil was followed by a drive home, coincidentally listening to the audiobook The Education of Henry Adams, marvelling at the Harvardian Adams' review of the British intervention threat of September - November 1862, comparing his memories in the U.S. legation with the documentation that emerged postwar. ACW historiography at its very best.

Got home, got an email tip that Richard has a blog, saw that he had a post on Petraeus.

As Shakespeare or Milton or Chaucer once noted, How 'bout them apples?

My view of Petraeus differs from Richard's - I see him as the captive of a corrupt, bloated, broken system, one that he did not try to reform by leveraging the prestige of his Iraq service. This could be a harsh read - after all, his deadliest arch-enemy, Gen. Casey, still runs the army and is his boss. (Bumper sticker idea: "Ask me about my deadly, arch-enemy boss!")

Daily Beast had an excerpt today on Petraeus's commissioning which helped me focus a long-simmering general resentment. Thank you, Beast.

After my commissioning in the infantry, my rank was backdated by the Army so that I would not outrank a certain West Point cohort, matriculating a week or two later. Petraeus was in that cohort. Not to pull a Joe Johnston or anything, but these matters have a strange power to irk. Good to have a specific face to associate with that irksome backdating. (Insert Chaucerian expletive here.)

Petraeus did an admirable thing before commissioning. He chose Infantry as his branch. This is a point that counts for much with me. Further, we, in that day as newly commissioned infantry officers, had the illusory and futile option of volunteering for Vietnam assignment ... to later be told that they didn't want infantry there any more. If he so volunteered for that then, even better.

I'll set aside my pettiness to pull for him.

Meanwhile, hooray for Richard Miller and for Richard's new book. And for compound coincidences like these.

Generals who faint

General David Petraeus was in the news in mid-month when he fainted during a CCW-type of hearing.

The thin, youthful-looking general is a documented fitness buff, doing multiple runs per day and other strenuous exercise. (Bumper sticker seen on the car of a marathon runner today: "My sport is punishment in your sport.")

General Petraeus will be 58 in November. General Mansfield was 58 when he was killed in battle. Mansfield, shown right, had not fainted up to that point, at least not on the record. He is the oldest looking general I have ever seen. The Civil War reader, first encountering Mansfield, asks, "What the hell?" The newspaper reader, encountering Petraeus, thinks "How youthful and fit."

Petraeus and Mansfield. One slogs around all day in Maryland or Virginia mud, heat, and frost in heavy boots and wool clothing as a kind of daily fitness program; the other mans a desk in Floridian air conditioned comfort between inspections, briefings, and rounds of self-imposed exercise.

None of this is intended to slight Petraeus but to make the point that one can run, jump, exercise, whatever, and it will not change that one is 58 years old. Fainting or worse are possible. Forget about 60 being the new 40. Mansfield was remarkable - exceptional - and no basis for broad army policy.

Joe Hooker was our fainingest ACW general but his faints were accompanied by blood loss and concussion. Remember how you thought he was a geezer in the summer of 1862 at 47 years of age? That's 11 years younger than Petraeus, 11 years older than McClellan.

And speaking of older generals, how old do you make Lee in the summer of 1862? He was 55, three years younger than Petraeus. Lee - another exception and no basis for policy.

In J.F.C. Fuller's book Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure, he names three pillars of generalship: courage, creative intelligence, and physical fitness and he attributes all three to "the attributes of youth rather than middle age." He does not find courage and creative intelligence among middle aged officers as a rule, and he would be dismayed at the current leadership of the U.S. military.

Under Petraeus, directing the Iraq war, we find Ray Odierno, 56. Under Petraeus, directing the Afghanistan war, we find Stanley McChrystal, 55. At the top, this is an army of Mansfields. We love Mansfield but is this a good thing?

If we look at the ages of Union field generals that we once considered "old," a comparison is interesting (all summer of 1862):

Hooker - 47
Sickles 42
Meade - 46
Kearny - 47
Butler - 43
Grant - 40

On the Rebel side:

J Johnston - 55
Jackson - 38
Beauregard - 44
Longstreet - 41

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mike Mullen, turns 64 in October. Army Chief of Staff Casey is 62 next month.

BTW, General George Washington wrapped up his war at Yorktown at the ripe old age of 49.

Old Union generals: now think of the oldest you can.

Scott was 75 before retirement. He got out of the way relatively fast. Mullen is not going to reach that standard, fortunately, nor John Wool's 77 (in the summer of 1861). Wool stayed around and, as Beatie shows in livid colors, spent the spring and summer of 1862 old man style scheming and fussing at McClellan.

Mullen is the age of Edwin Vose Sumner in '62. Whatever you think of Sumner now, your first reaction to him was that he was a freak of circumstances from whom little might be expected.

Mullen is a year older than the sedentary John Dix was in summer, 1862. Dix was valued as a political general who also commanded volatile military jurisdictions (Baltimore, New York). He was an exception by definition.

Fuller made allowances for age in peacetime leadership, suggesting some sort of organized transition to young generals in time of war. If that were even feasible, it could not happen because at the highest levels, this modern army leadership will never willingly leave peacetime cultural norms.

Fuller: "In war, it is almost impossible to exaggerate the evil effects of age upon generalship, and through generalship on the spirit of the army."

(Petraeus picture from an unidentified UK newspaper. They give out fewer medals there and seem intrigued by ours.)

Carman's Maryland Campaign

There are now two editions of Ezra Carman's study of the Maryland Campaign after years with none.

By way of introduction, here are a few glittering generalities.

Joseph Pierro's work came out earlier. It is in one volume, which I find handy, but the size is a little unhandy at 11.1 x 8.4 inches and the type size is one point too small for geezers. There are no photos or maps. The footnotes are minimal (but not too stingy), source-oriented (tracking some of Carman's sources) or strictly informational. Pierro seems to have defined his role mainly as transcriber of the notes and clarifier of the odd reference or quote - in other words as a restrained or even minimalist editor making himself useful to the reader/researcher on the edges of that major effort, transcribing and delivering a famous source document.

Thomas Clemens' work is out last month and is in two volumes (the first just now), which with Amazon's discounts, will still be cheaper than Joseph Pierro's somewhat expensive edition, discount matched against discount. Two volumes are less handy, however, than Pierro's singleton. The trade HB size of 6x9 is more comfortable; the type size is roughly the same as in the Pierro's work but there is a smidge more leading which makes reading somewhat easier. There are photos, including many of the battlefields, and some attractive, fascinating maps. Clemens took up the transcription burden, as did Pierro, but is richer in his notes. He gives slightly more sources for obscure Carman quotes and statements; he corrects errors made by Carman; he points out authorial self-contradictions; and he even pauses occasionally to argue with the author, which I dislike in principle but appreciate in these specific cases.

A word on Carman, and this is unfairly broad but conveys my sense: Carman's perspective was that of an active, committed Republican veteran who happened to appreciate McClellan.

He processed Republican editorial pages of the war into a framework that could hold his research together in a narrative - it's a framework that still informs our basic understanding of the Maryland Campaign and Antietam.

Further, he has been so relied on by historians that his views are already fully assimilated into our current "understanding." The sole surprises Carman may deliver involve his mitigations and rationalizations of standard issue Republican damnations of GBM. (That may be no fun for you, but it intrigues me.)

In sum, Carman may not surprise much and the book buyer may feel he has been left with the picked over bones of a Thanksgiving dinner instead of a rich feast.

This is where Clemens (right) comes in. Where Pierro is the editor as deliverer of archival material, Clemens is the editor-as-critic. In my view, the unique familiarity we readers already posess with the content of Carman's manuscript puts Pierro's approach at a disadvantage. We need a full, historiographic critique to accompany the publishing of Carman's famous manuscript.

BTW, where Joseph Pierro has a dust jacket showing establishment blurbs (hello again McPherson, Davis, Bearss, Wert), Clemens has blurbs from the cool kids: Hartwig, Hoptak, Petruzzi, Rafuse. He is in fact a very cool kid himself. He comes to Carman with "attitude." We need that here.

The drawback to Clemens' Carman is not that he intrudes upon the material but that he does not intrude enough. It's not that his notes and comments are too many but that we want much more. Pierro has delivered us the manuscript; from Clemens we want more commentary than is supplied.

An alternative division of labor might even have been, Pierro = manuscript in book form; Clemens = commentaries in book form.

For my taste then, Clemens' edition is the edition that I want, despite some frustration.

Examples and details next installment.

The meaning of November, 1864

It does not seem we will ever run out of authors to claim that President McClellan would have made peace with the Rebels, for the Centennial fades slowly.

Thus, small forward movements in Centennial doctrine, tiny concessions to opposing views, tend to miss the broad readership set in its ways, raised on that historiography hardened by 1965.

When a Centennialist like John Waugh tests the boundaries of doctrine in his election account saying that McClellan would not have made peace by any means, it passes over the heads of other Centennialists who blurb his dust jackets; over the heads of his mass market readers; and over the heads of new authors working in those venerable traditions established by American Heritage so long ago.

Personally, standing outside this much-lauded award-winning school of thought, I would have guessed that reading Southern letters and diaries might cast light on the events of 1864. The Rebel reactions to McClellan's nomination are uniformly dour. But the Centennialists seem to use these sources to scavenge battle anecdotes only.

Likewise, a reasonably attentive review of Governor McClellan's New Jersey days would have revealed a principled intractability fiery enough to incinerate all bridges to his political sponsors.

Understanding Governor McClellan the way I do, it is not possible for me to envision a Democratic lever long enough or strong enough to move peace onto President McClellan's agenda in 1864/65.

Lately, the less rote historian has tended to split the difference with me on 1864. Thus, McClellan personally was for "unconditional surrender" but one doubts his ability to resist party pressure from the doves. I find this thin stuff in light of GBM's political dealings during wartime and after.

We cannot blame a contemporary Southerner for holding views uninformed by McClellan's wartime political dealings and post-war political career. The following is from Faith, Valor, and Devotion: The Civil War Letters of William Porcher DuBose. I would say, if you are an historian today and presenting these views and conclusions - those of an 1864 soldier - as your own, you are slacking. Seriously so!

DuBose splits the difference:

October 8, 1864
[...] With regard to the condition of things at the North, after McClellan's letter of acceptance I began to think his election would probably be less desirable than that of Lincoln.

I regret the absence of any battle-related anecdote here but would ask the Centennialist to read that sentence again anyway.

There is no doubt that he is sincerely & honestly for the Union at all hazards, by war if no other means. We have nothing therefore to hope from him; he is no more our friend than Lincoln is. But if there is nothing to hope from him, there is something to hope from his party which may control him when it gets into power. And the change cannot hurt us; it may benefit us, therefore I am for McClellan. I think Lincoln will be elected but it is by no means certain.

If we cannot transcend this analysis after 150 years, then we don't need history, or more precisely, Centennial history.

Commanding Lincoln's Navy

If you cannot get past the title of a book, it's a good hint that much more aggravation is in store. If the author is Stephen Taaffe, that's yet another solid indicator.

I cannot get past the idea of "Commanding Lincoln's Navy." Anyone even reasonably well read in this field is entitled to debate whether it was Fox's Navy or Welles' Navy. Lincoln does not even remotely enter into the picture.

I'm shouting. I must be aggravated.

One of the best bits of Welles' diary is where he ruminates about flag officer selection and the difference between the Army and Navy. He says that if Stanton emulated his and Fox's care and effort in selecting senior officers, the war would be on another footing altogether. Stanton's neglect of officer development and selection marks him as a failed secretary, in Welles' eyes.

This is another way of saying that the Navy made its own successes; other observers noted how Lincoln left Welles be.

The author of this book owes a great deal of explanation for its title. On the other hand,

I’ve got kids in private school, so anyone who can beg, borrow, or steal the requisite cash ought to own Commanding Lincoln’s Navy.

Brilliantly motivating little speech. Who can doubt there will be much here for scholars?

"Shovel ready" ACW projects

If stimulus money could go to this project, one wonders how the funding was arranged and why major ACW parks under federal control were not (are not, will not be) shovel ready. This may look like good news but it points to a scandal.

Winfield Scott in 2010

More on the theme, "Civil War readers are much harder on historical figures than contemporary figures." As you can tell, this irks me.

Consider that if you thought that this nation and its military were at war in 2010, you might glean insight from a recent tidbit from theArmy Chief of Staff from Defense News:

Q: What are your priorities in the next year?

Gen. George Casey: The first priority is embedding the enterprise approach in the institutions and the structure of the Army, and the undersecretary of the Army has really taken the bit in the teeth here. And again, we've been working on this enterprise approach since 2008, and I think we're going to, by the first part of next year, redo the documents governing the structure of the headquarters and the major commands to align them up with this approach and to basically institutionalize that.

The second most important thing that I'm working on with Gen. Martin Dempsey is the revision of our Capstone Doctrine and our Training Doctrine. We published them in 2008.

Is there anyway to shoehorn Winfield Scott into an equivalent response? What would that look like?

Q: What are your priorities in 1861-62?

Winfield Scott: First, we've been working really hard on a condensed version of the Delafield Commission report and hope to have that distributed down to unit level in the coming months. We also have some excellent translations of Jomini in the pipeline and these should find their way to field units before the year's end.

The second most important thing is a revision of Hardee's Tactics, which were previously published but need to be updated.

We are not the same people, by a long stretch.

One joy of Civil War reading is communing with the people we are not.

Southern strategy in a nutshell

Atlantic blogger:

I don't want to overstate this, but I suspect going into the war, no small part of Southern secessionist ideology was built on the ability to kick ass, and that ability being decisive.

Civil War Navy Sesquicentennial

It's a new blog.

In pursuit of the MoH

How to have your ancestor awarded a Medal of Honor. (It helps to have Kent Masterson Brown write his bio.)