A token plan (conclusion)

In this post, you saw what historians are linking to when they cite an Anaconda plan or strategy.

In the first Anaconda artifact, Scott refers to an operation involving seaboard blockade and a Mississippi blockade made up of naval posts. He alludes cryptically to waterborne transport of armies without elaboration.

In the second artifact, Scott he says the river and seabord blockade can be supplemented with an army movement on steam transports to clear the Mississippi down to the sea. He asks for input on details for this projected operation.

In the third artifact, Scott adds a modification to his idea, that of having a clearing force divided between riverborne and roadbound columns and the columns originating on the Ohio.

These represent three different concepts. To those who believe in an Anaconda plan or strategy, I say, you have three if you have any. To use a single source to footnote your reference to an Anaconda plan or strategy is to say THIS is the Anaconda. But at different points in time, Scott entertained different operational schemes.

Scott himself refers to the third incomplete sketch using the word "plan" and the newspapers and historians have followed suit. Even the most basic operational elements have not yet been defined making this (in fact) a non-plan.

Just as careless, hurried historians could be misled by Scott's own use of "plan," so they could also be misled into thinking there is a strategy through the presence of what looks like a strategy statement in the second artifact:

... so as to envelop the insurgent States and bring them to terms with less bloodshed than by any other plan.

This is an ill-defined operation proposed against a speculative end state to gain bargaining chips in a future negotiation. This is not a strategy, not even an operational objective.

Here is a strategy statement: Displace, destroy or capture the rebel government. Here is a statement of operational objectives: Capture Richmond. Another strategy statement: Prevent communication with the outside world. Statement of operational objectives: Occupy these X points on the rivers and coasts.

What Scott gives out is a non-strategy statement: Establish a blockade to [experience a possible political outcome].

Remember the context. On April 27, McClellan proposes a violent operation to overthrow the seat of Confederate government. Scott responds with a counterproposal to mount an operation to strengthen future negotiating positions. Scott forwards both items to Lincoln in a way that presumes Lincoln's favor. In a separate letter he tempts McClellan with leadership of the hypothetical river operation. He tries to entangle McClellan in the planning for such an operation. Out of these gossamer threads, history spins a complete plan and a famous strategy.

What is unsaid in Scott's statement is the presumption of future negotiations. Whence this faith? From his political mentor and patron William Seward, chief of Cabinet, a believer in negotiations. Why might Scott presume Lincoln's favor for his views? He might be getting Lincoln second hand through Seward's filter.

Scott is in fact developing a "product" for Seward, who sees himself leading peace negotiations; Scott is selling goods designed for Seward to Lincoln (and McClellan). That is the "Anaconda plan" or "Anaconda strategy" in a nutshell. Chips and tokens for sale or trade with no plan or strategy in sight.

A token plan (cont.)

This post lays out the scraps of information cited by historians in their references to an Anaconda Plan or strategy. When you see Anaconda plan or strategy footnoted, is this what you expect to see in the look-up? Or has the author fobbed off a token of his "respect" for you as a reader?

[1] This first item is occasionally cited in conjunction with either of the next two. The letter on which this endorsement appears was sent two days after McClellan assumed command in Ohio. Scott is calling Lincoln's attention to McClellan's incompetence as a planner. The last two sentences contain material construed to be Anaconda related.

[Indorsement.]

MAY 2, 1861.

As at the date of this letter General McClellan knew nothing of the intended call for two years' volunteers, he must have had the idea of composing his enormous columns of three-months' men for operating against Nashville and Richmond-that is, of men whose term of service would expire by the time he had collected and organized them. That such was his idea appears from a prior letter, in which, although, the Ohio quota is but about 10,000 men the general speaks, I think of having 30,000 and wants arms, &c., for 80,000. Second. A march upon Richmond from the Ohio would probably insure the revolt of Western Virginia, which if left alone will soon be five out of seven for the Union. Third. The general eschews water transportation by the Ohio and Mississippi in favor of long, tedious and break-down (of men, horses, and wagons) marches. Fourth. His plan is to subdue the seceded States by piece-meal instead of enveloping them all (nearly) at once by a cordon of posts on the Mississippi to its mouth from its junction with the Ohio, and by blockading ships of war on the sea-board. For the cordon a number of men equal to one of the general's columns would probably suffice, and the transportation of men and all supplies by water is about a fifth of the land cost, besides the immense saving in time.
Respectfully submitted to the President.

- WINFIELD SCOTT

[2] This second item is referenced by itself or in conjunction with another of these three when the Anaconda is mentioned. The relevant content is in the third paragraph only.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, May 3, 1861.
Major General GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,
Commanding Ohio Volunteers, Cincinnati, Ohio:

SIR: I have read and carefully considered your plan for a campaign, and now send you confidentially my own views, supported by certain facts of which you should be advised.

First. It is the design of the Government to raise 25,000 additional regular troops, and 60,000 volunteers for three years. It will be inexpedient either to rely on the three-months' volunteers for extensive operations or to put in their hands the best class of arms we have in store. The term of service would expire by the commencement of a regular campaign and the [items?] not lost be returned mostly in a damaged condition. Hence I must stronly urge upon you to confine yourself strictly to the quota of three-months' men called for by the War Department.

Second. We rely greatly on the sure operation of a complete blockade of the Atlantic and Gulf ports soon to commence. In connection with such blockade we propose a powerful movement down the Mississippi to the ocean, with a cordon of posts at proper points and capture of Forts Jackson and Saint Philip; the object being to clear out and keep open this great line of communication in connection with the strict blockade of the sea-board, so as to envelop the insurgent States and bring them to terms with less bloodshed thany be any other plan. I suppose there will be needed from twelve to twenty steam gun-boats, and a sufficient number of steam transports (say forty) to carry all the personnel (say 60,000 men) and material of the expedition; most of the gun-boats to be in advance to open the way, and the remainder to follow and protect the rear of the expedition, &c. This army, in which it is not improbable you may be invited to take an important part, should be composed of our best regulars for the advance and of three-years' volunteers, all well officered, and with four months and a half of instruction in camps prior to (say) November 10. In the progress down the river all the enemy's batteries on its banks we of course would turn and capture, leaving a sufficient number of posts with complete garrisons to keep the river open behind the expedition. Finally, it will be necessary that New Orleans should be strongly occupied and securely held until the present difficulties are composed.

Third. A word now as to the greatest obstacle in the way of this plan- the great danger now pressing upon us-the impatience of our patriotic and loyal Union friends. They will urge instant vigorous action, regardless, I fear, of consequences-that is, unwilling to wait for the slow instruction of (say) twelve or fifteen camps, for the rise of rivers, and the return of frosts to kill the virus of malighant fevers below Memphis. I fer this; but impress right views, on every proper occasion, upon the brave men who are hastering to the support of their Government. Lose no time, while necessary preparations for the great expedition are in progress, in organizing, drilling, and disciplining your three-months' men, many of whom, it is hoped, will be ultimately found enrolled under the call for three-years' volunteers. Should an urgent and immediate occasion arise meantime for their services, they will be the more effective. I commend these views to your consideration, and shall be happy to hear the result.

With great respect, your, truly,
WINFIELD SCOTT.

[3] This last item is referenced independently or in tandem with one of the others above. Anaconda content appears in the last paragraph.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, May 21, 1861.
Major General GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, U. S. Army,
Commanding, &c.:

SIR: Considering that Cumberland, in Maryland, is not withing your command, and is under the immediate consideration of Major-General Patterson and the authorities here (all of us men nearer at hand), we are surprised at your repeated admonitions to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of War, and myself to occupy that point, and I am still more surprised at your complaint to the Secretary of War against me that you are without instructions or authority and with your hands tied up. In reply, I refer to the communications sent you at the following dates, some of which, at any rate, you have acknowledged:

First. Letter of April 30, on learning you were the major-general of Ohio Volunteers. Second. Copy of letters of commanding officer at Cairo, of May 2, instructing him not to detain provisions. Third. Letter of May 3, giving plan of a campaign. Fourth. Telegram of May 6, in relation to regular officers of your staff. Fifth. Telegram of May 8, order to stop provisions at Cairo, &c. Sixth. Telegramof May 8, in relation to camp at Cairo and intercepting regular companies from Fort Randall. Seventh. Telegram of May 10, in relation to re-enforcing Cairo. Eighth. Copy of letter to Colonel Robert Anderson, May 15, in relation to volunteers in Western Virginia and Kentucky. Ninth. Letter of May 15, sent by Lieutenant L. A. Williams. Tenth. Telegram of May 20, stating that you authority was ample within your military department. Eleventh. General Orders, Nos. 14 and 19, defining the limits of your department, adding thereto Western Pennsylvania and Virginia. Besides which, your communications on the subject of ordnance supplies have been promptly referred to the Ordnance Department and attended to.

It is not conceived what other instructions could have been needed by you. Placed in the command of a wide department, with the quotas of three-months' men under you of several States, it surely was unnecessary to say that you were expected to defend it against all enemies of the United States, and it was not intended that you should make expeditions much beyond its borders without some great object of interest to the Federal Union to be suggested by you and approved here. Indeed, the thee-months' men were called into service mainly for defensive purposes, but permission would readily have been given to you to march into a neighboring State to countenance or to protect the friends of the Union, if you had presented a reasonable case for such interference. It is otherwise in respect to the greater of the long-term volunteers of your department when received, but as yet I am not aware that a single regiment has been presented or organized in your department. Out of these troops you will at the proper time replace the defensive posts occupied by the three-months' men, and hold the remainder in convenient camps of instruction-that is, near to wood, water, and cheap supplies, and to transportation by rail, canal, or river. It is suggested that these rendezvous or camps of instruction should consist of four or eight regiments each, and on ground either porous or slightly rolling. Larger camps soon exhaust the smaller supplies and comforts for too many miles around them. As a greater part of these troops are not expected to take the field much before the return of frost, they will, under good instructors, have ample time for the acquisition of tactical instruction and habits of discipline (obedience), without which they will not be equal to the expedition for which they are intended.
After desiring you to consult freely with the Governors of the States within your department on the best sites for these camps, I will here add a modifications of the expedition toward the Gulf of Mexico, alluded to in a former letter. I propose to organize an amry of regulars and volunteers on the Ohio River of, say 80,000 men, to be divided into two unequal columns, the smaller to proceed by water on the first autumnal swell in the rivers, headed and flanked by gun-boats (propellers of great speed and strength), and the other column to proceed as nearly abreast as practicable by land- of course without the benefit of rail transportation-and receiving at certain points on the river its heavier articles of consumption from the freight boats of the first column. By this means the wagon train the of the land column may no doubt be much diminished, but would still remain, I fear, so large as to constitute a great impediment to the movement. Would 80,000 men be sufficient to conquer its way to New Orleans and clear out the Mississippi to the Gulf? What should be the relative numbers of the two columns, and at how many points besides Louisville, Paducah, Columbus, Hickman, Memphis, Vicksburg, and New Orleans would the two columns be able to hold a close communication with each other? Of course much would depend upon the relations to the United States of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri. I ask your views not only on the foregoing points, but also as to the form, draft, tonnage, and armament of the gun-boats or tugs. Cincinnati abounds in the best information on all these heads. Again assuring you that you are likely to bear an important if not be principal part in this great expedition, and of my great confidence in your intelligence, zeal, sciene, and energy, I remain, very truly, yours,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

P. S. - Without waiting for the formal order of Secretary of War extending the limits of your department across the Ohio and the Mississippi, you will not hesitate to give any reasonable support (without comprosing your detachments) in your power to the friends of the Union in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri.

A token plan (cont.)

A propos of our strategy discussion, you might find Jomini's definition interesting. Mahan, who postdates Scott's education (BTW) gave his students the short and sweet version of Jomini: "Strategy decides where to act." This well suits our lazy historians and readers and one finds this often. However, the full Jomini appears below in all its elaboration. From the Art of War:

Strategy embraces the following points, viz.:—

1. The selection of the theater of war, and the discussion of the different combinations of which it admits.

2. The determination of the decisive points in these combinations, and the most favorable direction for operations.

3. The selection and establishment of the fixed base and of the zone of operations.

4. The selection of the objective point, whether offensive or defensive.

5. The strategic fronts, lines of defense, and fronts of operations.

6. The choice of lines of operations leading to the objective point or strategic front.

7. For a given operation, the best strategic line, and the different maneuvers necessary to embrace all possible cases.

8. The eventual bases of operations and the strategic reserves.

9. The marches of armies, considered as maneuvers.

10. The relation between the position of depots and the marches of the army.

11. Fortresses regarded as strategical means, as a refuge for an army, as an obstacle to its progress: the sieges to be made and to be covered.

12. Points for intrenched camps, tétes de pont, &c.

13. The diversions to be made, and the large detachments necessary.

This is not my litmus test for the Anaconda, it is offered here mainly to show how inadequate is the usage "Anaconda strategy" in a contemporary context.

A token plan (cont.)

The "Anaconda plan" does not refer to a document, as we have seen in the previous post. Nor does it exist embodied in orders or other artifacts that take shape during a planning process.

This "plan," whenever referred to, is just a concept, a couple of talking points. A military plan, written or unwritten, has operational and other elements that are missing here. To the newspapermen of the 19th Century, random thought experiments could platonically be composited by some invisible hand into a notional "plan" that exists hypothetically on its own plane, complete, perfect, or at least good enough for their readers then. It's not good enough for us now, and I would strongly caution writers and teachers in military schools especially to examine their consciences before referring to an "Anaconda Plan." This term has even less substance to it than the nonsense referred to as "McClellan's letters to his wife."

Again, I make the caveat that it is possible Scott had a plan per se and he presented this to newspapermen and that a story with proper plan elements exists in some archive undiscovered, just as McClellan's letters to his wife may yet someday be discovered. Meanwhile, let's follow the data we have.

This leaves us with the term "Anaconda strategy." Again, a strategy contains elements that are missing from our Anaconda record, the most important of which is aim or purpose. Scott's statements represent proposed operations to achieve unstated goals and effects. They are operational ideas lacking any kind of strategic framework. Example of an effective statement of strategy: we will end the rebellion by capturing Richmond and the CSA government there. Some will argue that this is not a strategy since it has left out the means, but I would accept this from defenders of the Anaconda as a strategy if the Anaconda reached that level of clarity. It doesn't. The Anaconda is the antithesis of strategy.

I will post the three most popular Anaconda citational texts in full late tonight so you can judge for yourself.

Assume Anaconda really is a strategy for a moment and ask yourself the next logical question: if a "strategy" is not implemented, is it a strategy at all? On a comedy record, Mony Python once asked, "Can a bee be half a bee, or must it* ipso facto half not be?"

Many Civil War historians vote for the bee equalling half a bee when they say the Anaconda was implemented over time as part of the unfolding war. I am on the *not* side. Strategy needs an actor, an implementor consciously applying it. Outcomes that resemble elements of earlier concepts are not strategies, nor are they vindications.

Most late war historians seem to take great pains to exclude analogies between McClellan's waterborne Richmond campaign and Grant's 1864 efforts - to the reader's detriment, I think, but that is neither here nor there. The point is outside of a contemporary report filed with the Prussian General Staff, no historian has suggested that Grant's activity in 1864 was a fulfillment of McClellan's plans. Some historians even take pains to distinguish overt correlations, such as the attack on Petersburg proposed by GBM in '62 from the attack made in '64.

The same reasoning should apply where there is a temptation to say that the Anaconda was fulfilled as the war progressed. The Anaconda was not a strategy, it was not a plan, and it was not fulfilled. Scott envisioned certain operations independent of specific outcomes and some of these were undertaken independently of his thinking to achieve results he never specified.

*it = the half bee

A token plan (cont.)

Let’s have some more fun with history. Please pull down any suitable ACW history you have and look up “Anaconda.” It tends to be indexed under Scott.

Go to the first reference and follow the end note (or footnote). You’ll find one reference given – at most, two. Collection permitting, pull another work and repeat the experiment. This is the neat part: you’ll again have just one reference (at most, two) but it/they may be different! My first three pulls yielded three separate single sources! Civil War history is a carnival fun house, for sure.

In this post, you’re going to get six references to the Anaconda, more, I think, than have ever appeared in one place in any work of Civil War history. At the end of this, you’ll be loaded for Anaconda.

Now, why would an author footnote this Anaconda business at all? This use of notation is out of line with historical practice (see addendum after the post). It baffles me why McPherson, Eicher, et al, were noting Anaconda and then, of all things, linking it to a single source.

Perhaps the author is telling the reader, “I am recapping information from this one source only.” Well, why would you embarrass yourself this way when the subject must be composited from multiple sources? Why call attention to lousy research?

If you want to footnote Anaconda, do as D.S. Freeman did on so many occasions; name all the sources, say how they differ or agree, and add whatever historiographic comment is appropriate.

On to the references:

(1) A recent history of Bull Run mentions the initial trace of the Anaconda taking form in Scott’s letter to Seward of March 3, 1861. If you look at the letter, it has a single remark about blockading ports if duties are not collected. This is not enough to mark the genesis of a more complex idea.

(2) A letter sent by McClellan to Scott on April 27 contains elements of a national strategy. Scott passes GBM’s missive on to Lincoln with marginalia critical of McClellan’s ideas. Scott’s comments run a mere 13 lines when printed out on 8.5x11” paper. The last two sentences propose a cordon of ships on the Mississippi and a seaboard blockade in lieu of McClellan’s proposals. This skimpy bit is cited by some authors as their second Anaconda reference given in addition to one of the substantive notes below. People who mention this source, however, miss an opportunity to observe that Scott’s last two sentences are abrupt in a way that suggests this topic was already known to Lincoln. The whole act of passing McClellan’s ideas on to Lincoln this way implies the rounding out of an earlier Scott-Lincoln discussion.

(3) Some authors cite Scott’s letter to McClellan of May 2, 1861 as their principal source. This letter runs to a total of four paragraphs. Just one paragraph outlines Scott’s broad conception of an advance down the Mississippi while the seaboard is blockaded. It lacks details or substance.

(4) Scott’s letter to McClellan dated May 21, 1861 is a favorite citation. This again is four paragraphs in length and only one paragraph contains elements of his strategic thinking. Scott here makes some suggestions and asks McClellan to (a) comment on the ideas and (b) offer specific details to round out the conception. Rather than representing a plan, this letter invites a discussion that could lead to a plan someday.

(5) Some mention that Scott shared his plans with newspapermen and that Anaconda was described in the press. A news report would seem to me to offer a more complete picture of this “plan” than the fragments of Scott’s own writings that are currently used. I have yet to see a specific newspaper reference cited by authors, however.

(6) Nicolay and Hay left an account of the Cabinet meeting of June 29, 1861, which is linked to Scott’s defense of the Anaconda by Detzer and the compilation Lincoln Day by Day. I don’t have N&H available as I write this, but it seems from the summaries that in the meeting, Scott proposed to start an army down the Mississippi while delaying McDowell’s advance into Virginia.

And there we have it; the skinny historiographical sticks on which pop history spins the china plates of its engrossing infotainment. Oddly enough, there is no plan on file, no memorandum in Lincoln’s or Seward’s papers, no preliminary orders, nor anything tangible to promote these scraps above the rank of concepts.

Even stone soup needs some ingredients.

On to the ideas next. Some correspondence will be posted separately.

Addendum
Sherman Kent’s Writing History was published in 1941, during the great Lincoln revival that presaged the great ACW book boom, and Kent, then a Yale historian, said this about the use of citations:

Many of the statements made in the text demand validation. The reader has the right to ask, “Where did he get that?” and the writer has an obligation to answer. The reader however will not question all the statements. The parts of the essay he will especially wish to have footnoted are these: (1) all direct quotations, unless obviously familiar; (2) quotations and paraphrases of documents or passages from sources, monographs, and other secondary work; (3) statistical material … (4) iconoclastic remarks … statements which at first blush seem improbable; (5) new ideas from the sources not found in the texts and monographs; (6) specific statements from newspapers… Facts of common knowledge … need no citation..

The closest match to our Anaconda citers might be (2) in which the author is telling us he is paraphrasing a single source and inviting us to compare the paraphrase with the source. This is still bad citation and bad history as the Anaconda does not sit neatly summarized in a single source (again, with the possible exception of an undiscovered newspaper article somewhere).

A token plan

The simplest matters in Civil War history are obscured. How was McClellan commissioned? How did Lee come to command the Army of the Potomac? When was Pope relieved of the Army of Virginia?

There is a miasma surrounding so much in ACW history and at the same time such a high demand for authoritative narrative that the result is a kind of compressed representation of knowledge. To go back to Baudrillard, we are fed symbols, simulations that do duty in lieu of underlying facts (whose reality is unknown to the general reader). Let me call these “tokens,” which is shorter than “pop history’s wooden nickels.”

Token: Lincoln restored McClellan to command after Second Manassas. Token: Halleck restored McClellan to command after Second Manassas. These two misrepresentations easily coexist in Civil War literature because the underlying truth is of less than passing interest.

“The Anaconda Plan” is this type of symbol – a representation of something that is not but which is agreed upon as a necessary fiction to advance the narrative. Hitchcock called certain story elements “Maguffins,” creations that served no intrinsic purpose but to advance the plot. The Anaconda advances the plot.

The tale of the Union’s Civil War needs an early war strategy. If there is one, it can then pass through a character-like arc: it can fail; be revived; triumph. Or it can provide literary continuity through reference to its elements at different points in the chronology. Or it can pour a nice draft of “what-if” into the reader’s cup.

To find a strategy, we must find something simple enough for the laziest, most ill-informed reader to understand. A military plan per se would be to complex, with too many moving parts: motives, means, ends, actionability. What we need instead are some thought experiments, notions sketched in letters, exploratory “high concepts” with nothing to them except the power to excite the reader’s imagination. This is good token material. This is “the Anaconda Plan.”

“Plan” and “strategy” are military words with common meanings, just as some medical jargon has common meanings. Reading a medical history, we don’t want to see “fever,” “psycho,” etc., used in a street sense; and yet Civil War history is rife with references to “strategy” and “plans” in the same sense that I have a “strategy” or “plan” to stop off for milk on the way home from work. This too is the “Anaconda Plan.”

The “Anaconda Plan” is less egregious than many other Civil War tokens, but it is misleading and annoying and worth exploring further .

G. W. Smith, biz book punching bag

"As Smith discovered, being a boss is not the same as being a leader."

"When faced with consequential decisions, most people would prefer to be more like Lee than Smith, but the reality for many can be just the opposite".

"Davis was lucky [at Seven Pines] to have Lee close at hand (Lee was his advisor) but what would have happened if Lee had not been in the role he was in?"

Is this the same Lee that let Smith fight Lee's own Seven Pines battle for him? The Lee who was mysteriously absent after his urgent appointment to command the Army of the Potomac? The Lee who interpreted Davis's take command immediately as "take command sometime in the next 24 hours after you have some quality time off"? Is that the Lee managers should emulate?

People well read in Lee material, help me out here. Is this not the ultimate hands-off manager, the delegator par excellence, the you-handle-this-even-if-it-leads-to-Gettysburg-Malvern Hill-Antietam-the-loss-of-west-Virginia, etc.?

On the other hand, Lee's Lost Order is a masterpiece in micromanagement.

How do we split the difference?

Let us not deny the management students their teachable moments. We can do better than to bash Smith.

Lee and Smith at Vera Cruz

In 1896, GW Smith recounted two anecdotes from the Mexican War involving interactions with RE Lee. Offered for "what they're worth," I personally find them rich, especially in light of Lee's "hanging around" behavior at Seven Pines and Smith's interpersonal "tone."

After the work upon the army gun battery, the mortar battery and the trenches had been fairly commenced, I was transferred to the naval battery and took my regular turn, with Captain R.E. Lee, and Lieutenant Z.B. Tower, in superintending its construction. I was in charge of the work the day it opened its guns upon the fortifications of the city, having relieved Captain Lee that morning. Seeing him still at the battery, about the time the firing commenced, I asked him if he intended to continue in control adding, "If so, I report to you for instructions and orders." He replied, "No, I am not in charge. I have remained only to see my brother, Lieutenant Sydney Smith Lee of the Navy who is with one of the heavy guns. My tour of service is over. You are in control; and, if I can be of any service to you whilst I remain here, please let me know.

There had previously been a difference of opinion between Captain Lee and myself in regard to the dimensions that should be given to the embrasures. The Chief Engineer [Totten] decided in favor of Captain Lee and the embrasures were changed and made to conform to his views. In a very short time after the firing began one of the embrasures became so badly choked that it could not be used until the debris could be removed. [...] Just after that incident, I asked Captain Lee what he now thought in regard to the proper dimensions for the embrasures. He replied "They must be made greater when the battery is repaired tonight."

- From Company "A" Corps of Engineers, USA, 1846-1848, in the Mexican War by Gustavus W. Smith

Did Lincoln become McClellan?

The current historiography depends heavily on depicting McClellan as a failed model corrected in the later war. In this historiography, Centennialism, the corrections are incremental, culminating in Grant's selection to top command. Centennialism then posits Grant's excellence in terms of his service to Lincoln; Grant's staying out of politics, Grant's alignment with Lincoln's military aims, Grant's doggedness, etc. If we add in the standard claims about Lincoln in the late war, a picture of oneness appears: Lincoln stayed out of Grant's business, Lincoln implictly trusted Grant, Lincoln was loyal to Grant.

From his first book, his PhD thesis in fact, Brooks Simpson has attempted to correct the Centennial view of the Lincoln-Grant relationship. I won't characterize his views: read for yourself. A lot of interesting Civil War history can be discovered and enjoyed once we realize the Lincoln-Grant partnership was not the cliche the Centennial made of it.

Recently, Harold Holzer imagined Grant's hardest hard war views and projected these onto Lincoln as Lincoln's own. Simpson objects:

In truth, Lincoln’s feelings about Grant’s losses in the campaigns of 1864 were mixed. As he told the general during a visit to the front in June 1864: “I cannot pretend to advise, but I do sincerely hope that all may be accomplished with as little bloodshed as possible.” The following month, he telegraphed his commander: “I do hope you may find a way that the effort shall not be desperate in the sense of great loss of life.” The next year, in a conference with Grant and Sherman, Lincoln again expressed the hope that the war could be ended without one more major battle. True, after the battle of Fredericksburg in December 1862 the president commented that fighting such a battle every week would eventually destroy the Army of Northern Virginia, showing that he understood the grim attrition of war. Yet he also had mixed feelings about the destructiveness of the conflict. On August 14, 1864, he called upon Grant to meet with Robert E. Lee to try to arrange “for a mutual discontinuance of house-burning and other destruction of private property.”

These remarks in condensed form encapsulate in reverse McClellan's perceived faults. Did Lincoln become McClellan over time?

Is it possible that the closer affinity or similitude was between McClellan and Lincoln?

Your daily Lowry digest, condensed

Harry Smeltzer notices that the book with Lowry's claim in it was endorsed by certain esteemed personages.

Brooks Simpson notices that said personages are outraged that historians other than their blurbing selves failed to check Lowry. This is a post not to be missed.

Morningside books on sale

Here's a link to their clearance sale.

Brooks Simpson's blog

Brooks Simpson has launched his own blog; good move, overdue.

A good use of Ford's

The idea of doing ACW and Reconstruction plays at Ford's feels right, doesn't it?

Lowry: Compare and contrast

The news is out, See:
Kevin Levin
New York
Brooks Simpson

Lowry was interviewed on Civil War Talk Radio in its early days; he uttered one of George Carlin's forbidden words IIRC, irking Gerald. I found him overconfident of his achievment, evasive, and without historiographic sense.

I read at least three of his books (see here, here, here). He was an author who consistently went farther than the material allowed.

It's not that he stretched the material, it's that he would pick his premise first - always from a dramatic marketing angle - then marshal the supporting data which would fail to measure up to marketing's promise. We're talking undergraduate history papers.

Lowry is an enthusiast with focus on the wrong things. He is a sensationalist. I think he could make himself useful as a compiler of information rather than as a narrative historian. That would be a better use of his energy, if he has any left after this scandal, and if anyone will trust such compilations.

Retroactive preservationism

The Army has ordered a halt to the resale of precious artifacts now in private hands that it junked some years ago. (By what authority they do so, I cannot understand.)

These now retroactively preserved artifacts - whose history the Army was uniquely qualified to appreciate before it scrapped them as unwanted trash - gained instant bureaucratic value this week when they were repriced by the howls of scandalized outsiders. Decibels of embarassment were converted into units of measurable historic significance for those custodians who had earlier behaved as vandals.

Again, as with the Walter Reed fiasco, the Army acted after a WaPo expose embarassed the brass.

To anyone who ever watched or read a Lovejoy mystery, the underlying operation is as basic as A-B-C:

...the company performing the renovation replaced the urns with modern replicas and was allowed to take away the originals...

If you know the value of things, renovation can be more than just a business: in the right situation, it's a racket.

I once had charge of a unique collection of high value paintings owned by the Army; the president of a certain republic imagined our Army high command appreciated presents of rare art and made many such. How dealers knew that these pieces were then in my custody I still wonder.

The most memorable offer I received was that in exchange for one of the paintings in my care, I could have any painting of my choice from the national museum. This immediately told me that any piece I might name was already a copy, or at least that copies were circulating of the whole national catalog as if they were the originals. Nice business, antiques and art.

Another example. The 9th Infantry does not exist as a regiment anymore and its artifacts were in the hands of the Second Division some decades ago; these included astonishingly elaborate dragon-draped silver punchbowls and cups worked by Chinese craftsmen at the time of the Boxer Rebellion. I drank from these a few times (my 1/17th Bn was brigaded with the 2/9th). I wonder if these heirlooms were replaced with replicas by now. A few weeks ago at a Christmas party, an antiques dealer amused me by standing back 10 feet from place settings calling out which items were plate and which were sterling. There's a punchbowl half a world away I wished he could have surveyed as well. The big threat to antique silver right now, he said, was meltdown for cash.

The inventory of its treasures is (or was) fragmented in the Army, with nothing like the property/inventory safeguards surrounding, say, firearms. The idea of the defense budget going to preserve these things - and they are not nearly all in military museums - is weird and their custody is spotty.

We need an inventory of the armed forces' historical and cultural artifacts; we need ownership of these to pass out of the hands of the armed forces. We will be astonished at the holdings disclosed, I promise.

Wharton's take on G.W. Smith

As we fogeys like to say, it's unbelievable what they're teaching kids these days.

BTW, has anyone ever seen or heard this one before:

Davis returned to the battlefield. The Union Army was rumbling in the distance.

Again, he asked Smith for his plan.

"Sir, I have no plan to defend the Confederacy," Smith infamously replied. "Do you have any good ideas?"

The "madness" of G.W. Smith, cont.

The question arises whether Davis knew he was employing a relapsing paralytic. The answer is in Jefferson Davis's papers:

Private
Nashville Tennessee, September 3rd. 1861

My Dear Sir,

I write to inform you that I arrived at this place last night from Lexington Ky. by private conveyance. I have resigned my appointment as Street Commissioner of the City of New York to take effect on the 8th. of this month. My object in fixing that day was to give time to Capt. Mansfield Lovell to get here before the fact of my resignation is known. [Lovell was Smith's deputy in NYC.] My wife is in Ky. and will join me here in a few days. I have left the North for the purpose of connecting myself with the South and sharing her destiny - On and after the 8th. of this month I shall be entirely free from all trammels, and will take an early opportunity to offer my services to the Confederate States in whatever capacity or position they may be most useful. I am glad to be able to say that I have entirely and perfectly recovered from my recent illness, at one time it was feared that perfect recovery would not take place for a year, if ever. But thank God I am now "all right."

The guns at Sumter would have brought me South at once if I had been in condition to do anything -

Please present my respectful compliments to Mrs. Davis and accept assurances of regards friendship and admiration for yourself from Yours Very Truly,

G W Smith

I have no doubt that Mansfield Lovell will be here in a short time. He has been like a caged lion.

Smith marked this letter in 1865 saying actually his acquaintance with Davis antebellum was "very slight." The editor of these papers notes that Smith had learned of federal arrest orders while on his way to Hot Springs, AR, for treatment of his paralysis.

It is interesting that Smith was a combat commander again within six months of Seven Pines.

The curious absence of Robert E. Lee, cont.

Scott Smart was moved to rummage through some books at hand and he posted his findings to the comments section of Harry's blog. I want to run his comments without interjections except to emphasize nothing in what follows contradicts Smith's account of how Lee took up his duties so long after he was ordered to take immediate command:

I looked at the WC Davis bio of J Davis, and he provides some info re Smith’s problems, but on first reading at least it seemed a little like the “Davis must have known” sort of thing. There were some notes so I looked at J Davis’ “Rise and Fall of the Confederate Govt v2″ and Davis lays out the timeline pretty clearly: Afternoon of 31 May he was riding along the lines with Lee and learned Johnston was out of action. He told Lee that he was to take command of the army and to make plans that evening (31 May/1 Jun). The next day (1 Jun) Davis returned to the lines and found Gen Whiting who pointed out he location of Smith’s HQ. Davis writes that he rode up to Smith to tell him he would not take command prior to Lee’s arrival to spare both embarrassment. It isn’t clear the exact embarrassment, but I guess subsequently Smith being next in seniority to Johnston, assumed he would be appointed commander and came to dislike Davis on account of this apparent slight. At any rate, Davis says Lee arrived some time later and met with Smith after Davis had left, eventually catching up with Davis and they rode together to Longstreet. Davis is clear that Lee is in command at this point. Davis makes no mention of the reason for bypassing Smith, but gives the impression that he had determined on Lee from before Johnston was wounded.

Postmaster Gen John Reagan “Memoirs” also was cited, and Reagan generally substantiates J Davis’ account. Reagan writes that when Davis (who Reagan had met) saw Johnston go by on a stretcher, he “at once gave General Lee verbal direction to take command of the army”. He then goes on to write that archives of the Dept of War show that Smith had command of the army for three days, but states this was in error and reflects the date of the written orders.

Now WC Davis gives some material on the supposed unfitness of Smith, and says that it was discussed by J Davis, W Preston Johnston and Ives the evening of the 31st which I imagine could have happened as after-the-fact of Davis’ order to Lee to take command. WC Davis references Preston Johnston’s letters to his wife which might be the place to look for comments on Smith’s mental or physical condition. At least what I could find showed no concern about Smith up to the point that Johnston was wounded, and if the timeline of J Davis and Reagan is correct, the decision was made before Smith could react to Johnston’s wounding. I have no idea of the reliability of J Davis or Reagan’s post-war writings though.

The "madness" of G.W. Smith, cont.

Russell Bonds mailed in some neat finds indeed:

Jefferson Davis to Winnie, June 2: (Papers of Jefferson Davis, 1862, p. 209)

:. . . Gen'l. Lee is in the field comdg. Genl. G.W. Smith has come in this morning sick, his old disease it is said."

OR, Vol. 11, p. 686-86, Smith's adjutant to Lee:

HEADQUARTERS,
Hughes' House, June 2, 1862
General R. E. LEE, Commanding, &c:

GENERAL: I regret to inform you that General Smith finds himself utterly unable to endure the mental excitement incident to his actual presence with the army. Nothing but duty under fire could possibly keep him up, and there is danger of his entire prostration. He goes to town to-day to gain a few days' respite. All business and all exciting questions must be kept from him for awhile. Major Melton will accompany him to prevent, while it is necessary, all such intrusion.

Since writing the above, I have again seen the general, and am pained to learn that partial paralysis has already, commenced. The case is critical and the danger imminent. I will add a line in a few moments in reference to general condition of affairs I am, general, with high regard, your most obedient servant,

JASPER S. WHITING,
Major and Assistant Adjutant-General, Acting Engineer

Whiting did his boss no favors with this report! "Utterly unable to endure the mental excitement!" Note please, the progressive nature of this thing. Gullain-Barre is progressive in the same way.

Russell adds: "Welsh's Medical Histories of Confederate Generals (pp. 199-200) might shed some light or give some leads as well. Or not . . ." Not - Google Books won't allow a peek at the Smith entry.

In any case, it looks like we have additional confirmation of the malady starting on the morning of June 2nd. This makes mayhem with a lot of ACW narratives.

The curious absence of Robert E. Lee

Let's refer again to the transition in command at Seven Pines and ponder what we are reading:

About 1:30 pm. [June 1st] President Davis rode up and asked for General Lee. On being told that I [G.W. Smith, commanding the battle] had not seen General Lee during the day, the President expressed so much surprise that I asked him if he had any special reason for supposing General Lee would be there. To this he replied ; Yes; and added that early in the morning he had ordered General Lee to take command of the army at once. [...] General Lee arrived at about 2:00 p.m. and at once took command of the army.

If you are familiar with Seven Pines (in other words Fair Oaks from the viewpoint of the Southern commanders), day one (5/31/62) features Davis and Lee riding about the battlefield trying to get information plus Lee also waiting at Johnston's HQ to learn what he was doing, while Johnston avoided the pair of them with complete success.

From Davis's and Lee's POV, the battle must have seemed a muddle, the commander not to be found, no one sure of the plan, no communication. Smith - Johnston's second in command - was at HQ also long out of touch with his commander.

Now move to evening. I want to suggest the following sequence of events for the night of the 31st: (1) Johnston wounded (2) Smith takes command (3) Smith confers with subordinates, develops plan, issues orders (4) Smith shares plan with Lee (5) Lee writes letter after midnight praising battle plan (6) Davis appoints Lee to command after midnight.

It's not clear to me where in this sequence to put "Davis learns Johnston is incapacitated." Smith says Davis told him the Lee appointment was "early" on the 1st of June. Meanwhile, Lee writes Smith a letter approving the battle plan for the 1st, dates it the 1st, and nothing in the letter conveys his new status as commander of Smith's army.

You see that I give Lee the benefit of the doubt that he wrote Smith the approving letter BEFORE Davis put him in command. If Lee had written the letter AFTER appointment without reference to the new relationship it would have been a very dishonest distancing act.

There was, nevertheless, a distancing act.

Davis is shocked by Lee's absence from the battlefield as late as 1:30 p.m. on the 1st. When Lee appeared at 2:00 in the afternoon and "took command," he did not issue any orders, deferring to Smith. When Lee and Smith encounter Longstreet between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. on the 1st, Lee lets Longstreet report to Smith, offending Smith's sense of order to the point where Smith orders Longstreet to report to Lee.

It's easy to see what Lee is up to: he is letting the battle play out without him, without putting his name on it. The question is why?

Again, I have some possibilities:

(1) Lee sensed the battle was a mess, whether or not Smith's plans were good. He did not want to own it.

(2) Lee rated Smith's chances of retrieving the battle on day two higher than his own.

(3) Lee rejected the command structure but could not reasonably change it until after the battle; he did not want to fight a battle with Johnston's (now Smith's) commanders and dispositions.

(4) Lee did not understand Davis's intent and imagined he had more latitude in the timing of his assumption of command than he actually had.

(5) Lee spent the morning getting lost, or falling asleep, or enmeshed in some confusion or foul-up.

(6) Lee merely carried on in the widespread early war tradition of letting his number two (Smith) function as operational army commander.

More on (6) in another post. Note that Johnston, as commander of the Army of the Potomac, wrote Davis in late 1861 that he could not release Smith from his organization because as his number two, Smith was the operational commander of the army.

Whatever Lee's motives, Smith seems to be our sole source for a detailed description of the change of command, and in Smith's account, Lee's absence was unexcused.

For a different view, see Mort Kunstler's account of the command change here.

G.W. Smith, meet Guillain-Barre

[M]uscles cannot be used at all ... the patient becomes nearly paralyzed ...

The madness of G.W. Smith (cont.)

G.W. Smith said in Century magazine that he was stricken on the second of June but recovered eighteen hours "after Lee relieved me of command of the Army."

In his book, The Battle of Seven Pines, Smith says "The next morning (June 2), I was compelled by illness to leave the field." Morning is not very specific.

Govan and Livingwood in their Johnston biography, A Different Valor, put Lee's assumption of command at 2:00 pm June 1, the latest time I've seen from pop historians. This 18 hour remark would move out to an 8 a.m. June 2 recovery. Their time is not sourced. However...

In the Battle of Seven Pines, Smith talks of Lee's assumption of command this way:

About 1:30 pm. [June 1st] President Davis rode up and asked for General Lee. On being told that I had not seen General Lee during the day, the President expressed so much surprise that I asked him if he had any special reason for supposing General Lee would be there. To this he replied ; Yes; and added that early in the morning he had ordered General Lee to take command of the army at once. [...] General Lee arrived at about 2:00 p.m. and at once took command of the army.

What he means is formal command, for he adds, "General Lee made no adverse comment on my management of the army and gave me no orders then or any other time that day."

Between 4:00 pm and 5:00 p.m., Smith and Lee are riding on the Williamsburg Road. They encounter Longstreet who renders a report to Smith; Smith redirects the report to Lee. At 6:00 p.m. they return to Smith's HQ and Smith issues orders recalling troops sent to Longstreet's aid. Smith is fully himself into the evening.

So a June 2nd recovery is consistent with a June 2nd affliction, but the details are difficult.

One of Harry Smeltzer's readers wrote him to say:

“Glatthaar, OTOH, says Smith had suffered the 'paralysis' before the war, when he was street commissioner in New York City." “A bout with paralysis forced him south for treatment. The Federal government misconstrued his intentions and deemed him an enemy, so Smith offered his services to the Confederacy.”

It is dangerous to rely on Glatthaar for anything. Only the paralysis matches Smith's obituary which puts it this way:

After the election he continued attending to the duties of Commissioner, and served out the term for which he had been elected. His administration of the office had been very able and honest, and had given great satisfaction. He held over, awaiting with anxiety the appointment of a successor. Owing to overwork, about two weeks before active hostilities actually began at Fort Sumter, Charleston, Captain Smith was struck down by paralysis and confined closely to his room for some months. When recovered sufficiently, he went to his friends in Kentucky. At a later day he learned it was the intention of the U. S. authorities at Washington to arrest and imprison him, and he proceeded to Richmond, Va., in September. About this time he resigned the office of Street Commissioner of New York City.

Steven Newton in Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond, writes of the famous Richmond war conference involving Davis, Lee, Johnston, Longstreet, Smith, and Randolph,

Smith he finally located at the Spottswood Hotel only thirty minutes before the appointed time. There, his second in command had nearly collapsed from the exertions of the previous few days and his chronic nervous malady. Smith told Johnston that he felt entirely too ill to participate...

The citation for this vingnette is excellent, an unpublished account of a conversation between Smith and Bevery Bohnston (Joe's brother) in 1863.

Worth looking into: conversion disorder and Jean-Martin Charcot.

The madness of G.W. Smith

Common knowledge is the curse of Civil War history. Among the commonest knowledge is how Lee came to command the Rebel Army of the Potomac.

Please pause a moment to collect your own thoughts on how it happened.

Ready?

If you had asked me, I would have said that Gustavus W. Smith suffered some sort of breakdown and Davis then assigned Lee to take over from Smith (who had taken over from Johnston). Was that your recollection too?

I never looked deeply into this. The record gets very thin when addressing what the malady was and how it was manifested. It is most odd for our beloved storytellers to pass up juicy gossip or vivid anecdotes in constructing their tales.

I gave one formulation of the legend but there are variations. Consider these:

Wiki: ... he suffered what was likely a nervous breakdown upon taking command and Jefferson Davis replaced him with Robert E. Lee the following day, June 1."

Comment: Wiki speculates about nervous breakdown ("likely") and gives the malady date as May 31 (working backward from June 1, the "following day"). It presents in one sentence, breakdown > replacement. It does not source the breakdown.

In The Civil War: a History, Harry Hansen, Gary Gallagher, and Richard S. Wheeler take a crack at it: "... command devolved on Major General G.W. Smith. But Smith, who was near a nervous breakdown, made a poor start ... On this Sunday morning, June 1 ... At noon President Davis appointed General Robert E. Lee to the command of Johnston's army."

Comment: At noon on June 1, 1862, Davis appointed Lee to the command; this is quite a distinction from Lee taking command subsequent to an appointment. Please note it. This follows "a poor start" by Smith with the reader invited to draw a causal inference. Smith is "near a nervous breakdown," something the reader cannot picture without help, and no details are given.

Now The Seven Days by Cliff Dowdey: "When on June 1 the army devolved on Gustavus Smith ... [he] suffered a total collapse of his faculties. Smith was removed from the field in a state he called paralysis, and which today would probably be diagnosed as traumatic shock."

Comment: Note Dowdey makes the odd point that the army did not devolve on him on May 31, when Johnston left the field wounded, but the next day. Note also the sequence: assumes command on the 1st, suffers immediate collapse.

Let's work backwards from Dowdey, for despite the lack of notes, he gives Smith as his source and in his bibliography he has only one of Smith's books, the Battle of Seven Pines. So Smith is his source.

I have not yet found any other source on the malady aside from Smith himself. If you have one please advise.

Here is what Smith says in his Century article, "Two Days of Battle at Seven Pines":

I was completely prostrated on the 2nd of June by an attack of paralysis, no symptom of which was manifested within eighteen hours after Lee relieved me of command of the Army.

Smith is stricken on June 2nd! He uses a specific word in two sources: paralysis. No nervous breakdown, no "collapse of faculties" or "trauma." If Smith is the sole source on this, the judicious historian cannot swap out the word paralysis for another of his own choosing. He has recovered by the night of the 2nd (within eighteen hours after Lee assumed command).

Elsewhere, Smith wrote that Lee was promised command of the army by Davis the night of the 31st when Johnston was wounded. This separates Smith's performance and health from the command decision. It also separates the appointment to command from the assumption of command.

These are matters that should interest the Civil War historian but apparently do not.

Moreover, in the Century piece Smith quotes a letter from Lee approving of Smith's own attack plans for June 1st. In the afternoon of the 1st, after the change of command, he says Lee gave him no orders. Smith directed the fight all day. Smith's postwar writings detail how he fought Seven Pines on June 1 and refute Longstreet's and Johnston's criticism of his conduct of the battle on June 1.

Smith (1) fought the battle and then (2) suffered "paralysis." If Smith is the sole source of our knowledge of the affliction, that has to be the sequence.

Meanwhile, have some medical fun:

Paralysis: "A general term most often used to describe severe or complete loss of muscle strength due to motor system disease from the level of the cerebral cortex to the muscle fiber. This term may also occasionally refer to a loss of sensory function."

Nervous breakdown: "...a popular term - it is not a clinical term - that is often used to describe a mental disorder that a person experiences. It is used for a number of reasons, including: to hide a diagnosis; to avoid the stigma of a diagnosis; not understanding the reasons for certain loss of function..."

So "nervous breakdown" takes us away from the specific - "paralysis" - to the nonspecific. It interjects ambiguity into the record where there was specificity.

Psychological trauma/shock: "Psychological shock can occur after a physically or emotionally traumatic experience but it effects [sic] your state of mind (although this can give you symptoms such as palpitations and feeling faint, it doesn’t usually lead to serious physical collapse)."

The matter of the "madness" of G.W. Smith is again one of many signs of the quality of love our ACW writers have for their readers.

To have a Civil War...

To have a Civil War requires deep, possibly irreconcilable political disagreements. To have such disagreements requires political principles and political philosophy; these, in turn, require a particular reading of civics.

The Civic Literacy Program has found that today's elected officials know much less of civics than the already civics-challenged man in the street. Are you smarter than an American Politician? Apparently so.

If politicians don't know enough civics to hold strong opinions, that puts us out of danger of a Civil War, which is good news:

Seventy-nine percent of those who have been elected to government office do not know the Bill of Rights expressly prohibits establishing an official religion for the U.S.

Thirty percent do not know that “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” are the inalienable rights referred to in the Declaration of Independence.

Twenty-seven percent cannot name even one right or freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment.

Forty-three percent do not know what the Electoral College does. One in five thinks it either “trains those aspiring for higher political office” or “was established to supervise the first televised presidential debates.”

Fifty-four percent do not know the Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war. Thirty-nine percent think that power belongs to the president, and 10% think it belongs to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Only 32% can properly define the free enterprise system, and only 41% can identify business profit as “revenue minus expenses.”

It would appear we are a long way from a Constitutional crisis of any kind going into the Sesquicentennial.

New York records online

" ... the New York State Military History Museum and Veterans Research Center is making capsule histories of 360,000 New York Civil War Soldiers available online." That is a lot of data to crunch.

Here are the links themselves:

•Roster of New York Volunteers during the Civil War

•Annual Reports of the Bureau of Military Statistics, 1864-1868

•New York State Militia Officers Prior to 1858

Reconstruction dollars

The next round of presidential dollar coins to be issued might seem interesting to the Civil War collector.

The Sesquicentennial in Arkansas and New York

Arkansas formed an official Sesquicentennial board in 2007; I missed it.

Meanwhile, New York refuses to form one. This article cleverly links New York City's wartime ambiguity with the current ambiguity about any commemorations.

The public historian explains and explains

MG John Walker, CSA, to LTG John Pemberton, CSA, July 4, 1863: "You can expect no help from this side of the river."

Public historian to public, December 27, 2010: "He's saying 'I can't help you. I have no troops, I have no supplies, I have no way to get over there.' It was just another punctuation mark to just how desperate and dire everything was."

Question for public historian: might he have really been saying, "You can expect no help from this side of the river"?

SCV grabs another headline

This is going to be a long, painful commemoration if the SCV keeps cooking up provocations.

There are about 10,000 shallow, sanctimonious prigs in the media who are loaded for bear and are itching to be goaded into dishing out fifth grade civics lessons.

Outrage fatigue, unlike battle fatigue, is not going to set in with these people. Somebody organize a peace commission.

Crazy talk?

I think the fact that we were not Lincoln scholars proved to be an advantage. We rolled up our sleeves without any preconceptions and simply let the evidence take us wherever it led.

What an odd approach.

OT: Re-enactors I can relate to

This is a history post, though not an ACW post. Please think history and ponder deeply the following.

Forty-two years after the Civil War ended, the first Peking-to-Paris road rally was held. The winner was a car made by Itala. I wonder if any ACW veterans ran that race.

It's become an triannual event. I tend to peruse the the literature issued by the organizers each time beforehand. This year, they offered this suggestion to would-be entrants: your best bet for winning this race would be to buy and kit out an 1920s Rolls Royce. Think about that.

If you are driving a Land Rover, Jeep, Hummer, or some such "off road" vehicle, please read the preceding carefully and consider what it means to you, since anyone can enter this race in any car whatever. If you are in the services and drive military vehicles, give it some additional thought. In 2010, your best technology for winning this thing is a machine created in easy range of Civil War memory.

Nevertheless, this year's results showed 1920s Rollers to be inadequate.

David (picture above) and Karen Ayre came in fourth place with their 1907 Itala. They were beaten by Nicky Bailey and Janek Mamino in a 1918 Buick Roadster. Nick and Janek were beaten by a 1923 Vauxhall OD 23/60. Coming in first were Charles and Nellie Bishop in their 1925 Vauxhall 30/98.

But oh look! There's a 2009 Ford Ranger that did magnificently in 163rd place! Oh, and there's a smashing result for a 1999 Toyota Landcruiser in 165th place! They finished the race. Hooray.

Think I'll go get some fat auto loans so I can buy a craptastic computer-controlled sporty 4WD mud runner to take me to the mall. Just don't ask me to go Peking to Paris.

In 1907 a model car of that year won the race. In 2010, no model car of the current year could dream of winning this race, while hundred-year-old stuff is totally competitive.

It takes a road race to show us how we and market tastes have reshaped technology.

Jonathan Letterman

Under the generally acknowledged great Civil War commanders there is a layer of great Civil War technocrats who tend to be almost as well known, e.g. Gorgas, Dahlgren, Meigs, Ellet, etc.

I don't think Jonathan Letterman, M.D., is well known in this class. I think of him as a gift to the Northern wounded, part of the immense circle of talent recognized and recruited by McClellan. The GBM-Letterman relationship should raise McClellan a notch in the most hostile quarters, I think.

Today's Army has the decency to recognize Letterman above and beyond what Centennial historiography allows, and I commend their material to you.

One fundemental difference between Meade and McClellan was thrown into stark relief by their management of Letterman. See here for material damning to Meade.

Meanwhile, I simply cannot imagine being Southern and wounded without a Letterman or a McClellan to look after me.

At the crossroads of history (cont.)

Carl Edwards is not the last NASCAR driver who will be recruited for the miniseries "Appomattox." "...according to the show’s website, certain NASCAR drivers will sign on to play certain roles." Another prong in this TV show marketing strategy has also been disclosed: "Among the country artists who will have roles are the members of Rascal Flatts, Dwight Yoakam, Kix Brooks (formerly of Brooks & Dunn), and Laura Bell Bundy..."

The website does us the favor of showing us actors cast against historical photos. Well done!

And is this the first talking film or TV show to portray McClellan? McClellan at Appomattox! Must be like McClellan at Gettysburg (if you remember that meme here) only in 1865. But McClellan is in Nice at that point, IIRC.

Certainly, this must be the first portrayal of Halleck on TV and I have to laugh at the casting of Kevin Farley here. I guess old fish eyes is going to be something of a comedian on the small screen.

The casting department somehow delivers Stonewall, Burnside, McPherson, and AS Johnston to Appomattox, as well as GBM, perhaps through flashbacks.

Most amusing: check it out.

At the crossroads of history

HBO has passed judgement on the Civil War buff by signing a NASCAR driver, Carl Edwards, to play a Civil War general in a made-for-TV ACW miniseries. I like this comment from their press release (emphasis added):

The connection between the Civil War and drivers who race NASCAR is simple: those values of the Civil War-the patriotism, the spirit of American competition, the regional and national pride that poured forth from and for its heroes-is best exemplified in the American Values and American Spirit embraced today by the NASCAR affiliated drivers and their fans.

That's worth a whole post but let us leave it with the question Grant vs. Lee = The Spirit of American Competition? Kevin Levin owns the meme ACW as entertainment - let him plow this rich quote.

For my part, as an old soldier, I can't help but observe that the daily killed and wounded in our ongoing wars take a back seat in this press release in exemplifying American Values and American Spirit.

If HBO has become a new custodian of American Values and American Spirit and if they get a few things wrong in the Values/Spirit department at first, well, let's stay positive.

Now, Carl Edwards may be a great guy, but he has been chosen to play Gen. John B. Gordon. Question for NASCAR fans: is Edwards the John B. Gordon of NASCAR racers?

I ask because my NASCAR IQ is low. I follow Formula One in a haphazard, desultory way because it is no longer the racing of my youth. The Robert E. Lee of F1 is dead. My cohort, those who went into racing, suffered combat infantry levels of attrition. Maybe higher. They did so knowingly. They are lucky to have a truly great readership to keep their memories alive, as well as a movie or two needing no historical analogies.

How do we compare the race car driver of today with one of 40-50 years ago? Jean Shepherd made an inadvertant comaprison with the John Gordons during one of his radio monologues in 1960: he said that the young blades who had been part of the horsey crowd previously were now all into racing. Gordon may not have been a cavalryman but he exuded a cavalier ethos.

Imagine: a Confederate cavalry that immolates itself for its own (and our) entertainment; or a Pickett's charge around the track; or a life-threatening attempt to excel under peacetime conditions.

Imagine an audience that is not immune from the danger they observe.

How far away from that are we - and Carl Edwards - now? TV distance with accident-proof races and a sanitized ACW history to match.

Pictured right: F1 winner (1955) Juan-Manuel Fangio. He lived by virtue of quitting. See also Jackie Stewart and Sterling Moss. John Gordon did not quit but lived nonetheless.

Secession Ball

That Secession Ball to be held tonight has triggered gushers of printer's ink. The results are not worth reading.

The real meat of the anniversary of South Carolina's secession is not something newspaper hackery is going to be able to serve its readers. We can however list the uneaten courses here:

(1) What are the distinctions among celebration, commemoration, and observance?

(2) Are there such things as intergenerational guilt and virtue?

(3) Do state names themselves confer political or historical continuity?

(4) What connection does a modern succesor state have with its annihilated predecessor?

(5) If Reconstruction is long over, can you be "unreconstructed"?

If the standard of discourse is higher than portrayed here, send me the links and I will post them.

The "mindless pursuit of college degrees"

From the Chronicle of Higher Education, no less.

Euclid and the geometry of Lincoln studies

Look upon yon works of Foner, ye Lincolnians, and despair!

If I had a Lincoln blog, that would be my motto. And yet, every so often a work comes out that tells the cynic, "There may be something to this Lincoln stuff." Something beyond Fonerfare, Holzergrams, and the "comprehensive review of mostly familiar material."

As a D-level geometry student, I saw enough light in this subject to appreciate that it developed through an orderly system of argumentation; it was an extension of the rhetoric courses we took; it stood at the seam of math and language and reason. It set my future taste in maths, steering me towards such as George Spencer-Brown, matrices and vectors, and other practical and sensible verbal-numerical explorations.

David Hirsch and Dan Van Haften, an attorney and mathemetician respectively, propose with force and conviction that Euclid provided a rhetorical framework in which Lincoln operated. The analysis is concrete and impressive and the authors present diagrammatic (and tabular) evidence of the origins of Lincoln's powers of discourse.

Their book, Abraham Lincoln and the Structure of Reason, thus adds something new to Lincoln studies. The broader question is whether Lincolnians, numbed by Foner, Holzer, McPherson, Goodwin, etc., give a damn about the origins of Lincoln's argumentation or any other particular. To many of them, Lincoln appears of whole cloth: indivisible, totemic, sui generis.

Any project breaking Lincoln into bits and pieces for analysis is therefore going to run into a wall of silence, I think. Frank Williams, an establishment figure, wrote the introduction to this work, but he's a bit idiosyncratic, surely an exception.

Lincoln = self-made genius or recycler of influences? This is not a question for 2010 and thus this beautifully written, elegant work by Hirsch and Van Haften is something like a 1940s Borzoi book, not only in quality and treatment but in terms of the point at which it stands historiographically.

Parallel texts, Euclid's and Lincoln's, present powerful evidence of derivation. This entire book is an argument about derivation. Can the guardians of Lincoln's pop imagery welcome extensive, decades long evidence of close derivation? Or is not Lincoln pop culture's man-who-invented-himself-at-each-stage-of-life?

If Lincoln showed that anyone can become president, there is no room in our culture for a codicil that he must first master Euclid.

Twenty-five years ago, when I was a critic at New Art Examiner, the air was rife (in that context) with questions of "To what extent does this work [abstract painting] using geometric form retain its importance in light of the ideology-sensitive work being done today ..." The ideologically sensitive work surrounding Lincoln today has the power to bend light into shapes Euclid could hardly describe.

This is an excellent book with great notes, full biography and a fine style. Given the time, I'll post a review of it on its own terms and in its own context. It deserves no less (but it will likely get much less).

Potential post overload

Oddly enough for a quiescent blog, I have accumulated more ideas for posts than can be executed in short order. Please stand by and I hope to reward your interest.

WaPo discovers our level

It didn't take long - just a few weeks - for the WaPo's fresh new Sesquicentennial section to descend to the lowest common denominator of Usenet level ACW discourse. Enjoy the comments!

Meanwhile, dig this WaPo review of Eric Foner's latest. The self-parody leaves me with nothing to mock:

The value of Eric Foner's "The Fiery Trial" lies in its comprehensive review of mostly familiar material; in its sensible evaluation of the full range of information already available about Abraham Lincoln and slavery; and in the deft thoroughness of its scholarship. "The Fiery Trial" does well what has already been done before "but ne'er so well expressed."

This review could represent a fair summary of what the legion of regurgitators thinks of itself.

One outlier issue here is "deft thoroughness of its scholarship." These summarizers of secondary sources and purveyors of well-worn analysis are engaged in literary work ("ne'er so well expressed") while modeling some sort of imaginary scholarship mantle for their ignorant but adoring public. Take on the writer label, dear scribblers! Wear it proudly! It's no disgrace.

I think many believe that rewriting historical stuff becomes "history" by virtue of the subject matter handled, and their handling makes them "scholars."

Imagine a scholar who has never had an original thought or insight, never pieced together primary sources to uncover new patterns, or repudiated widely-held but erroneous views. Were the monks who copied manuscripts scholars? Scholars of chirography perhaps.

On the other hand, in the context of a discourse so low as that of WaPo's battle flags, Foner and company might scale up to the level of "scholar" by comparison.

Scott's Operational Art (link list)

These are the posts referring to Winfield Scott's operational art as demonstrated in his two coordinated offensives of 1861:

"Concentration in time" and the ACW (9/28/2010): How ACW writers and others misunderstand and misapply Clausewitz's concept; a suggestion that Scott be studied as a corrective.

"Concentration in time" and the ACW (9/29/2010): Shows that the mutated Clausewitzian construct "concentration in time" has been further bastardized by adding the Jominian idea of interior/exterior lines and proposes Scott's first coordinated offensive as a way to recast the analysis into something internally consistent and useful.

"Concentration in time" and the ACW (9/30/2010): A recap of Scott's first offensive with emphasis on how much better it was served by coordination than by simultaneity.

"Concentration in time" and the ACW (10/01/2010): Chronology (in context) of Scott's first coordinated offensive; demonstrates coordination as a superior principle to simultaneity.

Scott's operational art (10/05/2010) - Review of the complexity and dynamics at work in Scott's first coordinated offensive.

Scott's operational art (10/06/2010) - Describes the fruits of Scott's victorious first coordinated offensive in terms of benefits and how these influenced the second offensive.

Scott's operational art (10/08/2010) - Sketches stark differences between Scott's second coordinated offensive and his first.

Scott's operational art (10/21/2010) - Analyzes the fundamentally mistaken concepts Scott tried to implement in his second offensive and by which his subordinates were judged.

Scott's operational art (12/01/2010) - Reviews failures of Scott and Patterson in the Valley during Scott's second offensive with an emphasis on military management.

Scott's bad example to Lincoln - lists hypothetical lessons learned from Scott's 1861 campaigns that seem to inform Lincoln's subsequent military thinking and behavior.

Scott's bad example to Lincoln

Having traveled this far in the analysis of Scott's late-career, early-ACW operational art, we would be remiss if we did not consider the effects on Lincoln of this primary schooling in war.

It is in no way fair to hold Winfield Scott responsible for lessons mislearned by Lincoln, nevertheless I have long felt that Lincoln's bizarre military management owed much to misapplying what he thought he saw during Scott's two offensives, the first of the war that he could observe from headquarters.

Like one of Konrad Lorenz's newborn ducklings, Lincoln was (I think) "impressed" at the right moment in his learning curve with a lot of "wrong" data.

This is obviously speculative but I have found it convincing and useful over the last 15 years. We all agree that Lincoln was a learner and we should agree that Scott's example offered lessons. This is a list of things Lincoln (I believe) might have surmised as reflected in presidential decisions taken later in '61 and '62:

(1) Campaigns can be run from an office in Washington using telegraph, mail, and couriers.

(2) To be more effective than Scott's conditional orders, movements need a time peg: synchronization.

(3) The relief of high commanders deserves no contingent preparation and no coordination.

(4) A single failure offers sufficient grounds for summary dismissal of high commanders.

(5) The state of a force can be adequately surmised from reports and letters.

(6) The state of ground can adequately be surmised from maps.

(7) Subordinates can appreciate the commander's intent at great distances with minimal input.

(8) Logistics is not much of a factor in campaigning.

(9) There is no military reason for one force to get away from another without harm.

(10) Harm inflicted offers more political benefit than the bloodless taking of strategic points.

Scott did not mean to set a military example in his first offensives - that's not my charge - he made accommodations given his condition, lack of staff, and a few personal (non-military) predilictions. They represented expedients that inadvertently set a horrible example for the new president. Scott compensated for his own accommodations and expediencies with a store of military knowledge the president did not have.

I wonder if each point here speaks for itself or if illustrations of Lincoln's decisions need to be recapitulated.